Colgan 3407 Update

[WSurf]

I have flown at both the regionals and majors. I can tell you that the attitude towards safety is much greater at the majors.

Again your train of thought is wierd.

Attitude towards Safety is defined by that indivdual.
Believe me there are many unsafe pilots at the majors.

Sometimes at the regional level most of the pilots are young and eager. Sometimes they can feel bullet proof and maybe try things that could get them in trouble. However over time, and with experience many lose that bullet proof ego.
I remember as a young pilot I did things in the plane that I wouldn't even try now. And that comes with age and experience. Not wether your at a major or not.

 

[cuban8]

Tailplane Icing with Stall

I see some references to tailplane icing and stall here, but seriously.... how many people, either here on this forum, or anywhere, have ever actually experienced a tailplane stall (and I am referring to the era after aircraft such as the J31, Saab 340..etc were modified to reduce the chance of such an event)...my guess is NONE!

 

[WSurf]

I see some references to tailplane icing and stall here, but seriously.... how many people, either here on this forum, or anywhere, have ever actually experienced a tailplane stall (and I am referring to the era after aircraft such as the J31, Saab 340..etc were modified to reduce the chance of such an event)...my guess is NONE!

It can happen, and it has at my airline. The story is also really horrific. Lucky for the crew this happened at an altitude where they could recover.

So yes, tailplane stalls can occur.

 

[pair_of_pratts]

For years the FAA has had a "one size fits all" stall recovery training program. Push the thrust levers up and pull back on the yoke to minimize altitude loss. About 5 years ago the FAA put together and industry working group to rewrite FAR 121 sub parts N and O. These are your current training regulations. Shortly after Pinnacle 3701 the group began looking at what that crew did when they got stick shaker. The set full thrust and tried to maintain altitude. It didn't work and they realized that maybe they should get away from the "one size fits all" stall recovery training and began working on new regulations. On January 12, 2009 the FAA introduced a notice of proposed rule making with the new regulations. Take a look at the requirements starting on page 1360 http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2009/pdf/E8-29584.pdf

Here is a link to Transport Canada's recommended Training and Checking Practices for Stall Recovery. http://www.tc.gc.ca/CivilAviation/commerce/circulars/AC0247.htm

 

[Microclimates]

Here is a link to Transport Canada's recommended Training and Checking Practices for Stall Recovery. http://www.tc.gc.ca/CivilAviation/commerce/circulars/AC0247.htm

That's a good read... A private pilot knows what a stall is, yet our 121 training standards throw that knowledge out the window. But then again, isn't it typical of the airlines that you save a penny and lose a dollar (sort of like saying don't lose any altitude in a stall-- except when you really stall in which case you'll lose big time doing what you were told to do!)

 

[Crossky]

Granted. I took out the obviously unavoidable accidents (engine falling off the AA DC-10 at ORD, the DAL L1011 in windshear at DFW; the DAL DC9 in wake turbulence at GSW; UAL DC-10 with triple hydaulic failure, etc). There are some - maybe lots on this list - that could have been avoided with better technology, etc. But most (not all) were attributed in large measure to pilot error. I guess this list is basically my visceral reaction to hockeypuck's absurd assertion that pilots at major/legacy carriers don't do stupid things because they are paid more. We ALL have done stupid things, regardless of where we work.

Fly safe.

While I appreciate your list and your sentiment, the NTSB disagreed with you about the cause of Delta 191 crashing. They blamed it mainly on pilot error, with other contributing factors. Very simply, it's dangerous to fly underneath a servere thunderstorm which has just starting raining. It was dangerous then and even with all the newer technology it's dangerous now.

From the NTSB report: "On August 2, 1985, at 1805:52 central daylight -time, Delta Air Lines
flight 191, a Lockheed L-1011 crashed while approaching to land at Dallas Fort Worth​

International Airport, Texas. While passing through the rain shaft beneath a thuflderstorm, the flight entered a microburst which the pilot was unable to traverse successfuliy. The airplane struck the ground about 6,300 feet north of the approach
end of runway 17L, hit a car on a highway north of the runway killing the driver, struck two​

water tanks. on tile airport, and​

broke apart. Except for a section of the airplane containing
the aft fuselage and empennage, the remainder of the airplane disinegrated during the
impact sequence, and a severe fire erupted during the impact sequence. Of the 163 persons
aboard. 134 passengers and crewmembers were killed; 26 passengers and 3 cabin attendants
survived.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable causes​

of the accident -were the flightcrew’s decision to initiate and continue the approach into a
cumulonimbus cloud which they observed to contain visible lightning; the lack of specific
guidelines, procedures, and training for avoiding and escaping from low-altitude wind shear;
and the lack of definitive, real-time wind shear hazard information. This resulted in the
aircraft’s encounter at low altitude with a microburst-induced, severe wind shear from a
rapidly developing thunderstorm located on the final approach course."

​

 

[Crossky]

I can make a couple observations right?

CA had low time in the A/C, which had a 20 kt higher stick shaker and pusher speed when the de-icing system was activated, as it was. If the CA (who had low time in type) didn't remember this fact and didn't notice the stall raster set at a higher airspeed, AND the higher time FO did notice it but didn't say anything (FO had 750 hours in Q400?), one can easily see the scenario of A/C getting dangerously slow.

Bottom line: talk business only below 10K, in IMC especially, and always SAY something when you notice something is not right. Just standard callouts. It's not personal, it's just business. I've actually had FO's offended because I used standard callouts when they were slow or misaligned with the runway or high or low on GS. Sheesh. I had to give them the talk.

Also, Colgan slow at BTV? C'mon guys, I am not perfect either, believe me, I've made my fair share of mistakes, but you guys are under the microscope right now. Fly right always for sure, but especially right now.

 

[bogey383]

Our industry has become much safer due to the crashes listed above. CRM, GPWS, most aircraft spoilers go down when thrust levers are advanced, etc. are all results of accidents. In today's current environment, most pilot-error accidents are at the regional level. I have flown at both the regionals and majors. I can tell you that the attitude towards safety is much greater at the majors.

That may be true, but only to a certain extent. At the major level, at least a good one. A cockpit crew may only do two legs. However, we all know at the regional level especially tprops, it may be common to do five or six legs. With that said even with a good attitude about safety your chances of having something happen is much greater. This is all a matter of opinion.

 

[Amish RakeFight]

Bottom line: talk business only below 10K, in IMC especially, and always SAY something when you notice something is not right. Just standard callouts. It's not personal, it's just business. I've actually had FO's offended because I used standard callouts when they were slow or misaligned with the runway or high or low on GS. Sheesh. I had to give them the talk.

Great advice.

 

[Sig]

That's a good read... A private pilot knows what a stall is, yet our 121 training standards throw that knowledge out the window.

Now I'm upfront and screaming that my training dept has been trying to reinstate the mystery of flight one checklist at a time, but this statement makes no sense to me.

What happens when you cob the levers in a 737?

The pitch moment is righteously changed. Does that mean all knowledge hitherto is BS? No.

As far as I know, the way a wing flies (contrary to how the imbeciles in the FAA want you to answer on the written test) is, in principle, the same for all wings.

Why is 121 stall training so radically different from the BS lame profile I flew as a student pilot?

IT ISN'T! I know what a stall is. I know the indications. My airline would rather not have me get there- but I'm still on the hook if the machine does because I know better! FFS, I'm the captain with an ATP!

Are these machines certified to actually stall, or are they fitted with nifty whizbang bells and whistles PLUS training that prevents that situation?

I have no idea. I refuse to stall a Dash I'm driving, and I receive training for such a scenario. It doesn't mean I don't know WTF is going on when the situation gets pear-shaped, and certainly doesn't preclude me from fixing it as best I can.

After all, I know better- right? We all do. Right?

 

[Snaab]

Also, Colgan slow at BTV?

That CA has been fired, finally.