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GV Accident in West Palm Beach ?

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CL60,

Yes, there is an exhaustive procedure for nutcracker malfunctions in both the Quick Reference Handbook and the Flight Manual. More importantly, if you have a problem in a Gulfstream, technical assistance from the manufacturer is only a phone call away 24 hours a day worldwide. Enter a hold someplace, pick up the SATCOM, call Gulfstream, tell them the fuel you have remaining in hours and minutes, and they'll get Flight Ops, Tech Ops and the engineers that designed the system together if necessary for your conference call. The days of having to go it alone on your own are behind us.
 
GV WOW

It will be VERY interesting to see the final report on what actually happend.

The WOW system defaults to the "Air" mode at 150 AGL based on the RA (using the FWC), so unless there were multiple failures or they didn't get higher than 150 AGL, the WOW would have been in the Air Mode and the ground spoilers wouldn't have deployed until touchdown if they were armed. Also, a simple WOW failure would have been detected and displayed on the CAS and the pilot would have been able to raise the gear by pushing the Lock Release and raising the gear.

GVFlyer is exactly right about the ground affect of the beautiful wing. Landing hard in this jet is an art form. The fuel issue is also correct -- about the most they would have had on board is around 30K, plus or minus 1K. That would make an GV weigh around 80K, still 10K less than max and only 5K above max landing... something tells me the whole story will be a good lesson on CRM and checklist discipline. I like the gear pin theory.

Why were they in such a big hurry to get back on the ground? Did they have oxygen generators in the luggage compartment? If their only problem was not being able to raise the gear, they had at least 5 hours of fuel on board --with the gear down... Hurry, hurry, hurry...
 
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My guess is that the aircraft is innocent. This sounds like a case of bad maintenance procedures compounded by poor pilot practices. That is to say, someone left WOW lockouts on the aircraft following maintenance which the pilots didn't catch on preflight and then AFM procedures weren't followed in flight.

My standard brief to the other pilot is, "Don't let me screw-up, Don't hurt me, Don't get me fired."
 
It is my understanding that the aircraft had been on jacks in the hangar to investigate a gear problem that the crew had reported on a previous flight. During maintenance, the techs defeated the nutcracker switches to make the aircraft think it was on the ground for their troubleshooting. After the maintenance was completed, the aircraft was removed from the jacks but they forgot to remove the nutcracker lockout.

The gear would not retract after they took off because the nutcrackers thought they were still on the ground. On short final, the crew closed the throttles. Since the nutcrackers thought the aircraft was on the ground (with the throttles closed and nutcracker defeated) the ground spoilers deployed. The aircraft sank like a brick and struck the ground with an excessive vertical descent rate.
 
This afternoon, I spoke with a Captain who passed along the following tidbit.

Immediately after the accident, the group of mechanics that had worked on the plane were drug tested, and two failed. This, along with the defeated switches, may take some heat off the crew.

How easy is it to visually inspect the switches in question during the preflight? Is this a gross oversight?
 
Wooden sticks eyed in GV crash

by Gordon Gilbert

Wooden tongue depressors are implicated in the hard landing of a Gulfstream V last February 14 that drove the right main landing gear up through the wing, causing substantial structural damage but no injuries.

According to the NTSB, maintenance workers at General Dynamics Aviation Services (formerly a Signature maintenance center) on West Palm Beach (Fla.) International Airport put these flat wooden sticks into the landing-gear squat switches to override their function, thus simulating a gear-up configuration while the airplane is on the ground. The use of tongue depressors to make the airplane “think it’s in the air is standard practice” in the maintenance industry, according to Gulfstream. Two other manufacturers confirmed that the use of such sticks for this purpose is “fairly common.”

This procedure allows mechanics and technicians to operate and test aircraft systems and equipment that couldn’t otherwise be tested on the ground if the airplane “thinks” it’s on the ground, said Gulfstream. Gulfstream doesn’t believe that there were “remove before flight” flags on the sticks implicated in the GV incident.

Apparently, a flight crewmember or mechanic forgot to remove the sticks before the airplane took off with just the two pilots on a planned IFR flight to Teterboro (N.J.) Airport. When the crew couldn’t get the gear to retract, they decided to return to West Palm. The NTSB said that when the jet was about 50 ft over the runway entering a flare and with the thrust levers in idle, the ground spoilers deployed.

The sudden loss of lift caused the airplane to descend rapidly to the runway. According to witnesses, the airplane “bounced high,” shearing the right main landing gear aft and pushing it up through the wing before the jet settled onto the pavement. There was no major fuel spill and the airplane did not go off the runway, according to investigators. At press time, investigators were looking into why the spoilers deployed and what effect the unremoved sticks had on making the airplane “think” it was airborne.

“If written procedures in the airplane flight manual and the instrumentation in the aircraft, which was operating as intended, had been followed, the incident could have been avoided,” said a Gulfstream spokesman. “The instruments would have indicated accurately what the status of the airplane was.” He said pilots have to follow the procedures “clearly outlined in the GV’s airplane flight manual if you get certain lights and instrument readings in the cockpit.”

The spokesman clarified, “If the airplane had been operated as intended and if written procedures by both ground and air crew had been followed, this accident could have been avoided.” The financial extent of damage had not been determined at press time, the spokesman maintained.

An FAA maintenance alerts bulletin (MAB) published soon after the accident gives further insight into the circumstances surrounding this incident. The following excerpts are from MAB No. 285:

“While changing tires, maintenance technicians placed the aircraft on jacks, and avionics personnel took advantage of this opportunity to perform tests on the electronic systems. In order to perform the tests, the avionics personnel used tongue depressors to hold the landing gear switch in the on-ground position. This procedure is commonly used for testing purposes to override the actual position of the landing gear. When the electronic tests were complete, the avionics personnel forgot to remove the tongue depressors from the gear switch. After the first takeoff, the pilot tried to retract the gear and received an unsafe landing gear indication. During landing, he placed the landing gear control in the down position, and the landing gear collapsed, causing substantial aircraft damage.”

The alert goes on to recommend “that all devices used to perform maintenance operations or to secure the aircraft be flagged and made clearly visible to anyone who may attempt to operate the aircraft. Even the switch-disabling device used in this case should have a means installed to notify an operator that the aircraft is not safe. In addition to proper flags or streamers, it would be beneficial to devise a system of placing a notice in the cockpit that could not be overlooked by a person intending to operate the aircraft.”

A few days after the incident, Gulfstream disseminated Maintenance and Operations Letter GV-MOL-02-0008, which states in part: “After any maintenance during which weight-on-wheels (WOW) switch lockout devices are used, the maintenance provider must verify that all WOW switch lockout devices have been removed…Gulfstream V preflight procedures require a check of the nose gear and main landing gear WOW switches.”

The letter concludes, “If a flight crew experiences a wow fault message during flight, the procedures in the Aircraft Flight Manual must be followed. Failure to follow the appropriate procedures for an amber wow fault crew alerting system message could result in an in-flight deployment of the ground spoilers.

There are five General Dynamics Aviation Service centers, established after the purchase of the former Signature regional maintenance facilities. The GDAC centers provide service mainly on non-Gulfstream models, although they are approved for Gulfstreams. There are also five Gulfstream Service Centers. All 10 facilities have received the FAA diamond award for excellence in quality.

The accident GV had recently changed owners (within two weeks of the accident, according to some reports). Although the airplane’s registration number is N777TY (Tyco’s airplanes use a TY suffix), it does not belong to Tyco International, according to an official at the company’s flight department in Portsmouth, N.H. The last registered owner shown for the 1996 GV (S/N 508) is BB Five of Wilmington, Del., with Bank Boston Leasing of Boston, Mass. as the operator, according to AvData of Wichita.
 

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