Colgan 3407 Down in Buffalo

[AA717driver]

Nice 'ad-hoc NTSB investigation' here but I know I've been in situations where something is such a surprise that many of the sensory inputs don't get processed until after the event.

If they were cruising along on autopilot, setting up for the approach, configuring--the last thing they would be expecting is a lot of noise (not processed immediately) and an abrupt pitch down.

While they may not have been aware of their airspeed deterioration (due to configuration change in rapid succession, maybe?) they did know they were near the ground. Your first instinct is to stop going down. You pull back, get resistance, then pull HARD!

Maybe at that point, he realized he was fighting the pusher and disconnected it, generating the pitch up.

I just know that you're not going to dissect the problem in the same detail as is being discussed here (very good presentations!). You act on instinct--instinct that has been modified by training, hopefully. But there are no guarantees in those situations.

JMO. TC

 

[dmspilot00]

I believe that making stall recovery’s primary focus ‘a constant altitude maneuver’ is not only a bad training procedure but a dangerous procedure.


The FAR’s are not written in granite; they can be changed and have been many times over the years. Training manuals are written by operators and approved by POI’s. They can be changed too and often are.

That was a really well written post with good insight. I don't work for an airline, but I agree, a stall is not a constant altitude maneuver. The FAA is stupid.

I sincerely hope that method of training did not contribute to the upset of 3407. Unfortunately it looks like that possibility is lurking in this tragic accident.

It's already been found to have contributed to the Pinnacle 3701 crash. Sad no one learned the lesson.​

 

[surplus1]

Thanks. Unless it's your 'dream', not working for the airlines is no big deal. Some of the very best pilots out there don't fly for the airlines.

I've tried the corporate bit and personally didn't like it but it didn't have anything to do with the pilots or the equipment. It was the people that rode in the back.

I recall PCL 3701 as well as CMR 5191. Both very sad outcomes of the mistakes we all make but not so mysterious.

This one (3407) is more of a mind boggler for me.

 

[Andy Neill]

Anyone else notice that his name [Chealander] is not featured prominently in the stories the last couple of days, I think finally someone told him to STFU. ...

So much for that theory:
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/29300872/

 

[firstthird]

http://biz.yahoo.com/ap/090220/plane_into_home_investigator.html?.v=1

Saw a similar story, made me want to puke. Someone has to stop this guy. He's leaking his resume to the press as the 'hero' of the NTSB. YGTBSM.

Wow, he held nuke codes. Maybe he even flew a plane once. His priorities are way wacked.

typical NTSB guy
1 - figure out the accident
2 - prevent future accidents

Chealander
1 - get in front of cameras as often as possible
2 - speculate about causes, up to and including blaming the crew, prior to getting all the facts
3 - leak resume on a slow news day
4 - maybe help with the investigation at some point

 

[enigma]

but I agree, a stall is not a constant altitude maneuver. .​

Sorry for being late to the discussion, this may have already been addressed but since you're still talking about it I need to add one small point.

The stall recovery techniques required for 121 operations are basically intended to apply to transport catagory aircraft with proper stall warning systems.

When we practice "stalls" in the 121 environment, we are not practicing stalls, we are practicing stall recovery at the first indication.

I don't recall the exact percentage above the stall that the system is required to give a warning, but the margin is far enough above the aerodynamic stall to allow a zero altitude loss recovery. The immediate action required is the application of power. There is not need to reduce the angle of attack because the airfoil is not yet stalled.

That's why we "fly out of stalls" with power and attempt to maintain altitude.

If the aircraft actually reaches a true aerodynamic stall, the same recovery techniques used in a basic trainer still apply. You MUST reduce the angle of attack.

I've performed a large number of stall warning system flight checks in Super80's and I can assure you that the airplane will maintain altitude after the initial stall warning if you apply power in a timely manner. I can also assure you that the airplane will NOT maintain altitude if you allow the situation to deteriorate past the initial stall indication until you actually achieve a stall.

If anyone cares, the Maddog can get just a little squirrelly when it quits flying.

My experience in flight check convinces me to abandon the checkride correct stall recovery procedure if there is ANY doubt about the recovery. If the aircraft stalls, reduce the angle of attack. I'd rather dip below circling mins and go around than I would hit the ground in a level attitude.

BTW, this post is in no way intended to comment on the Q400 accident. I have no idea what happened and have not read the entire string. I just wanted to clarify the Part121 stall recovery procedure.

 

[UndauntedFlyer]

Q400 Pilots:

I would like to know what kind of cockpit indications there are if there is a malfunction in the de-icing boot system on any part of the airplane and/or tail. This accident just sounds so typical of the NASA scenario for tailplane icing that I can not help but think that that's the cause here. And remember, to lots of people with lots of money at stake, it's just easiest to blame the crew when the cause is really a design and certification problem.

 

[WSurf]

Q400 Pilots:

I would like to know what kind of cockpit indications there are if there is a malfunction in the de-icing boot system on any part of the airplane and/or tail. This accident just sounds so typical of the NASA scenario for tailplane icing that I can not help but think that that's the cause here. And remember, to lots of people with lots of money at stake, it's just easiest to blame the crew when the cause is really a design and certification problem.

As much as I would like to believe this, there are many factors that are surfacing that seem each day to prove otherwise.

I don't think anyone on here wants to pin the crew. But if a crew got distracted by the ice and allowed there airspeed to get dangerously low and used an improper recovery from a stick pusher then you have a problem.

Be it the Captain with only 110hrs in type, be it Colgans training. Be it two people in that cockpit got fixated or distracted (by the ice conversation going on) to allow that airpspeed to get low. Be it the Tail and Boots weren't able to shed the ice fast enough.

Hopefully we will get more info soon.

 

[UndauntedFlyer]

When a Q400 pilots adds full power and at a slow speed I would guess there is a large torque reaction with yaw and roll left; and I would think that that would require major rudder to correct. Could this have been a factor too?

 

[PURPLEHAZE21]

Speculation = Speculation.