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FAA urged to Change Rest rules by NTSB in Recent accident study

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1) Call in from your hotel room to begin your rest period.

2) 10 hours minimum rest from the time you call in at the hotel to your van time the next morning, not reduceable.

3) 12 hours maximum duty day, extendable to 13 for wx delays, etc.

In exchange for this they can increase the number of hours we can be scheduled to fly to 9 hours.
 
The CA on that flight was in my initial new-hire class at PCL. He had become a Check Airman, had about 7,000 hours total time, and about 5,000 in the CRJ, 3,000+ of which was PIC time (estimated based on how much time I had in the airplane knowing he flew about 1,000 more hours than I did in my first 3 years before I got off reserve).

He was doing IOE with a new-hire pilot who was very low-time.

It was the last leg of the day, I "heard" 9:30 (approximate) hours rest the night before, and they were at 14 hours and change of duty at the time of the accident, pretty close to midnight.

I disagree with the board on finding that he disregarded information that the runway was slick. 15 minutes prior to landing, he spoke with the airport manager who was doing snow removal ops and received a verbal that braking action was "fair" as reported by a truck following the snow removal equipment. The worst of the storm hit just a few moments later after the CA returned to normal descent duties and approach planning, and he was too busy flying the descent and approach to check in one last time below 10,000.

What's most interesting about this is that the Captain initially REFUSED this leg based on weather and the forecast winds and heavy snow. Pinnacle dispatch called NWA ops and got them to CHANGE the forecast to include a wind just BARELY at the legal limit for tailwind to do the only approach available to meet the forecast ceiling and vis, AND amended the snow forecast to LIGHT snow instead of heavy.

Northwest has the ability to amend their own TAF's away from what the NWS publishes within certain parameters. I'VE HAD THEM DO THIS TO ME, it's NOT a rumor. Difference is the last time they did this, I diverted back to MSP when we got to the destination because the weather was below mins (it's one of my interview stories where I disagreed with a policy, did as instructed anyway, then chose the safe exit and came home, proving my point along the way). This CA didn't divert because it was within acceptable mins when he started the approach. This is the first time I know of that it has bit NWA directly.

Where he touched down is in debate. The airport manager insists it was "halfway down the runway" while the FD data (weight on wheels), G/S recording, and aircraft speed show it closer to 2,000 feet past the threshold - well within the TDZ.

Doubt very seriously they will change the rest rules over it. No fatalities, regional carrier, and, quite frankly, without those factors, they're simply going to pin it on the CA being fatigued and making a bad call which is partially true, but he was walked down the primrose path.

This guy is VERY sharp, one of the nicest guys in the biz that I know, and didn't deserve the crucifying he got over it (he lost his job). We all make mistakes; we just get lucky most of the time and either the person beside us catches it or we luck out and nothing happens.

Was hoping the board would emphasize the weather changing issues by NWA ops more in this hearing. Personally, I don't think ANY airline should have that ability...

Airport ops reported "nil" braking from the truck twice over the radio...

Now days with OE are limited to 14 hours of duty. The flight time was limited to 8, but too many flights were being cancelled so that went away.
 
limit the duty day to 12 hours and make rest 12 hours--- fly as much as you can in the meantime... incentize the companies to be more efficient... it's not a mistake that the most productive pilots are also the happiest.... but then again i get jealous of their schedules- ave 10 hour duty day- 14 in a hotel- 7 hrs block- and 8-9credit- consistent schedules- am OR pm. You could fly a whole lot and not get tired w/ those parameters.
My airline schedules me all kinds of ways that make me exhausted, but yet doesn't make either one of us any money or produce anything.
 
Airport ops reported "nil" braking from the truck twice over the radio...
Doesn't help if the aircraft in question is no longer monitoring the ops frequency and is, instead, monitoring CTAF... Too bad the ops guy didn't have a radio with CTAF dialed in. :(

That's what fatigue gets you along with flying with a FNG who's just "along for the ride" once you take them out of their normal training environment profile.

Bet you if he was fresh and on top of his game, he'd have left that frequency up in #2 for monitoring and I can just about guarantee you the CA in question wouldn't have landed with a "NIL" braking report if he'd heard it. I know him and he's not a daredevil or risk taker by any means.

Now days with OE are limited to 14 hours of duty. The flight time was limited to 8, but too many flights were being cancelled so that went away.
I agree with the other poster. Anything over 12 hours of duty with a FNG, especially ops after midnight after an 8 hour flight day is just begging for trouble.

It's funny how PCL's culture claims to be "Safety First", but anything gets waived for that almighty "completion factor". :rolleyes:
 
limit the duty day to 12 hours and make rest 12 hours--- fly as much as you can in the meantime... incentize the companies to be more efficient... it's not a mistake that the most productive pilots are also the happiest.... but then again i get jealous of their schedules- ave 10 hour duty day- 14 in a hotel- 7 hrs block- and 8-9credit- consistent schedules- am OR pm. You could fly a whole lot and not get tired w/ those parameters.
My airline schedules me all kinds of ways that make me exhausted, but yet doesn't make either one of us any money or produce anything.

I think you are right on the money. Fly as much as you want but get the rest afterwards. And being able to fly more in a single day equals less time spent on the road, less time commuting, less money the company has to spend on hotel rooms, per diem, etc. Everybody wins.. and that's why it will never happen. :rolleyes:
 
The FAA responds only to bad publicity. Expect zero interest or action on the completely idiotic rest rules until there is a major accident that can be pinned on fatigue.
 
Hi!

Since I've been here, our rest ALWAYS starts when you get to the hotel.

We just started a new policy that any pilot (doesn't apply to the Falcon pilots, as they already have 10 hours) who flew a trip and can ask for/will get 10 hours of crew rest.

cliff
YIP
 
For those interested in reading the NTSB synopsis on the probable cause, conclusions, and recommendations, it's posted here:

http://www.ntsb.gov/Publictn/2008/AAR0802.htm

The full, unabbreviated report should be up in a few weeks.

Here are some factual findings (23 in actual report)
  1. The poor decision-making shown by the accident pilots, including their failure to account for the changing weather and runway conditions during the approach; their failure to perform a landing distance calculation; and their failure to reassess or discontinue the approach accordingly, likely reflected the effects of fatigue, as well as a motivation not to extend their duty day by going around or diverting to an alternate airport.
  2. Existing Federal Aviation Administration pilot flight and duty time regulations permitted the long and demanding day experienced by the accident pilots, which resulted in their fatigued condition and degraded pilot decision-making.
  3. The additional responsibilities and task demands involved in providing operating experience and performing related check airman functions likely aggravated the effects of fatigue for the captain/check airman.
================================
PROBABLE CAUSE:

This poor decision-making likely reflected the effects of fatigue produced by a long, demanding duty day; and, for the captain, the duties associated with check airman functions. Contributing to the accident were 1) the Federal Aviation Administration pilot flight and duty time regulations that permitted the pilots’ long, demanding duty day
 
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There was study a few years ago, it said napping in the cockpit was one of the best ways to combat fatigue. A 15-20 nap no longer than 30-minute nap in the cockpit eliminated 100% of the spontaneous micro naps during approach.
I think other countries allow this. If you should use this technique it is probably best to use CRM and make sure both pilot do not nap at the same time. Like happened to me one night back in 1969 off the coast of Vietnam, when all 12 of the crew were napping at the same time at 1,500’ AGL with one engine shut down, talk about waking up.
 
Hah hah! If that's a true story, it's hilarious (since it ended well).

Seriously though, although the "planned nap" strategy makes a great deal of sense, and I remember the study you're referring to, there is one problem.

It's in direct violation of current FAR's, and if a fed was sitting in your jumpseat, he'd have kittens.

Besides . . . what if the designated flying pilot pulled a Tim Russet while the PM was asleep? Better to just fly by the rulebook or call in fatigued if you don't think you'll be able to stay awake.
 

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