SkyBoy1981 said:
Every now and then I fly with a dud that has the personality of a brick....they never hear me say much of anything really, let alone "dude". These types are usually so full of themselves that they really have no life or personality outside of the "Captain" figure that they try to be when they are in the cockpit. Carrying on any type of conversation with these people outside of flying airplanes is next to impossible. It seems to me that you could be one of these people. Loosen up "dude".
SkyBoy, I think your comments are WAY out of line! This isn’t about who’s a dud and who isn’t, and it’s not about “loosening up” either. Tony’s right about the attitude. I’ve been talking about this sort of thing for YEARS and I’m often roundly criticized for it but this accident proves my point in spades. The bottom line is that how you conduct yourself matters, especially when the chips are down. This flight wasn’t conducted well AT ALL!
Have you taken a look at the pilot histories in the NTSBs findings? Have you taken a look at the CVR transcript? Before you chastise anyone for “being a dud” again make sure you do so. They are very revealing indeed.
By my count Captain Rhodes had to have taken at least thirteen checkrides in his life. He failed SIX of them. How’s that for attitude. He failed them for a variety of reasons, but fail them he did. The evidence suggests that on more than one occasion these failures were due to a lack of preparation. I’d say attitude plays a role there.
One of his upgrade instructors in the CRJ had concerns about the way he ran his cockpit – concerns that were borne out in this accident. He misidentified checklists repeatedly during this instructor’s time with him and he repeatedly called for the wrong checklists.
I suppose you could say about all this that he just didn’t perform well in stressful situations. Maybe someone should have insisted on improvement in that area. He might be alive today if they had.
Think about this for a minute: Rhodes, the PILOT IN COMMAND, got up out of his seat and went to get drinks in an airplane that was behind the power curve and slipping further into the rut they were in as they spoke. He left a pilot with 761 hours TOTAL TIME alone in the cockpit watching a critical situation he’d never seen before continue to deteriorate. To have done this, he either didn’t care what was happening to his airplane or he didn’t recognize what was going on. Which do you think is more likely?
I’ve said it before and I’ll say it again now – going to FL410 was an experiment for these guys. The CVR proves it – they could hardly believe their eyes from the time they got there to the time they crashed. They couldn’t have known what awaited them there. That makes it an experiment.
Once they had their problem going it took a minute and seventeen seconds from the time the cabin pressure warning went off to the time that someone said something about putting on a mask. That someone was NOT Captain Rhodes. But HE should have been the first one to understand the importance of doing so. Anyone whose thought through a double flameout knows it’s one of the first things you need to do if you don’t get an immediate relight.
Five minutes and forty-five seconds after the first mention of oxygen masks there seems to be evidence that the first officer still hadn’t put on oxygen. From that point until removal of the masks, the FO is out of the picture – all of the pilot speech comes from INT-1 – Captain Rhodes’ interphone. Also during that time he works the problem by himself as he tries to figure out why his FO isn’t responding to him.
They came down trying to get things going again and Captain Rhodes did EXACTLY the wrong thing – he slowed down despite having been told that he needed 300 knots or greater a to achieve an airstart and that significant altitude loss could be expected. He repeats the slow airspeed mantra right down to 13,000’.
Someone wasn’t paying attention in class. Or maybe he just wasn’t familiar with publications related to flight in the CL-65. He busted a checkride for a similar lack of familiarity with applicable publications before on his CFII ride.
If that’s not indicative of a lack of a serious attitude I don’t know what is. And you know what? Folks that can think of nothing better to say than, “Dude …, “ as they begin every sentence are the people about whose attitude I worry the most. “Dude,” just tells me something that has to be PROVEN wrong when I hear it in a professional setting.
So like it or don’t. Criticize me or don’t but I’ve known I had this one spot on since the first reports started to trickle in from the NTSB.
Attitude is everything.
TIS