The legacy of morning tv talk shows
LoveGun said:
If core lock is an issue with the CRJ-200 engines, bombardier and GE need to address the problem.
Bombardier does address it. Starting in the
mid-1980s, each CF34 engine except for spare engines is flight tested for core lock. Tight engines undergo an in-flight
seal "grind in" procedure. Engines that fail this flight test are returned to General Electric. The right engine on 3701 was a spare and had not been flight tested for core lock, but the left engine was tested before delivery. As others have mentioned, the left engine didn't fail to restart because of core lock, it failed to restart because the high pressure turbine was melted by an extreme overtemperature condition caused/uncorrected by the crew. Core lock is caused by interaction between shafts and seals. See:
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0UBT/is_2005_June_27/ai_n14713922/pg_2
LoveGun said:
How is it that we have hundreds of CRJ type rated pilots that don't even know what core lock is?
Many mainline pilots have been complaining in recent years that the technical information made available to them by their company is becoming more and more limited. As a technically oriented pilot, I am sometimes frustrated by this also. Sometimes I just want to know more, or more detail. So for many, having access to this type of information would be a good thing. On the other hand, I can see why airlines are prioritizing what information is provided during training, and that as a practical matter they can only cover the essentials unless the length of training increases beyond what is reasonable.
The limitations for the CRJ define a minimum airspeed to be maintained in the event of a flameout. The purpose of the limitation is to maintain N2 rotation and prevent the possibility of core lock in the flamed out engine. In this sense, training
does cover core lock, by teaching adherence to this airspeed limitation. The technical reason for the limitation might not be explained in detail, and some of us would find it very interesting if it was, but it should not be necessary to
justify a limitation to get pilots to follow it. Where would you draw the line? I think it is reasonable to rely on an airline pilot to have a sufficiently mature and responsible attitude that
persuading him/her to follow the published limitations isn't necessary. Given the immature behavior exhibited by the 3701 flight crew, perhaps that is what needs to be addressed, at the hiring level.
LoveGun said:
Also, high altitude flight was covered only briefly in our CRJ training. Granted the argument coud be made that if you're captain of a jet you should have an understanding of high altitude flight,
Anyone without an understanding of high altitude flight has no business in the cockpit of a jet, and certainly not in the command seat. Because it is common to all high altitude flight, this is not a subject that is appropriate to a particular transport jet type and does not belong in type training where it would only take valuable time away from type specific subject areas. It's general knowledge that should be brought
to the class.
LoveGun said:
but there is also a responsibilty on the part of examiners to assure that whoever was/is CRJ typed is familiar with high altitiude ops.
I agree that all examiners should be
checking for this. There is also some responsibility on the pilot here, if you don't know this area hit the books before or during your type rating, don't wait to be spoon fed general airmanship.
LoveGun said:
A lot of blame can be focused on the pilots for this accident, but also the finger can be pointed at the manufacturer, the training dept, and airline management.
This is like a drunk driver trying to avoid responsibility by blaming the bartender for serving him. The airspeed limitation in the event of an engine flame-out was published and trained, and ignored by the 3701 flight crew. How is this anyone elses fault? Not to mention all the other dangerous and immature acts that the DFDR and CVR revealed that led up to this crash.
LoveGun said:
Anyone that had a hand in allowing those pilots to fly a CRJ is suspect.
One more thing we agree on. These idiots, especially the CA but also the FO for not being assertive and putting a stop to the CA's dangerous antics, should have been weeded out of the system long before they got to the cockpit of a CRJ. The real problem was their lack of maturity and adolescent attitude. This crash, as someone else said so aptly was "self induced". They were not victims of anything external, except perhaps failed parenting that didn't instill a sufficient level of responsibility and maturity before these kids left home. Lying to ATC to conceal their second engine failure says it all. Hopefully if there is another crew out there like this one, this crash might be an eye opener that gives them a clue in time.