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Emergency 737 AD

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Aug 27, 2006
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FAA Issues Emergency AD on Maintenance of B-737s



On Aug. 20, 2007, a China Air Lines B737-800 caught fire and exploded after landing at Naha Airport (Okinawa), Japan. The 157 passengers and 8 crewmembers aboard the airplane made an emergency evacuation, and no injuries were reported. The Aircraft and Railroad Accident Investigation Committee (ARAIC) of Japan is conducting an investigation of the accident, and specialists from the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board, Boeing, the FAA, and GE Aircraft Engines were sent to help.
After several days of investigation, the ARAIC reported that a bolt from the right wing slat assembly had punched a hole roughly 1.5 inches in diameter in the fuel tank, which caused a fuel leak that led to the fire. As a result, on August 25, the FAA issued an emergency airworthiness directive (AD 2007-18-51) to all owners and operators of B-737-600, -700, -700C, -800, -900 and -900ER series airplanes. The bolt assemblies in question are not installed on older B-737 models. The emergency AD—issued with a 24-day compliance requirement—mandates inspection of the bolt assembly within the downstop of the main slat tracks. However, immediately after the FAA issued the AD, field reports showed that a more aggressive inspection schedule was necessary. On August 28, the FAA issued another emergency AD (AD 2007-18-52), which requires inspection of the bolt assemblies within 10 days of receipt.
This AD requires no pilot action—the bolt assemblies cannot be observed during the flight crew's preflight inspection. Maintenance personnel must remove panels or use a borescope to look within the slat housing at the slat track downstop assemblies. The inspections must ensure that the bolt assembly is not loose, is not missing parts, or is otherwise not installed improperly. A specific torque value must be applied to the bolt and nut within 24 days. The FAA considers the AD to be an interim action; redesign of the bolt assembly may be required.
AD 2007-18-52 is available at this link. Additional information on this directive will be provided as circumstances warrant.
 

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