Attn A320 pilots

[JasonW]

I am doing a short presentation on the A320 family of aircraft in my transport category systems class and would like to add some pilot feedback. For anybody who has flown an A320:

1. What is your general opinion of the aircraft?
2. Is there anything particular that you really like or dislike about the aircraft?
3. How does it compare to other aircraft you've flown?

I would greatly appreciate any feedback. Thanks in advance.

 

[J32driver]

I'm pretty new to the aircraft. I'm enjoying it.

Plus side:
Extremely comfotable cockpit, very roomy and quiet
Systems are simple and very well laid out
Performance is good. Stuff it in, shut the doors, GO. W&B usually isn't much of a concern
Fly-by-wire controls make the airplane very easy to fly in most phases of flight

Minus side:
FMS system is a capable, but not as user friendly as other aircraft I've flown. VNAV descent guidance is my biggest complaint.
Fly-by-wire controls offer zero tactile feedback when trying to control the airplane during gusty/windy approaches.

Overall, I very much enjoy the Airbus.

 

[GVFlyer]

The biggest problem with the aircraft is that it is made in Toulouse, France and not Seattle, Washington. Each aircraft purchase puts brie and burgundy on the table for some French citizen who despises the USA, but does little for any US worker. Yes, Yes I know about US products that may be supplied by vendors that would constitute a small percentage of total content. Tired argument...

The other issue with the aircraft is the French design philosophy. They think pilots are of little value and something to protect the airplane against. Subsequently, if you look at the accidents at Strausberg, Bale Mulhausen or Merignac, you will see that they all occured because the pilots could not overcome the aircraft flight control systems. Additionally, when the automation is working the pilot is left out of the loop - when the autopilot or autothrottles move the flight controls or change the power setting nothing moves in the cockpit. When the pilot is flying, the flight control system offers no feedback to assist the pilot in judging conditions.


GV

 

[Groucho]

A319,320,321

I agree with the first poster. The aircraft is the most comfortable I have ever flown. It's like riding around in your living room chair. Performance is good, the A321 is a pig in climb the 320 OK and the 319 performs quite well.

The first poster doesn't like the FMS. Our company has both Boeing and Airbus products and let me tell you there is no FMS yet built that can do everything ATC wants and do it easily. The early FMS on the Bus is not as good as the Boeing but the new Thales units are quite good. We have them on order for a fleet retrofit. There are two versions and we are getting the ones without the bugs.

GVflyer does not appear to fly the aircraft, from the looks of his data, and he can certainly criticize it if he likes but a pilot must monitor any automated aircraft. The more automation, the more monitoring. This is true of Boeing, Airbus, or any highly automated machine.

All in all, it's a good ship with good support and it stands up well and performs well.

 

[skiandsurf]

The biggest problem with the aircraft is that it is made in Toulouse, France and not Seattle, Washington.
GV

Probably the best part is the fact that it is built in France. Could you imagine if Boeing had no competetion...yikes.

Actually, the cockpit is very spacious and comfortable. Noise levels are very low. Automation, when figured out, is very nice. FMS not as user friendly as the Boeing FMS. The radio select switches are confusing. It is very easy to get yourself off a radio frequency, if not paying attention. The sidestick is very comfortable after 3 or 4 landings, its a no brainer. The cabin is very comfortable. The overhead storage is big, you can put roller boards in wheels first ( line them up side to side vs end to end). Back to the cockpit, the table makes the "front office" a "front office".
737 vs A320................A320.

 

[reepicheep]

A counter-intuitive, human factors nightmare, limp-wristed prissy little french cream-puff of an airplane.

On the plus side: comfortable, roomy, quiet, good a/c in summer.

But from a pilot's perspective (something obviously not considered in Toulouse) it's vastly inferior to the Boeing product.

 

[Donsa320]

A-320

As usual, those who have not flown the airplane have the usual complaints. I typed in the -320 in 1989, before any were even in the United States. We did the walk around on the oral with a slide show. My type rating was about number 15 issued by the Feds. Other than having to go back to a 2 pilot airplane, I was very happy with the 320. It did everything the B-727 did on half the fuel and one less engine and crewman. It handles crosswinds fine, nice in turbulence with load alleviation, got struck by lightning and nothing happened, fly by wire is great so all in all, no complants from me. In fact as I neared retirement I was offered the 747-400 or stay on the 320 at 747 pay rates. I took the Bus. Anybody who would prefer 14 hour JFK to Narita non-stops to pleasant SFO overnights can have the 74.

And BTW, Airbus airplanes have more Lockheed in them then anything else. When the L-1011 line was shutdown, Lockheed engineers were recruited for the A-300. Take a good look and you will see the Lockheed influence.

DC

 

[xrated]

Subsequently, if you look at the accidents at Strausberg, Bale Mulhausen or Merignac, you will see that they all occured because the pilots could not overcome the aircraft flight control systems. Additionally, when the automation is working the pilot is left out of the loop - when the autopilot or autothrottles move the flight controls or change the power setting nothing moves in the cockpit. When the pilot is flying, the flight control system offers no feedback to assist the pilot in judging conditions.


GV

Those accidents happened, not because the pilots "could not" overcome the aircraft flight control systems, it was because the pilots didn't know the systems well enought to turn them off. I'm not sure what GV is saying about the pilot being "out of the loop" when the automation is working. True, the controls don't move (its got autoTHRUST, not autothrottles) but we do have nifty engine gauges that tell us what the airplane is doing. Its not difficult to moniter the gauges. The system is safe, and it works. Just have to adjust to the differences like you do any time you change aircraft types.

 

[GogglesPisano]

1. Comfortable, ergonomic cockpit (ever been inside a 737?)
2. Desiged from scratch for ease of workload (ever worked a 737?)
3. The tray table is awesome.


OTOH, the FMS was inferior to the RJ's I flew and the LCD's left more information out. The radio panels were a bit counterintuitive as well.

 

[Say Again Over]

Subsequently, if you look at the accidents at Strausberg, Bale Mulhausen or Merignac, you will see that they all occured because the pilots could not overcome the aircraft flight control systems by GV

Another ignorant statement by someone that doesn't have a clue.

 

[GVFlyer]

Those accidents happened, not because the pilots "could not" overcome the aircraft flight control systems, it was because the pilots didn't know the systems well enought to turn them off...

The Toulouse - Blagnac accident occured with factory test pilots flying the aircraft. I learned about the Airbus design philosphy through a Society of Experimental Test Pilots (SETP) review of this mishap.

Here's a Der Spiegle comment and review session on Airbus accidents conducted with Bernard Ziegler Technical Director of Airbus Industrie for flight test.


Interview with Bernard Ziegler, described as Technical Director of Airbus Industrie, responsible for flight test and certification (`Zulassung') of all
Airbus aircraft.

The interview focuses on the reliability of Airbus aircraft, in the light of the following crashes: Bangalore, Feb 90 (A320: landed short of the runway in clear weather, 92 dead); Strasbourg, Jan 92 (A320 descended into a hill in clouds on a backcourse approach to the airport, 87 dead); Warsaw, Sep 93(A320, landing in a thunderstorm, overran the runway, 2 dead, many injured); Nagoya, Apr 94 (A300, copilot and autopilot in control conflict, eventually nose rose at an extreme angle and the plane stalled, crashing tail first onto the ground, 246 dead); Toulouse-Blagnac Jun 94 (A330, testing engine-outgo-arounds, stalled and crashed, 7 dead including the Airbus chief test pilot). The Habsheim A320 accident is not mentioned. The header to the intro says:

"Airbus Industrie is under pressure. Twelve total-losses since 1987 with 815 dead have awakened doubts about the concept of airplanes dependent on electronics. Do technical failures contribute to the series of accidents? Or are pilots overextended by the`flying computers'?"



Ziegler says they've had a lot of bad luck recently. He says there's no reason to change the Airbus `philosophy' of taking over some of the pilot's tasks by computer, pointing out that all of the new technology developed by Airbus, from `glass cockpit' to new types of autopilot, has been followed by `all the others'. And, ` the pilot still has the last decision. Whoever suggests the contrary doesn't know what they're talking about.'

They discuss the problems in Warsaw concerning the late deployment of airbrakes and thrust reverse, concerning which he points out that (a) it's a requirement for all modern airplanes that deployment is not enabled until the plane is firmly on the ground; and (b) there are particular limits on landing, for example not when a tailwind is stronger than 10 knots, or when the landing speed is too high. In Warsaw, these boundaries, which were carefully ascertained in test flights, were crossed. When asked why the Polish investigators singled out late deployment of airbrakes and reversers... he said that the level of the compression sensors on the landing gear, and the landing logic, has been changed for Lufthansa at the request of the client, but that only an expert can tell the difference between the old and the new landing logic.

There follows a discussion about computers vs other kinds of flight control, during which he says that there is in principle no difference between more traditional methods of control and the fly-by-wire of the A320, and that it's an illusion to believe that there's ever a direct connection between the pilot's hand and the behavior of an airplane - flying is in this sense something artificial.


He is asked about the involvement of the autopilot in Nagoya, and about a prima facie similar problem with an autopilot in 1991 in Moscow (an A310), and why Airbus had not modified all the autopilots of these types. He replies that requiring expensive modifications is not a simple matter, and must first be thoroughly investigated to see if they cause more problems than they solve. He says that in conjunction with the certification authorities, Airbus had developed an autopilot modification and recommended that A300-600 clients perform it, and after the Moscow incident had notified everyone officially of the correct use of the autopilot mod. After the Nagoya accident, Airbus decided that the modifications they had recommended to A300-600 and A310 aircraft should be mandatory.

Concerning the A330 test flight crash in Toulouse, he points out that it was a difficult but not dangerous test, and in response to a question concerning entering the right autopilot `flight level', he points out that it was mistakenly left at 2000ft but should have been at 7000ft according to the checklist. He says that the fundamental error was that the crew let the nose-high, low-speed situation persist too long, and speculates why: because they took the nose-high situation for an anomaly and they wanted to see what would develop [according to the preliminary report, it was pilot commanded. They were confused as to which mode the flight control was in]; because the test engineer trusted the pilot to know when to return to normal; and Nick Warner [chief test pilot Airbus] had been critised before by test engineers for retaking control too quickly, and maybe was sensitive to potential criticism in this case also. It was a question just of two seconds delay.

The consequences, he says, will be that automatic protection will be developed that will rule out such extremely unlikely accidents, and that the A330 and A340 are the first aircraft to be protected automatically against the development of such a flight condition.



A few comments -

Warsaw: Ziegler correctly points out regulations concerning thrust reverse and airbrakes. However, no mention was made by the interviewer or Ziegler of the wheel brakes themselves. The wheels did not spin up on landing to the required speed to allow the anti-skid system to function as designed. Ziegler's selection of the tailwind for commentary raises some hypothetical considerations. At the given landing speed, with the tail wind, the wings were developing less lift than they would have been without the tail wind, making it more likely that the braking functions would have been enabled by
the sensors. On the other hand, had there been no tailwind, the pilots would have landed at the same indicated airspeed, which would have given them 10 kts slower ground speed, but the same amount of lift preventing the sensors from indicating ground contact. For similar problems not to have occurred in this situation, the wheels would have not to have aquaplaned at this slower landing speed. But in the accident situation, they did not appear to spin up to speed until the ground speed was well below this, and much more of the airplane weight was on the wheels.

It's a simple consequence of the landing logic that braking systems did not deploy under the landing condition in Warsaw, as may be seen from an inspection of the description of the logic in the Flight Crew Operating Manual.

Bangalore: it appears the pilots were confused as to which control mode the airplane was in. Under the particular conditions of flight, the engines went to flight-idle and the airplane descended rapidly into the ground while the
pilots were trying to figure out what was going on.

Nagoya: The autopilot appears to have been engaged and in `go-around' mode (`abort landing, gain altitude quickly'). The copilot, who was flying, was pushing hard forward on the control column trying to land the airplane. The autopilot was counteracting this by configuring the airplane aerodynamically for full nose-up.When the copilot eventually let go of the column, the airplane's nose rapidly rotated upwards to an extremely high angle and the speed decayed severely, causing the aircraft to stall nose-high, close to the ground. It hit the ground tail-first. The standard procedure in which pilots are trained is to disconnect the autopilot and ensure it is disconnected if they want to hand-fly the plane onto the runway. There are numerous puzzles concerning this accident.

Toulouse: Under the correct checklist settings, the pitch of the aircraft on takeoff would have been automatically controlled when the autopilot was engaged. The co-pilot who was flying rotated on take-off to a high angle. Meanwhile, Warner engaged the autopilot (which took three tries) and `failed' the left engine. It's surmised they were expecting the autopilot to return the aircraft to a precise pitch as it handled the situation, as planned. The aircraft was flying in a different control regime than planned due to the mistaken altitude-capture setting of 2000ft rather than 7000ft on the autopilot. Pitch was not `protected' by the autopilot in this regime. Speed decayed rapidly since the nose did not go down, the aircraft was unable to maintain lateral control when it was below the airspeed required to do so, and yawed and rolled. After this situation had developed, Warner throttled back the right engine to regain lateral control, as well as regaining wings-level and nose-level. When control was regained, the ground was just a little too close.


What do these mishaps have in common?


GV






~

 

[Say Again Over]

As usual, those who have not flown the airplane have the usual complaints

So true, more fodder from the uninformed.

 

[GEXDriver]

So true, more fodder from the uninformed.

I think GVFlyer is looking at the Airbus from a test pilot viewpoint and with a test pilot attitude, you know "hand me a checklist and I can fly anything", but he works for a US aircraft manufacturer so I don't think you can expect him to like a foreign airplane.

 

[Say Again Over]

To answer the original question, I like the bus, easy to operate, very roomy cockpit and easy to read displays, The autoflight and auto-land work great, flying with the side stick is great fun. The only downside in my opinion is the relatively weak climb performance when full.

 

[xrated]

What do these mishaps have in common?


GV






~

In three of them, as I can tell, a lack of knowledge of the systems and pilot error.

 

[Toobdrvr]

I think the most impressive design feature of the Airbus is the window-sill cup holder:

In the morning, it knows to quickly turn my hot coffee cold!

In the afternoon, it knows to turn my cold Coca-Cola hot!

It's the reverse thermos!!! Amazing!

Sorry, I couldn't resist. I love the plane for all the reasons stated above. It's true that most of the strong critics simply have not been asymilated yet. Those I've met who have flown both A and B may have their preferences, but don't seem to feel as strongly as those whose Airbus experience is merely academic...

 

[GogglesPisano]

I think the most impressive design feature of the Airbus is the window-sill cup holder:

In the morning, it knows to quickly turn my hot coffee cold!

In the afternoon, it knows to turn my cold Coca-Cola hot!

..

And on the takeoff roll, it sends the venti coffee from Starbucks all over the carpet. At least the window sills can chill a can of soda to near freezing after about an hour in cruise.

 

[NJAFracPilot]

In three of them, as I can tell, a lack of knowledge of the systems and pilot error.

A lack of knowledge on the part of Airbus factory test pilots?

I understand that you Smurfs are the best Airbus pilots in the known universe, specially considering the big iron experience of your initial cadre, but I think the point here is that an overly automated airplane with counterintuitive systems is confusing competent pilots... something that is not happening in Boeings.









`

 

[Metro752]

Does the new Thales unit come with [CHAINSAW MODE] [EXEC]

 

[FL420]

I only have firsthand experience with the A320 and the B757 so can only compare the two.

In general, my ideal single-aisle airliner would be the B757 Rolls-Royce engines, wing and brakes mated to the A321 fuselage and flightdeck, systems design philosophy, fly-by-wire with sidesticks and engine FADEC's.

Specifically:
Flat floor w/o seat tracks that try to twist your ankle and rip the heels off your shoes. You can also spread a blanket on the carpeted floor and sleep behind the seats on those long augmented out and back turns. Score one for the Bus.

Dark overhead panel philosophy with mostly flat pushbutton switches to minimize damage to your head if you forget to duck. Great human factors engineering with flow lines for systems. Score one for the Bus.

Much better design on cup holders, pilot sunshades and side window shades on the A320. Score one for the Bus.

Sidesticks allow you to put the aircraft where you want it to go with just minute movement of the wrist. You do need to properly adjust your armrest. Score one for the Bus.

The tray. What can I say? It holds a lunch, a laptop and all the paperwork we still have to do flying internationally. You can cross your legs and spin around in your seat. Score a big one for the Bus.

The Intel 8086(or 8088) processor on the earlier A320's was way too slow. It was very easy to out-type the processor and just when you went to line-select a scratchpad entry, the waypoints would re-shuffle and your entry would end up on the wrong line. Also, the processor would only read the MCP every half-second making it imperative to verify the MCP entry on the FMA before moving on to other tasks. Even though both FMS's were made by Honeywell, the B757 FMS was less capable but more intuitive than the A320 FMS. FMS's have been greatly improved in later versions of both aircraft. Score one for the Boeing.

I personally preferred the conventional hydraulic steel brakes on the B757 to the brake-by-wire carbon brakes on the A320. I liked the feel and perceived effectiveness of the steel brakes better. Cockpit readouts of brake temperatures and brake fans for quick turns on the A320 were nice. Score a draw on brakes.

The IAE V2500 engines on the A320 configured for all-coach class(29 rows, 174 seats) weren't always up to the task for the passenger loads and stage lengths we flew. Had to make many bleeds/packs off takeoffs. Never had to do that in the B757 with either the RR or P&W engines. You can never have too much power. Score one for the Boeing.

The A320 was only certified to FL390 while the B757 was certified to FL420. That extra 3,000 feet was pretty useful when trying to stay out of the tops of Wx. Never any worries about the strength or lifting ability of the wing on the B757. Score one for the Boeing.

The fuselage diameter on the A320 family is 7.6 inches greater than on all the single-aisle Boeings. This allows each coach seat and the aisle to have an average of an inch extra width. There is more headroom and more room for overhead bins also. Score one for the Bus.

The A320 had vacuum lavs which were very noisy(hard to sleep in the back row on crew rest) and somewhat cantankerous but saved the weight of 5 gallons of blue water per lav. The B757 lavs hold 9 gallons of liquid each of which 5 gal. is fresh blue juice. Much quieter, heavier and often stinkier and always the possibility of a flush motor overheating. Vacuum lavs more suitable on a long-range aircraft ala B767 and B777. Score a draw on lavs.

Aesthetics. I don't think a better-looking airliner was ever built, with the possible exception of the Lockheed L-1049 Super Connie, than the B757. Score one for the Boeing.

And thats my humble opinion.