Not so fast, Airbus!

[Cobra17]

Yeah, ask the guard and res. guys....give me a break. As a guy that flew tankers 15 yrs on ACTIVE duty...

Sorry...I guess I just found that quote to be a little bit arrogant and a lot of bit offensive to every guard and reserve unit.

...

Background
Air Mobility Command manages an inventory of more than 481 Stratotankers, of which the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard fly 294 in support of AMC's mission.

http://www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?fsID=110

...


But I guess it is ridiculous to consult with 61% of the fleet on what aircraft should replace it.

 

["Luke"]

These guys do a fine job, and I've never heard them complain. I guess they are all retired military anyway.
http://www.omegaairrefueling.com/vms/

 

[stupidpilot]

Yeah right I am the new guy working 7 days a week and they are the old heads working 2 days a month and two weeks a summer.....

And flying most every day the rest of the month at their civilian jobs. So I'm afraid the man was right. Most guard/reserve unit guys have quite a bit more flight time than the AD guys.

 

[Cobra17]

I'm all for civilian tankers, but not sure about the complexities with them flying in the AOR, especially when the bad guy pops open our first can of whoop ass.

Anyways, don't mean to hijack the thread, but I need to give props to the groundpounders. What we do is a joke compared to their sacrifice. God bless them all.

http://www.stripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=60825&archive=true

 

[Benhuntn]

Yep, you got me there. I just remember the many guard units on their way to Oman during the first gulf and how they turned around and went to Jiddah because it was a much nicer place. I also remember how they would deploy for two weeks and then go home while the AD stayed and flew. (By the way they required two days rest on each end of the deployment for time change). I remember crews making a 2nd or 3rd trip to the desert and the Lt Col's were absent. After years of flying in the US the said I think I will pass on this war.

I say let the active duty guys decide what to fly and they can pass their equipment down to the guard/reserve. Then everyone will be happy. The guard with their high time pilots can fly those old tankers that got them so much experience.

 

["Luke"]

I'm all for civilian tankers, but not sure about the complexities with them flying in the AOR, especially when the bad guy pops open our first can of whoop ass.

Anyways, don't mean to hijack the thread, but I need to give props to the groundpounders. What we do is a joke compared to their sacrifice. God bless them all.

http://www.stripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=60825&archive=true

Your right. How many Army air assets have been shot down (or severly shot up) by direct fire vs the Air Force?

 

[SIG600]

Can we just build new KC-10's? Tons of gas, and big fluffy baskets.

 

[JFReservist]

Wait... I thought the Airbus could do the job.

For those who say sc^ew Boeing, why don't you actually take a look the facts, and both jets' capabilities? Also included in the GAO report (extract below) was the requirement for a KC-135 replacement, not the KC-10 (which an A-330 sized jet would be). I'm sorry to say that AF procurement doesn't have the best name right now, as GAO sided with Boeing on all of their protests. After the Lease debacle, Boeing initially proposed the KC-777 as well as the KC-767, but the USAF declined as the recapitalization effort was for the KC-135. Again, if you are balming the boys in Everett for not having a new tanker, you would be wrong.



KC-30 Overrun and Breakaway Capability

Boeing also complains that the Air Force did not reasonably assess the capability of Northrop Grumman’s proposed aircraft to refuel all current Air Force fixed-wing tanker-compatible aircraft using current Air Force procedures, as required by a KPP No. 1 threshold under the aerial refueling area of the key system requirements subfactor.[54] See RFP, SRD sect. 3.2.10.1.1.9. Specifically, Boeing notes that current Air Force refueling procedures require that the tanker aircraft be capable of “overrun” and “breakaway” procedures when necessary, which would require the tanker aircraft to fly faster than the receiver aircraft or quickly accelerate during refueling.[55] Boeing’s Second Supplemental Protest at 29. Boeing contends that the Air Force unreasonably determined that Northrop Grumman’s proposed aircraft would meet these requirements.

With regard to the overrun issue, the record shows that Northrop Grumman was twice informed by the Air Force during discussions that the firm’s initially identified maximum operational airspeed of [Deleted] Knots Indicated Air Speed (KIAS) would not be sufficient under current Air Force overrun procedures to achieve required overrun speeds of [Deleted] KIAS for various fighter aircraft, including the [Deleted], or [Deleted] KIAS for the [Deleted].[56] See AR, Tab 184, EN NPG-MC1-003, at 2; EN NPG-MC1-003a, at 1-2. Ultimately, Northrop Grumman informed the Air Force that a [Deleted] limited the aircraft’s operational speed, but that Northrop Grumman proposed to include a [Deleted] to achieve the necessary overrun speed.[57] See id., Northrop Grumman Response to EN NPG‑MC1‑003a, at 2-7. The Air Force accepted Northrop Grumman’s proposed solution as satisfying this KPP threshold. HT at 628.

Boeing complains that Northrop Grumman’s proposed solution of [Deleted] to achieve overrun speed requires [Deleted], which is not consistent with the Air Force’s current procedures as is required by the KPP.[58] See Boeing’s Second Supplemental Protest at 29-32; Boeing’s Comments at 64. Boeing also argues that the agency did not note that Northrop Grumman qualified its promise to increase its maximum operational airspeed in its EN response. Specifically, Boeing points out that Northrop Grumman stated that, [Deleted], the KC‑30 had a maximum airspeed of [Deleted] KIAS, and not the [Deleted] KIAS evaluated by the Air Force. See AR, Tab 184, Northrop Grumman Response to EN NPG-MC1-003a, at 9.

At the hearing that our Office conducted in this protest, the Air Force produced its SSET mission capability factor team chief to testify regarding the agency’s evaluation of the capability of Northrop Grumman’s aircraft to satisfy this KPP threshold.[59] This witness, in response to direct examination, stated that the SSET found that [Deleted] would allow the KC-30 to achieve the necessary airspeed to perform the required overrun and breakaway procedures. Specifically, he testified that the SSET was convinced that, by [Deleted], the KC-30 could achieve an operational airspeed of [Deleted] KIAS, because Northrop Grumman had informed the agency in its EN response that the commercial A330 aircraft had a maximum “dive velocity”[60] of 365 KIAS and had been flight tested to a dive velocity of [Deleted] KIAS, and that analysis had been done showing that the A330 could even achieve a dive velocity of [Deleted] KIAS. HT at 626-27. The mission capability factor team chief testified that the SSET evaluated Northrop Grumman’s response to indicate that the [Deleted], see HT at 637-38, and that in any event Air Force current procedures did not require the use of the [Deleted] during aerial refueling operations. HT at 638-39.

From this record, we cannot conclude that the Air Force reasonably evaluated the capability of Northrop Grumman’s proposed aircraft to satisfy the KPP threshold requirement to refuel all current Air Force fixed-wing tanker-compatible aircraft using current Air Force procedures. The contemporaneous record, as explained by the hearing testimony, does not establish that the Air Force understood Northrop Grumman’s response in discussions concerning its ability to satisfy the solicitation requirements, nor does it demonstrate that the agency had a reasonable basis upon which to accept Northrop Grumman’s promises of compliance.

 

[Steeler Fan]

What are you basing that on?

The A-10 refueling thing may be based on speed--KC-10s had a relatively hard time with A-10s as well...same to a lesser degree with C-130s. It was awhile ago, but I do remember that those 2 acft had the slowest A/R speeds for us. Because of that, our higher AOA resulted in some pretty serious bowwave problems for both. Combine that with an A-10 fully loaded with stuff and you get the picture.

*In terms of actual facts, I have nothing to bring to the table at this time (except that the Steelers have won 5 Super Bowls!)

 

[JFReservist]

more from GAO

more about the AF procurement incompetence:

First, we agree with Boeing that the SSET erred in concluding that the [Deleted] in tanker refueling operations was not a current Air Force procedure.[61] See HT at 638, 735; Air Force’s Post-Hearing Comments at 19. As noted above, the contemporaneous evaluation record shows that the agency interpreted the solicitation requirement to comply with “current [Air Force] procedures” to mean compliance with the procedures set forth in the agency’s flight manuals for the KC‑135 and KC-10 tanker aircraft, and expressly informed Northrop Grumman during discussions that the flight manuals for the KC-135 and KC-10 established the current Air Force procedures for refueling operations. See AR, Tab 184, EN NPG‑MC1-003a, at 1, wherein the agency stated “[a]erial refueling procedures were contained in T.O. 1-1C-1-3 and 1-1C-1-33 for the KC-135 and KC-10 respectively when the RFP was released.”[62] These manuals show that current Air Force procedures provide that tanker pilots [Deleted] in refueling operations. For example, the KC-135 manual under Section IV, Air Refueling Procedures, warns tanker pilots that they “must be prepared to assume aircraft control [Deleted],” and under Section V, Emergency Air Refueling Procedures, instructs tanker pilots that in a breakaway situation, if a climb is required, they must “[Deleted].” See AR, Tab 289, Flight Manual KC-135 (Tanker) Flight Crew Air Refueling Procedures, Supp. III, T.O. 1-1C-1-3, Jan. 1, 1987, as revised Sept. 1, 2004, at [Deleted]. Similarly, the KC‑10 flight manual provides under Section III, Air Refueling Procedures, that the “[Deleted].” Id., Flight Manual, KC-10A Aircraft, Flight Crew Tanker Air Refueling Procedures, USAF Series, T.O. 1‑1C-1-33, Sept. 1, 2002, as revised Jan. 31, 2005, at [Deleted]. In this regard, Boeing provided the statement of a retired Air Force pilot, who had extensive experience as both a KC-10 and KC-135 tanker pilot and had operated each aircraft as both a tanker and a receiver in refueling missions; this individual stated:

Refueling is more demanding and difficult for both tanker and receiver aircraft if the tanker [Deleted]. For the tanker pilot, [Deleted]. For the receiver pilot, [Deleted]. Due to these realities, existing refueling guidelines dictate that [Deleted] should be used for refueling under normal circumstances. [Citations omitted.] Beginning aerial refueling [Deleted] should it become necessary, violates this policy. As previously noted, [Deleted].
Boeing’s Comments, attach. 14, Declaration of Retired Air Force Pilot, at 3-4. Although the Air Force and Northrop Grumman generally disagree with Boeing’s consultant that the Air Force’s current procedures provide for the [Deleted], neither the agency or intervenor have directed our attention to anything in the KC‑135 or KC‑10 flight manuals or to any other source that would establish that Boeing’s view, which appears to be reasonable on its face, is in error.

We also find unsupported the agency’s conclusion that Northrop Grumman’s proposed solution of [Deleted] did not also involve [Deleted]. In its EN response, Northrop Grumman informed the Air Force that 330 KIAS was the normal design maximum operating velocity of the commercial A330 aircraft, and that “selection of a [maximum operating velocity] drives overall design characteristics of the aircraft, specifically aerodynamic and structural design limits, handling quality definition, and thrust.” See AR, Tab 184, Northrop Grumman Response to EN NPG‑MC1-003a, at 2. Northrop Grumman explained that its [Deleted] limited the aircraft to its maximum operating velocity, but that the firm could [Deleted] to exceed the maximum operating velocity. The awardee then stated “three cases . . . to illustrate the performance of the KC-30 with and without [Deleted].” Id. at 3. The three cases that Northrop Grumman identified and separately described were (1) KC-30 [Deleted]; (2) KC-30 [Deleted]; and (3) KC-30 [Deleted], which indicated that the KC-30 could only meet the overrun requirement under the third case where both the [Deleted]. Id. at 3-6.

The SSET read, as described by the testimony of its mission capability factor team chief, Northrop Grumman’s EN response to describe a “fourth case” (although not identified as such) under the “third case” heading, but located at the end of that section, where, the agency contends, the KC‑30’s [Deleted] but the [Deleted]. See HT at 664. However, we are unable to accept such a reading of Northrop Grumman’s EN response. It ignores the logical structure of Northrop Grumman’s response to the agency, which only identified and described three cases. Moreover, nowhere in its response to the agency’s EN does Northrop Grumman suggest a “fourth case” where the [Deleted]; rather, the only reference to both the [Deleted] in the third case expressly states that the [Deleted] (“Case 3: KC-30 [Deleted]”).[63] See AR, Tab 184, Northrop Grumman Response to EN NPG‑MC1-003a, at 6. In any event, given the uncertainty surrounding the agency’s interpretation of Northrop Grumman’s solution to a matter the agency believed could render the firm’s proposal unacceptable, see HT at 625, 649, this is something the agency should have continued to clarify and resolve during discussions with the firm.[64]

Even apart from the agency’s apparent misreading of Northrop Grumman’s EN response and disregard of the current Air Force procedure to [Deleted], the record does not establish that the agency had a reasonable basis for concluding that Northrop Grumman’s proposed solution would allow its aircraft to obtain the requisite overrun airspeeds to satisfy this KPP threshold. The witness that the Air Force produced to support its arguments on this point testified that the SSET had concluded that the KC-30 had the “inherent capability” of reaching airspeeds greater than [Deleted] KIAS (the aircraft’s certified maximum operational airspeed) based upon the far greater airspeed ([Deleted] KIAS) identified by the firm for its certified dive velocity.[65] See HT at 624-28; Air Force’s Post-Hearing Comments at 17‑18. In this regard, the SSET apparently believed that simply [Deleted] would enable the aircraft to achieve its indicated dive velocity airspeed as its operational airspeed.

Although the SSET mission capability factor team chief repeatedly testified that the dive speed indicated that the aircraft would have the structural ability to fly at the dive speed limitation, see, e.g., HT at 674, he also admitted under cross examination that he did not know what the relationship was between maximum operating airspeed and design dive speed:

Q: What’s your understanding of what the general margin is between maximum operational velocity and dive velocity?
A: I’m not aware.
Q: Was there somebody on your team that was advising you about what the general margin is or difference is between maximum operational velocity and dive velocity?
A: There could have been. We had advisors for handling qualities.
Q: I know you had advisors. I’m asking you, were there any advisors who actually helped you with understanding the difference between dive velocity and maximum operational velocity?
A: They did not help me, no.
Q: Did they help the team?
A: Not that I’m aware of.
HT at 669-70. The SSET mission capability factor team chief’s (and presumably the SSET’s) lack of knowledge concerning the relationship between maximum operating airspeed and design dive airspeed[66] is particularly troubling given the definition of maximum operating limit speed in FAA’s regulations:

The maximum operating limit speed . . . is a speed that may not be deliberately exceeded in any regime of flight (climb, cruise, or descent), unless a higher speed is authorized for flight test or pilot training operations. [The maximum operating limit speed] must be established so that it is not greater than the design cruising speed . . . and so that it is sufficiently below [dive speed and velocity] to make it highly improbable that the latter speeds will be inadvertently exceeded in operations.




Incompetence is what lost the KC-X bid.