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At Southwest, No Fear of Fueling

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canyonblue

Everyone loves Southwest
Joined
Nov 26, 2001
Posts
2,314
The discount carrier is flying high, thanks to savvy jet-fuel hedges that are helping keep its costs earthbound

With its highly productive workers, efficient use of aircraft, and easy-to-use Web site, Southwest Airlines is as famous for its low costs as for its low fares. Recently, though, the discount king has been winning kudos for another kind of cost-cutting tactic: savvy fuel-hedging that has saved the airline millions of dollars as oil prices have hit records. Indeed, without its hedges, Southwest would have lost money in the first quarters of 2003 and 2004. Instead, with its recent third-quarter proft, including $73 million in net hedging gains, it's bragging about 54 consecutive quarters of earnings -- while many rivals are drowning in red ink.if (!window.adOb) document.write('');

Certainly, Southwest is feeling the squeeze of higher jet-fuel prices. With crude now at about $55 a barrel, its fuel costs per gallon rose 10% in the latest quarter. But thanks to the airline industry's most aggressive hedging program, Southwest can better afford to keep fares down even as oil prices rise.

And that's adding to the pain felt by higher-cost competitors, which are struggling to compete with rapidly growing low-cost carriers like Southwest. Analyst Vaughn Cordle of AirlineForecasts says most major carriers face the real possibility of bankruptcy, with fuel being the "key variable" in terms of the timing.

STAYING THE COURSE. It's not that Southwest was better than rivals at predicting where fuel prices were headed. Instead, with its rock-solid credit rating and strong cash position, it could afford to buy hedges in the past few years when the financially ailing legacy carriers couldn't. With their weak credit ratings, they faced not only higher costs but demands for cash collateral in some cases.

"You can't get enough money to buy [hedges], and you can't find anybody dumb enough to get on the other side of it," explains Continental Airlines CEO Gordon Bethune. Headed for bankruptcy and desperate for cash, Delta settled all of its fuel hedges in January for a gain of $82 million.

Solid Southwest can afford to stay the hedging course. It already has hedged more than 80% of its fuel needs for next year with prices capped at the equivalent of $25 per barrel of crude, 60% in 2006 at $31 a barrel, and over 40% in 2007 at $30 a barrel. That's far below where the market is betting that oil prices will be.

LOCK-IN RIGHT. Compare that to American Airlines, which is 4% hedged in the fourth quarter at $30 a barrel and is virtually unhedged for 2005 -- much like most of the legacy carriers. Even low-cost players such as JetBlue and AirTran are far less hedged than Southwest.

Southwest uses a combination of hedging instruments, including call options, collars, and fixed-rate swaps. Some are more expensive than others but less risky, while others give the airline a bigger advantage if oil prices fall. These instruments work in different ways, but Southwest essentially pays for the right to lock in fuel at a particular price or price range in a future period.

In some cases, if the real price is lower, Southwest is simply out the cost of the hedge. If it's higher, the airline is paid the difference. In other instances, Southwest might have to pay a counterparty the difference between the actual and the agreed-upon price if oil falls below where it's betting.

"INSURANCE." Is Southwest simply gambling, albeit successfully, on oil prices? The company insists that it's following a disciplined hedging program to smooth out volatility in a critical component of its costs. Fuel comprised 17% of its costs in the latest quarter, its second-biggest expense after wages and benefits.

"We don't know what's going to happen to energy prices," says Southwest Chief Financial Officer Laura Wright. The hedging effort, she says, is "really based on managing or fixing our costs" at a level at which Southwest can be profitable. Agrees airline expert Daniel Kasper of economics consultancy LECG: "I wouldn't call it speculation. I really think of it as insurance."

Southwest actually lagged behind its bigger rivals in hedging fuel costs until the late '90s. Analysts credit then-CFO Gary Kelly, now CEO, for focusing on the effort. Since 1999, after being hurt by a fuel-price spurt, Southwest has tried to hedge at least 50% of its fuel needs two years out, says Wright. The strategy helped it get a jump on rising oil prices this year.

NO CHANGE IN SIGHT. By the time some competitors were strong enough to jump back into the hedging market, it was too late for them to lock in lower prices. American, for instance, unwound its hedges in the spring of 2003 to conserve much-needed cash as it teetered on the brink of bankruptcy. When it began contemplating new hedges earlier this year, it didn't make sense to lock in dramatically higher fuel prices that analysts were predicting would come down, says a company spokesman. Now higher fuel prices are expected to add $1.2 billion to American's costs this year.

Two employees spend most of their time managing Southwest's hedges. Wright won't say what the hedging budget is. But with oil prices unlikely to plunge anytime soon, "we don't have anything that tells us we should change our strategy at all," she says. Chalk up one more advantage for the low-fare leader.
 
Well, this is just another example of how things go with good management...33 years of good management through the toughest times in the industry. If the SWA guys are proud of all this...they should be. I just hope their company can continue to make the formula work. Delta used to have pretty good management too...once upon a time...
 
Vladimir Lenin said:
yay:rolleyes:

would you like a cookie?
Are you a freakin' pilot or do you work at the Doubletree?
 
to re-phrase this...

Solid Southwest can afford to stay the hedging course. It already has hedged more than 80% of its fuel needs for next year with prices capped at the equivalent of $25 per barrel of crude, 60% in 2006 at $31 a barrel, and over 40% in 2007 at $30 a barrel. That's far below where the market is betting that oil prices will be.
(Sales Rep at Jet-A Supplier) "Herb, I know oil is sky high, but he11, I like you, for 80% of 2005's jet fuel, I am only gonna charge you $25 a barrel. Sure hope this gives you an upper-hand on the competition, some of which are paying walk-up prices of $55 a barrel since they have no credit and/or cannot hedge."

more kudos to LUV team

:)
 
Just goes to show what is possible with a good management team. Oh yeah, I forgot. It is always the pilots fault!
 
Well, if someone was providing those hedges a couple of years back, they may have been betting on Iraq getting back on line, no problems with Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, and hurricanes not shutting down the Gulf of Mexico oil wells. On the other side of every hedge is someone who thinks he/she's going to make a windfall profit providing a price guarantee that won't be used. I don't think it was altruism.

I wondered why some of SWA's competitors didn't hedge more. Now, I know why (beyond simple mismanagement).

My oil supplier offered me a pretty good price on home heating oil this year - guess he must've hedged, too! He!!, he's probably still making out like a bandit! ;)
 
An interesting argument...

As I was driving back home today I began to ponder the impact (long range) of $50+ a barrel oil on SWA & other LCC carriers with fuel hedges in place, whether it was a plus or minus. In previous times when cycles within the industry were resulting in layoffs at other carriers SWA managed their money to the point of having sufficients wads of it to continue to grow & take advantage of reductions in routes flown by others. The difference then was there were not many LLC carriers popping up to take advantage of "new openings" in various city pairings. We were the only one out there & SWA swooped in & introduced/increased market share.

It could be argued now that since SWA is the largest owner of "insurance" (fuel hedges) for the next 3 years, it will allow the company to not just survive but continue to grow at least at the minimum planned levels (8-10% a year) for at least this time period. The same could be said for other LCC that have fuel hedges in place.

Higher oil prices in a strange way has become the friend of SWA in a wierd quirk of fate. Many factors have allowed legacy carriers to operate at inefficient levels in a truly capitalistic system, i.e. continued regulation that is cleverly disguised by the government, bankruptcy laws that allow miserably managed companies to hold creditors at bay in hopes of getting some of their money back, poor labor/management relations that have deteriorated to the point no one trusts anyone, etc. This slow death has delayed the inevitable....a complete revamping of labor/management relations, work rules, an attempt to increase efficiencies, etc. The consumer has contributed to their demise as much as 911 with the demand for continued low prices....911 didn't dampen that basic law of supply & demand, it has only sped up the demise of legacy carriers. So has $50+ a barrell oil.

However, without $50+ oil these things would have been slow to develop & change but now legacy carriers don't have the luxury of time as each day their loses mount. These changes would've eventually occurred by legacy carriers y when competing against LLCs but again it has been accelerated. With the perceived certainity of $50+ a barrel oil, only companies that buy "insurance" (fuel hedges), will be able to withstand this drain of capital from its budget without tearing at the underpinnings of its financial basis. In other words, $50 a barrel oil is doing what competition couldn't do and bringing the realities of increased costs & reduced revenues directly to the legacy carriers with the dilemma of how to respond. They have very few options IMHO. The double whammy to high oil isn't just this fact though, it is potentially a stiflying factor for start-up LCCs.

High oil prices are making it much more difficult for start up LCCs (Indy Air & any other startup) to gain financial footing during start up. JB started when oil was much lower & their operations were well capitalized but fuel was a predictable & manageable commodity. Indy Air started with a business plan that called for fuel to be bought at $.85 a gallon...on the spot market where they buy it the figure is probably closer to $1.25 or more...well above what they intended to pay & above budget. Other entres into the fray must be scratching their heads on where to find the capital that will allow them to not only buy affordable aircraft but that will allow them to buy fuel hedges for fuel several years down the road. To devise a business plan for a startup today that says no fuel hedging is required would be like buying airplanes without insurance....penny wise but pound foolish. Investors might be willing to fork over money for hard assets like airplanes but fuel hedging? It could be argued it is a sound investment since SWA's current fuel hedges costs the company $557M but are valued at just under $1B (they run through '07) but airlines are invested in to make money not from fuel hedging (SWA would've lost $11M this past quarter without), they're invested in to make money from carrying passengers.

High fuel prices may be acting as a buffer to new start ups that could be competiting with SWA & other successful fuel hedgers while at the same time are threatening the solvency of established carriers due to their inability to add debt to purchase fuel hedges, thereby spending millons more on fuel than they had planned.

Managing in good times to prosper during bad times is not a bad strategy...having a clear plan, good credit rating & plenty of cash helps that plan to succeed. High debt, poor credit rating and no pricing power eliminates the possibility for wiggle room. The eventual bankruptcy of DAL and AA is hard to not imagine if oil prices remain at this level. The further demise of UAL & USAir in additional is also likely. However, I don't wish any of this to occur as I have many friends in the industry at these & other carriers but this industry has changed & will never be the same.

That fact is difficult for many to grasp but to the companies that can adapt & to the employee groups who do also, those companies & employee groups will prosper & should be praised for their sacrifice & vision IMHO. To young pilots who feel this is doom & gloom, wrong, it is an excellent time to fill the many cockpits that will be opened & vacated over the next 10 years. This industry will still be going well after all of us have stopped flying...someone will have to be flying those airplanes. If the wages don't match current wages (which they probably won't) then decide now if that will keep you from being happy. If so, then leave now & save yourself the misery many already have while getting paid well above the norm for most Americans. However, if you love the idea of flying and wish to have a wonderful career doing something you love, then good luck to you & safe flying!!!

Again these are the ramblings of an errant FO that equate to absolutely zero & are meant as nothing more than a point for discussion & debate. I'll apologize in advance if I've offended anyone with any of my words or if I've come across as blunt or uncarrying....not my intent, pls accept the apology.
 
Last edited:
chase said:
Managing in good times to prosper during bad times is not a bad strategy...having a clear plan, good credit rating & plenty of cash helps that plan to succeed. High debt, poor credit rating and no pricing power eliminates the possibility for wiggle room.
Nice post Chase. The above also should factor into ones personal life in this industry.
 
For once I don't agree with Chase ...

chase said:
It could be argued now that since SWA is the largest owner of "insurance" (fuel hedges) for the next 3 years, it will allow the company to not just survive but continue to grow at least at the minimum planned levels (8-10% a year) for at least this time period.
Well acutally in the short run I agree, but eventually we won't be able to hedge at these rates (just like your insurance premiums go up if you need to use your insurance).

chase said:
Higher oil prices in a strange way has become the friend of SWA in a wierd quirk of fate.
Nothing that raises our costs is our friend. The bottom line is that at a certain price of oil our business model won't work. We'll be forced to raise prices and while we'll be "beating" the competetion (because we'll be the last to raise prices), we'll be pricing out our customers. In this dire scenario we lose all of the legacy carriers and we at SWA end up eating all of our cash. When oil does come back down we are the new legacy carrier - expensive labor, high debt, old planes etc. Now somebody new (not JB they ate their cah long before us) comes along and pulls a Herb on us and you and I are back on the street. I am scared to death about expensive oil.

chase said:
High oil prices are making it much more difficult for start up LCCs (Indy Air & any other startup) to gain financial footing during start up. JB started when oil was much lower & their operations were well capitalized but fuel was a predictable & manageable commodity. Indy Air started with a business plan that called for fuel to be bought at $.85 a gallon...on the spot market where they buy it the figure is probably closer to $1.25 or more...well above what they intended to pay & above budget. Other entres into the fray must be scratching their heads on where to find the capital that will allow them to not only buy affordable aircraft but that will allow them to buy fuel hedges for fuel several years down the road. To devise a business plan for a startup today that says no fuel hedging is required would be like buying airplanes without insurance....penny wise but pound foolish. Investors might be willing to fork over money for hard assets like airplanes but fuel hedging? It could be argued it is a sound investment since SWA's current fuel hedges costs the company $557M but are valued at just under $1B (they run through '07) but airlines are invested in to make money not from fuel hedging (SWA would've lost $11M this past quarter without), they're invested in to make money from carrying passengers.
But when oil does come down there is going to be a lot of hardware and talent on the street - that is when the LCC startup boom is going to hit. I think we're going to get the fight of our life (again) when that happens.

chase said:
Managing in good times to prosper during bad times is not a bad strategy...having a clear plan, good credit rating & plenty of cash helps that plan to succeed. High debt, poor credit rating and no pricing power eliminates the possibility for wiggle room. The eventual bankruptcy of DAL and AA is hard to not imagine if oil prices remain at this level. The further demise of UAL & USAir in additional is also likely. However, I don't wish any of this to occur as I have many friends in the industry at these & other carriers but this industry has changed & will never be the same.
I definatly agree that out mgt team is the best in the industry, and their vision and foresight are to be applauded. I am think SWA is pointed int he right direction and focused on the right things. I even think the furture of SWA is probably gonna be great. But the sooner oil gets cheaper the happier I'll be.
 
ivauir,

Didn't mean to leave the impression I thought high fuel prices were in the long term interest of SWA....it certainly isn't & isn't for our economy....high oil prices will eventually slow the business cycle down & that definitely hurts us in the long run. However, in the near term with hedges in places SWA is insulated to a large degree (i.e. that is why one buys insurance/hedges & stabilized our costs for a defined period) from these spikes.

You're right, we can't keep this up forever & don't want to....yes new startups will get their footing once oil comes back down they will begin pullling out their plans & going after it but hopefully by then we will have continued to expand, lowered our overall costs by adding airplanes but without adding people, & we'll have some pricing power in certain routes to allow selective revenue gains.

Commentaries like the one above isn't generally my forte since any such comments are filled with so many assumptions that may or may not come true. Again, high oil prices are bad long term, for now they are bad also but they are "less bad" for us than others & IMHO will increase the likelihood of reducing seats in the overall airline economy which is what is driving the revenue's so low (along with high oil obviously). We don't disagree that much but appreciate the points you brought out. cheers
 
Good discussion ya'll.

To me, the problem we all face is that oil most likely isn't going down. Ever again. In our headlong rush to profit from trade with China, we have helped them to create an oil based economy and they are now competing with us in the world oil market.

I remember hearing a Spirit suit tell a recurrent school four years ago that we couldn't raise prices, even when everyone else was oversold, because our customers would just stay home. At the time, that sounded pretty stupid, and for that specific situation, it was. However, the industry may be reaching a point where all of our passengers will be priced out of travel.

I know about my family. I've bought a few tickets lately, but if prices go back to mainline walkup prices from the late 90's, my purchases will be reduced.

How does this affect SWA? It has been my observation that SWA is a company that bases it's costs on survival during lean times, unlike the other majors who have built their cost structures to make enough during the peaks to carry them throught the valleys. Now, the peaks are gone.

If I had to write an assesment of SWA's positioning for the future, It'd be pretty rosy. SWA posseses a cost structure better suited to profit in lean economic conditions, the employees (in my experience) are team players, and the SWA route structure gives it an advantage over any pure start-up carrier. Most importantly, SWA management seems to be avoiding the ego-trips that have characterized the downfall of so many of their legacy carrier competition. See the book, "Hard Landings" for an explaination of my ego remark. All in all, SWA may be hurt by high oil, but if any carrier can succeed in the new, post "cheap oil" economy, it will be SWA.

regards,
enigma
 
if SWA is performing well from a business standpoint NOW, during some of the toughest times for the airline industry, can you imagine how they will do if things (someday) return to the 1997-1999 "happy times"?


I mean, sh1t, if LUV is beating you now, you had better close your eyes and tell your CEO to get the vaseline ready when the "good times" come back
 

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