FAA Violated staffing policies

[Wasted]

Why would that be a good policy change? A takeoff clearance means the assigned runway is clear and is expected to remain so until you're airborne. What else do you want it to mean?

Why read back a hold short instruction? Why use a checklist? Why have two pilots? Why brief an approach? Some of you people have absolutely zero understanding of human factors.

 

[PunchTheClown]

I have a feeling there are going to be some big changes instore not only for the regional airlines but for the FAA as well, however I have no idea what they will be. I'm a bit shocked that the feds actually admitted to breaking the rules.

 

[TraneOfThought]

The sad part about this whole ordeal is that regardless of the ATC staffing, the airport lighting, or the fact that the crew was doing a stand up overnight is that at the end of the day it still comes down to situational awareness.

No matter what we have to know where we're going that's been instilled since student pilot days. Sure the airport diagragm can cause a little confusion and YES the Tower should have told them something when they were accelerating down the runway, but with all due respect, how can could you not see that you werent aligned with the runway? I hope that this will be a reality check for all of us to make sure EVERYTHING and I mean EVERYTHING is correct before we takeoff, cause i damn sure dont wanna read about this stuff again.

I apologize if i sounded trite

 

[Whistlin' Dan]

A few years ago a TCAS-equipped Russian airliner blew a TCAS-equipped DHL cargo transport out of the sky in a mid-air collision in a lightly-congested, low-workload, enroute radar environment. Both TCAS were functioning properly.

Just to clarify, the DHL jet was given an instruction by ATC which contradicted the resolution advisory (RA) being given by the TCAS. The pilots were following those instructions when the collision occurred. As a result of that accident, most airlines recommend following the RA provided by the TCAS.

Although I consider myself a pilot of only fair skill, I've flown with some truly great ones. What happened in LEX could have happened to any one of us. And anybody who tells you differently will quite possibly be the subject of a future headline.

 

[imacdog]

The sad part about this whole ordeal is that regardless of the ATC staffing, the airport lighting, or the fact that the crew was doing a stand up overnight is that at the end of the day it still comes down to situational awareness.

What "fact" that the crew was on a stand up overnight?

 

[LJ45]

Why would that be a good policy change? A takeoff clearance means the assigned runway is clear and is expected to remain so until you're airborne. What else do you want it to mean?

I want it to mean that we ALL agree we are at the proper runway and are cleared for takeoff at that precise moment. Are you against improvements to safety?

 

[transpac]

This whole thread is depressing. It seems that a sizable number of pilots are conceding that they are incapable of safely operating an aircraft without a Fed babysitter. The outcome of all this is going to be far more control from the ground and lowering of the authority and responsibility of the pilot in command. Some day actual inflight authority will be exercised from the ground and onboard pilots will be nothing more than standby servos in the autoflight system. After all, if two pilots can't follow a map about 500 ft to a lighted runway with giant numbers painted on it, why should the public trust them to safely operate inflight? Wouldn't be too hard to datalink everything to a giant cockpit at 800 Independence Avenue where a committee could make all the decisions.

 

[GeorgeTG]

A few years ago a TCAS-equipped Russian airliner blew a TCAS-equipped DHL cargo transport out of the sky in a mid-air collision in a lightly-congested, low-workload, enroute radar environment. Both TCASs were functioning properly.

Actually that doesn't describe the event correctly at all. and some similarities between these accident do exist

-one one controller on duty instead of the mandated 2
-contract employees: skyguide in switzerland, flight dynamics in lex that were tasked with doing more with less
-confusing circumstances: runway construction and taxi routing in lex vs atc server backup and disabling of controllers collision warning system.
-flight crew action different from what was expected for whatever reason: takoff on different runway than cleared in Lex, not following TCAS RA as required in Ueberlingen.

I am not assigning blame to the crew here, just pointing to facts that have been established at this time. As always the final verdict will fall at the conclusion of the investigation.

I for one am glad about any and all safety advances made and regs written based on past accidents. In a way some of our predecessors paid with their lives to advance safety for future pax and crews.

Obviously our job as flight crews is to concentrate on our end of the spectrum and strive for perfection. The reality is however that we are human and will make mistakes. I know I am far from perfect and will make errors.

What we need to do as crews is recognize the fact that we are fallible and try to have a process in place to recognize our errors and mitigate the adverse effects of our errors.

Or maybe it's better if we pilots quit giving the engineers tragic REASONS to develop new safety devices or the FAA to write new regs since they'll be doing those things anyway, by concentrating our energy on, and figuring out how to operate ("operation" is OUR area of expertise) more safely in this imperfect world until someone engineers and mandates it into perfection.

I welcome any and all safety advances that can help crews recognize errors made -- they allow me to go home after "one of those days" when the holes in the error chain line up.

cheers
George

 

[LJ45]

This whole thread is depressing. It seems that a sizable number of pilots are conceding that they are incapable of safely operating an aircraft without a Fed babysitter. The outcome of all this is going to be far more control from the ground and lowering of the authority and responsibility of the pilot in command. Some day actual inflight authority will be exercised from the ground and onboard pilots will be nothing more than standby servos in the autoflight system. After all, if two pilots can't follow a map about 500 ft to a lighted runway with giant numbers painted on it, why should the public trust them to safely operate inflight? Wouldn't be too hard to datalink everything to a giant cockpit at 800 Independence Avenue where a committee could make all the decisions.

Well in that case, lets just close the control tower...would that make you happy? I guess, lets get rid of TCAS, we are supposed to be looking outside all the time. Oh, and EGPWS we are not suppose to run into anything.

 

[HoserASA]

Wow the titles keep on piling up hozer.
Bottom line, if pilots don't take care of their own safety, bad things happen, and controllers go home for dinner.
Mazda owner
Packer Fan (I Know they suck)

I only listed those for credibility. And, the Packers don't suck, they just lose alot.

Hoser
Packer fan
Mazda owner too

 

[HoserASA]

ATC exists for the purpose of separating traffic, not for acting as a quality control for pilot actions. Granted, ATC will assist pilots beyond separating them and will mention any unsafe situation they happen to observe. But, that is all secondary to the reason they exist. To assign extra ATC staffing for the purpose of observing and correcting pilot negligence is ridiculous. .

So if a controller did see something like this, he should ignore it according to you? I did this job in the Air Force (ATC) and using your logic I should have let that plane I was watching land gear-up, the T37 venting fuel with a student solo on board continue after takeoff, etc.

As for manning, obviously this tower is busy in the morning and even the FAA directed it to have two controllers on duty. They did so the following morning. Tells you something huh. We'll see how the NTSB feels about it.

And, the PIC is ultimately responsible for his/her aircraft. I don't question that at all.

Hoser

 

[ArcticFlier]

..............or the fact that the crew was doing a stand up overnight is that at the end of the day it still comes down to situational awareness.

It wasn't a stand up, high speed.............what ever you want to call it. But then again, I thought this was beaten to death somewhere around here.


AF

 

[SkyBoy1981]

Nobody is saying that pilots need FAA babysitters in the tower....but by the FAA's own policy there were SUPPOSED to be an extra set of eyes in the tower that morning that very well could have caught this mistake.There wasn't, however, because our government is putting more money into modernizing the ATC system of a certain middle eastern country while neglecting to properly staff our own.

 

[transpac]

So if a controller did see something like this, he should ignore it according to you? I did this job in the Air Force (ATC) and using your logic I should have let that plane I was watching land gear-up, the T37 venting fuel with a student solo on board continue after takeoff, etc.

As for manning, obviously this tower is busy in the morning and even the FAA directed it to have two controllers on duty. They did so the following morning. Tells you something huh. We'll see how the NTSB feels about it.

And, the PIC is ultimately responsible for his/her aircraft. I don't question that at all.

Hoser

I believe you've mentioned once or twice your stellar career as an ATC'er, albeit in the USAF vs the FAA. But, you might consider boning up on English composition to dispel the notion that I'm saying you shouldn't mention to a pilot that his/her gear is still up or that he/she is venting fuel. My point is that controllers are paid to separate traffic. They are not overseers who make sure airline captains follow proper procedures and company checklists. The concept of a tower that handles less than one aircraft per hour during a shift needing an additional controller to ensure that airplanes take off on the cleared runway is beyond my comprehension.

 

[kevdog]

This accident was pilot error (stupidity, complacency, inexperience...whatever you want to call it). A 3 pilot crew might have caught this gross mistake even quicker than 10 people in the tower, so instead of beafing up the tower staffing, let's just go back to 3 pilot crews and a lot more jobs will open up for us all. Boeing would do very well with this new law.

I am sure 99% of us will use this crash to help us remember to look at the 10-9, the runway signage, the runway markings, the runway numbers, the runway lighting, our heading, and our compass...especially around ports with short runways.

 

[SkyBoy1981]

The concept of a tower that handles less than one aircraft per hour..

LEX handles less than one aircraft per hour? Is that a statistic somewhere or did you just pull it out of your arse?

 

[ground stop]

does the comair before takeoff checklist, or something similar, have checking the dg's on it? just curious.

 

[Wasted]

...is beyond my comprehension.

That is one thing I have definitely detected in your posts. That this entire thing is beyond your comprehension. That how could something this stupid can happen? That those two must have been on such a completely different plane of existence than other pilots, that nothing ATC, the airport authority or anybody else could have had a hand in it. But unless you get the nerve to realize that it could have happened to anybody, even you, the great Transpac sky captain God of the left seat oh full of pic authority, you will be unable to learn from it and accept the changes to cockpit, ATC, and administrative procedures that are going to result from this accident investigation, then you will be bound to repeat those mistakes.

 

[HoserASA]

I believe you've mentioned once or twice your stellar career as an ATC'er, albeit in the USAF vs the FAA. .

I only mention that to add credibility to what I wrote. Military ATC is not much different than FAA ATC. The military uses the same FAA 7110.65 handbook that FAA controller's use, with some exceptions for military procedures. In fact, most USAF bases (and a few USN bases) have approach controls that control civillian traffic as well as military, some instances more civillian than military. When PATCO went on strike in '81 military controllers (USAF, USN, USA, Marines) were sent TDY all over the country to control traffic, even busy facilities such as BOS and ATL. So, you implying that military ATC is below FAA ATC is an ignorant statement. But, you have all that ATC experience yourself, so what do I know.

I'm not saying to add additional controllers to a tower just to watch pilots. But the one there in LEX obviously was overwhelmed with other duties that may have prevented him from looking outside those big ole windows, which if he had an accident may have been prevented. At that particular time in the morning, apparently many flights are departing from LEX, and it's obvious, even to the FAA, that an additional controller is needed there.

The PIC was and is ultimately responsible, of which I agree. But a controller has responsibilities as well. That's the point I'm trying to make here. I really hope you see my point as well. Fly safe.

Hoser

 

[ReportCanoa]

According to the logic on this thread, we should throw the tower controllers in a cardboard box and have them rely on position reports to separate traffic.