ACA's real problems started when...
Their management overstepped their bounds in early 2002 by taking a hefty rate hike from UAL. To be clear, they were completely within their rights to do so via their contract, however UA management asked for a break considering the circumstances at the time. I believe ACA was the only carrier to take the increase, SkyWest and AirWis both stayed pretty much flat on their rates. If you remember this caused a big runup in ACA's stock price and hiring amid speculation that ACA was going to receive the lion's share of any additional flying in the UAX system due to the economic downturn. ACA management believed it was a shrewd move because they felt that they could capatilize revenue wise on UA downgauging a/c in the downturn which would give them more money when the recovery occurred and UA took some of the flights back to mainline. All the analysts agreed, except one(I don't think it was Boyd this time!), who said the strategy was only solid if UA was able to whether the storm and stay out of BK. Under that scenario, UA would have had to honor it's contract and ACA would have made serious cash. Any other scenario(BK/ATSB loan restrictions,etc) gave UA the opportunity to exact a measure of revenge. At the time, UA interim CEO Jack Creighton said as much internally to the employees about the ACA deal. His comments boiled down to 'We're very dissapointed with their decision, but we don't have a choice here; we need them right now and they have a valid contract with us, however we do intend to rectify the situation going forward." The comments from the guy running the UAX brand(Sean Donahue?) pretty much echoed the same sentiment.
With that setting the stage, is it any wonder the route UA took with ACA after BK? They were tough with everybody, but clearly harder on ACA then their other partners and the BK process made it legal. Management at every airline basically makes it clear that they run the show, you just work here. IMO, this is one of the situations where the ACA/Indy employees should have remembered that. Somewhere in the big RJ expansion phase of the late nineties/early 2000's, people stopped being commuter pilots and started being regional pilots. They flew RJ's now, not unsophisticated airplanes like Jetrstreams, 1900's, ATR's or Brasilia's that they all would have killed to fly two years prior. They flew too exotic second tier Mexican destinations and at off peak times on primarily mainline equipped routes while boasting of being 'all-jet'. A few of the companies attained DOT major status based on the revenues involved. This was all great, and definately something that should have promoted heavily during the numerous contact pushes during that time. Funny how you don't hear much of that these days. Problem was, we were still 'just' commuter pilots, only by the early 2000's most of us were too cool to accept that notion.
Management cares not for jobs, only profitibility and shareholder value. Shifting from economical, less capital intensive turboprops on routes that will never be touched by a major to less economical, capital intensive RJ's on routes that definately needed to be supported by mainline marketing and fee per departure agreements, was simply a matter of increasing profit margin and shareholder value to them. Never mind the fact, that it married their fortunes closely to those of the parent carrier, and effectively closed off the previous revenue streams because the equipment was no longer operated, the slots had been given to RJ's, and there was no where to park the equipment anymore anyway. From the line all the way up to the offices in Herndon, we missed this so when it came time to clean up managements mistakes we simply got mad at bad ol' United/UsAirways/NWA/AMR/DAL, etc. The paycuts ACA/Indy took, the effort to ward off Mesa, were all great employee efforts but they were basically the end game of internal managerial errors with UA and YV cast as the bad guys vs. ACA management. To most pilots 'just commuter pilots,' basically represents the opinions of arogant mainline pilots who either forgot where they came from or were ex-military and thought they were better. As far as the cockpit goes, those connotations have some validity. As far as the business goes though, it means what portion of the industry you work in and should have governed how you went about things as far as contracts, etc go-i.e. look out for your(pilots) interests vs. managements. All ACA really needed was a new CEO/management team to patch things up with UA and their contract would have been more inline with SkyWest's and we may have never seen TSA, CHQ, YV in the UAX system. UA knew that which is why they tried the YV takeover route first(after asking SkyWest to do it first).
A long winded post for sure that's begging to be hammered, but I think this ACA/Indy situation is almost like a watershed event for the current regional industry. As we watch what happens to Mesaba, Comair, ASA, etc I think the history will start with the tale of ACA/Indy.