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Pilot Errors
I should have been a bit clearer. The fuel selector problem was not the student's fault. Three other minor incidents were caused by the student's lack of judgment and unwillingness to accept instruction.
The combination led us to refuse further instruction until he decided he was ready to train and passed an interview with the chief instructor.
For the rest of the students and instructors, we had a long discussion at our biweekly meetings about complacency. If something doesn't work as it used to, we need to know so we can fix it. Airplanes give warnings before they fail. We also switched mechanics.
All of a sudden, the little squawks appeared in the book and people started calling immediately after a flight with a problem appearing in flight. The increased attention has found a cracked primer line, an alternator causing a high frequency harmonic with about 1 hour before the spinner and prop departed the airplane, a hydraulic leak in a landing gear system, four failed flight instruments, and mostly unusuable shoulder harnesses. Both aircraft owners had large shop bills last month, neither are complaining too much as a wrecked airplane would cost more. This month all three aircraft are set to make their target of 60 hours each and 20 in the complex.
Fly SAFE!
Jedi Nein
I should have been a bit clearer. The fuel selector problem was not the student's fault. Three other minor incidents were caused by the student's lack of judgment and unwillingness to accept instruction.
The combination led us to refuse further instruction until he decided he was ready to train and passed an interview with the chief instructor.
For the rest of the students and instructors, we had a long discussion at our biweekly meetings about complacency. If something doesn't work as it used to, we need to know so we can fix it. Airplanes give warnings before they fail. We also switched mechanics.
All of a sudden, the little squawks appeared in the book and people started calling immediately after a flight with a problem appearing in flight. The increased attention has found a cracked primer line, an alternator causing a high frequency harmonic with about 1 hour before the spinner and prop departed the airplane, a hydraulic leak in a landing gear system, four failed flight instruments, and mostly unusuable shoulder harnesses. Both aircraft owners had large shop bills last month, neither are complaining too much as a wrecked airplane would cost more. This month all three aircraft are set to make their target of 60 hours each and 20 in the complex.
Fly SAFE!
Jedi Nein
Pardon me for butting in, but I can't resist some observations and general comments. Caveat: It's been quite a while since I've given any instruction in light aircraft, but its also been a very long time since I started flying for a living. I'm still alive and that should be every pilot's ultimate goal.
Some things to consider:
1) More "accidents" occur in training than anywhere else. Particularly multi-engine training. Practicing emergencies is more dangerous than real emergencies in many cases.
2) Loss of an engine in a Part 23 twin is definitely an emergency. If it happens for real, declare it immediately without hesitation. If it happens to you, don't stop flying the aircraft until it has stopped moving (preferably on the airport, but anywhere).
3) Most if not all Part 23 aircraft (twins) have very poor single engine performance. They are not "required" by the certification rules to be able to actually climb on one engine and most can't (assuming GTW). This is seldom taught in the initial ME training phase. Learn it yourself and then pass it on to everyone you work with.
Note: flying around the airport (or trying to) on one engine when you have a sink rate of 50 ft/min. or a climb rate of 50 ft/min is not a productive exercise and probably will not increase your longevity.
4) Most (not all) "multi-engine instructors" have very little flying experience and even less multi-engine experience. Most (including the "experienced ones") have never had a real engine failure (thanks to strong engines) in a light twin. In general terms, its the classic "blind leading the blind" scenario. I'm not demeaning anyone or depreciating anyone, it's just a statement of fact. I was in the same category at one point.
5) The total and sudden loss of all power on one of your 2 engines, is a very rare event in the real world. Most engine failures give advance warning of some sort, which often goes unnoticed. This is seldom emphasized in initial multi-engine training programs. Teach situational awarness. It will do more to increase a pilots longevity by avoiding emergencies than you'll ever teach by practicing them.
6) Lot's of emphasis is often misplaced on the student's "quick response" to a "sudden failure", with a memorized sequence of reactions or routine, all coming under what I call the guise, of "immediate action". The truth is the best "immediate" response you can have, is no response at all. Take your time and fly the airplane. With the exception of a pre Vmc or pre V1 failure (which always mandates an immediate abort, there is time to deal with inflight failures. Slow down. There's little worse than shutting down and feathering the prop on an engine that can still develop 60% of rated power, just becuase you hastily completed a routine of unnecessary "immediate action". There's lots of evidence in twisted aluminium, ashes and body bags to substantiate the results of a feathered prop when the only thing that failed was a turbocharger.
7) In most cases, a total failure of one engine on takeoff (after airborne) in a light twin operating at max gross weight is going to require an off airport landing and preclude a "turn back" to the airport, just like it does in a single-engine aircraft. The failure to teach this reality has resulted in a lot of "loss of control" accidents in light ME aircraft following engine failure on takeoff (whether the failure was real or began as a simulated exercise gone bad). ME instructors in light twins need to teach student pilots how to survive the loss of power on takeoff, not how to attempt to make the airplane do what it cannot do. This includes "cabin class" twins like the Navajo and Cessnas 421 or similar types.
8) Teach your students (and yourself) to develop a plan of action, in the event of power loss, BEFORE takeoff power is applied. This is essential. There is very seldom anything "unexpected or sudden" that happens in an airplane, when it's pilot has planned ahead. If you know the failure is coming on EVERY takeoff, its a lot easier to deal with it when it does happen. The moral is a simple one ..... no surprises. That's how you get gray hair and the chance to retire.
9) Forget the so-called realism idea (refer to #5). It isn't going to be "sudden and unexpected" if you've complied with #8. Don't simulate loss of power by creating a real loss of power at low altitudes (below 3,000 agl). Don't cut mixtures and don't cut fuel selectors close to the ground. Its not healthy and there is no need for the sake of realism. Don't do it. If what you do and say to the student is correct, you can use the throttle for every simulation with all the realism required. Safety is number one. Practice that first and the realism will take care of itself.
How long is this initial ME training going to last anyway, 10 hours? By the time the new ME pilot has 100 hours of multi time he/she will have forgotten most of what you taught in those 10 hours anyway (unless they're trying to teach it to somebody else), particularly if you focus on the wrong stuff. How you simulate power loss is not important from a training standpoint, therefore you should use the safest possible method and that does NOT include fuel selectors OR mixture controls (at low altitudes) and should not include fuel selectors at higher altitudes (where mixture is fine). By the time you get to where you need more "realism" you'll be using good simulators, which is the only place this sort of russian roulette should occur.
10) At some point, you do have to go through a complete shutdown and restart in flight. Explain to the student that it will NOT be the same in every type and, perhaps more importantly, if you have a real engine failure you're not going to be restarting anything. This is an academic exercise and should be treated as such. Before you do it, know your particular airplane and know what it takes to unfeather that propeller. There's always a good possibility that you won't be able to do it (in some types). When you rehearse this, decide where you're going to make your single engine landing BEFORE you begin the exercise. Plan ahead.
In many, many years of doing this flying thing for a living, I've only had one (1) partial loss of power in a light twin (Queen Air), many engine shutdowns (precautionary due to partial failures) in large (round engine) recips and several engine failures (including cylinders exiting through the cowling) in large recip engines. A few precautionary shutdowns in turbine engines and only one (1) engine failure in a turbine powerplant. Many thousands of hours (more than shown in the profile) are included.
The bottom line is simple. Don't kill your student (or yourself) trying to be "realistic" in how an engine fails. Teach your students to think, to plan ahead and to use good judgement. That way you'll both grow old. This profession isn't about heroics or theatrics. Don't use them as training tools.
Finally, when you learn of examiners or FAA types that are into heroics, use somebody else. Examiners that need to "prove" anything, especially their expertise, should be avoided like the plague that they are.
Fly safe.
Some things to consider:
1) More "accidents" occur in training than anywhere else. Particularly multi-engine training. Practicing emergencies is more dangerous than real emergencies in many cases.
2) Loss of an engine in a Part 23 twin is definitely an emergency. If it happens for real, declare it immediately without hesitation. If it happens to you, don't stop flying the aircraft until it has stopped moving (preferably on the airport, but anywhere).
3) Most if not all Part 23 aircraft (twins) have very poor single engine performance. They are not "required" by the certification rules to be able to actually climb on one engine and most can't (assuming GTW). This is seldom taught in the initial ME training phase. Learn it yourself and then pass it on to everyone you work with.
Note: flying around the airport (or trying to) on one engine when you have a sink rate of 50 ft/min. or a climb rate of 50 ft/min is not a productive exercise and probably will not increase your longevity.
4) Most (not all) "multi-engine instructors" have very little flying experience and even less multi-engine experience. Most (including the "experienced ones") have never had a real engine failure (thanks to strong engines) in a light twin. In general terms, its the classic "blind leading the blind" scenario. I'm not demeaning anyone or depreciating anyone, it's just a statement of fact. I was in the same category at one point.
5) The total and sudden loss of all power on one of your 2 engines, is a very rare event in the real world. Most engine failures give advance warning of some sort, which often goes unnoticed. This is seldom emphasized in initial multi-engine training programs. Teach situational awarness. It will do more to increase a pilots longevity by avoiding emergencies than you'll ever teach by practicing them.
6) Lot's of emphasis is often misplaced on the student's "quick response" to a "sudden failure", with a memorized sequence of reactions or routine, all coming under what I call the guise, of "immediate action". The truth is the best "immediate" response you can have, is no response at all. Take your time and fly the airplane. With the exception of a pre Vmc or pre V1 failure (which always mandates an immediate abort, there is time to deal with inflight failures. Slow down. There's little worse than shutting down and feathering the prop on an engine that can still develop 60% of rated power, just becuase you hastily completed a routine of unnecessary "immediate action". There's lots of evidence in twisted aluminium, ashes and body bags to substantiate the results of a feathered prop when the only thing that failed was a turbocharger.
7) In most cases, a total failure of one engine on takeoff (after airborne) in a light twin operating at max gross weight is going to require an off airport landing and preclude a "turn back" to the airport, just like it does in a single-engine aircraft. The failure to teach this reality has resulted in a lot of "loss of control" accidents in light ME aircraft following engine failure on takeoff (whether the failure was real or began as a simulated exercise gone bad). ME instructors in light twins need to teach student pilots how to survive the loss of power on takeoff, not how to attempt to make the airplane do what it cannot do. This includes "cabin class" twins like the Navajo and Cessnas 421 or similar types.
8) Teach your students (and yourself) to develop a plan of action, in the event of power loss, BEFORE takeoff power is applied. This is essential. There is very seldom anything "unexpected or sudden" that happens in an airplane, when it's pilot has planned ahead. If you know the failure is coming on EVERY takeoff, its a lot easier to deal with it when it does happen. The moral is a simple one ..... no surprises. That's how you get gray hair and the chance to retire.
9) Forget the so-called realism idea (refer to #5). It isn't going to be "sudden and unexpected" if you've complied with #8. Don't simulate loss of power by creating a real loss of power at low altitudes (below 3,000 agl). Don't cut mixtures and don't cut fuel selectors close to the ground. Its not healthy and there is no need for the sake of realism. Don't do it. If what you do and say to the student is correct, you can use the throttle for every simulation with all the realism required. Safety is number one. Practice that first and the realism will take care of itself.
How long is this initial ME training going to last anyway, 10 hours? By the time the new ME pilot has 100 hours of multi time he/she will have forgotten most of what you taught in those 10 hours anyway (unless they're trying to teach it to somebody else), particularly if you focus on the wrong stuff. How you simulate power loss is not important from a training standpoint, therefore you should use the safest possible method and that does NOT include fuel selectors OR mixture controls (at low altitudes) and should not include fuel selectors at higher altitudes (where mixture is fine). By the time you get to where you need more "realism" you'll be using good simulators, which is the only place this sort of russian roulette should occur.
10) At some point, you do have to go through a complete shutdown and restart in flight. Explain to the student that it will NOT be the same in every type and, perhaps more importantly, if you have a real engine failure you're not going to be restarting anything. This is an academic exercise and should be treated as such. Before you do it, know your particular airplane and know what it takes to unfeather that propeller. There's always a good possibility that you won't be able to do it (in some types). When you rehearse this, decide where you're going to make your single engine landing BEFORE you begin the exercise. Plan ahead.
In many, many years of doing this flying thing for a living, I've only had one (1) partial loss of power in a light twin (Queen Air), many engine shutdowns (precautionary due to partial failures) in large (round engine) recips and several engine failures (including cylinders exiting through the cowling) in large recip engines. A few precautionary shutdowns in turbine engines and only one (1) engine failure in a turbine powerplant. Many thousands of hours (more than shown in the profile) are included.
The bottom line is simple. Don't kill your student (or yourself) trying to be "realistic" in how an engine fails. Teach your students to think, to plan ahead and to use good judgement. That way you'll both grow old. This profession isn't about heroics or theatrics. Don't use them as training tools.
Finally, when you learn of examiners or FAA types that are into heroics, use somebody else. Examiners that need to "prove" anything, especially their expertise, should be avoided like the plague that they are.
Fly safe.
Timebuilder
Entrepreneur
- Joined
- Nov 25, 2001
- Posts
- 4,625
Good advice.
It's nice to hear someone else preach about safety in multi training. All of our single engine work (with engine shutdown) was within easy range of the airport, and beginning at 3,000 to 4,000 AGL.
We also used two FAA reprints in our school:
Flying Light Twins Safely
Always Leave Yourself an Out
They're good reading that can save your life.
It's nice to hear someone else preach about safety in multi training. All of our single engine work (with engine shutdown) was within easy range of the airport, and beginning at 3,000 to 4,000 AGL.
We also used two FAA reprints in our school:
Flying Light Twins Safely
Always Leave Yourself an Out
They're good reading that can save your life.
bobbysamd
Well-known member
- Joined
- Nov 26, 2001
- Posts
- 5,710
Good points above
Us, too. We used the two FAA handouts.
Really,what ME instructors have to stress is an engine loss in a light twin might give you more time to determine alternatives than an engine loss in a single. In a single, your checklist is the ABC's; Airspeed (best glide), Best place to land, and Carb heat. In a light twin that loses an engine after takeoff, your procedure really isn't much different than a single. You may have to consider an off-airport landing. You may not have the performance (especially in Prescott on a hot day) to make it around. Your pattern may get too wide, especially with all the shallow turns and trying to climb.
Good discussion. Multi and instruments were my two favorite areas of instruction.
Us, too. We used the two FAA handouts.
Really,what ME instructors have to stress is an engine loss in a light twin might give you more time to determine alternatives than an engine loss in a single. In a single, your checklist is the ABC's; Airspeed (best glide), Best place to land, and Carb heat. In a light twin that loses an engine after takeoff, your procedure really isn't much different than a single. You may have to consider an off-airport landing. You may not have the performance (especially in Prescott on a hot day) to make it around. Your pattern may get too wide, especially with all the shallow turns and trying to climb.
Good discussion. Multi and instruments were my two favorite areas of instruction.
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