This thread really draws focus to the regional jet dillema perfectly.
In order to understand this industry and, therefore, set our career expectations we must be able to define a "regional jet" and determine what impact that equipment has had (and will have.)
First of all: Is there any such thing as a "regional jet"? I don't believe there is. There have been 50-100 seat jets operating for decades. It was not until the mid 1990s that they actually took on the name "regional".
Before that, aircraft such as the Bac 1-11, BAe146, Fokker 28, DC9-10 etc... successfully flew (even post deregulation) for major air carriers. All of these types carried less than 100 passengers and fulfilled essentially the same role as the "RJ" does today. They were old, inefficient types, and in the early 90s began to be parked.
A few years later a marketing GENIUS came up with the term "RJ" when Canadair stretched their Challenger platform to create a new passenger airline. ALPA and Delta dropped the ball by modifying their scope language and allowed Comair to be the first "commuter" to fly a turbojet powered aircraft.
So now the cat's out of the bag. The reaction at that point was nuclear. Once it got underway, it was largely self-sustaining.
Passengers: In a lot of small markets, passengers were accustomed to the E110, the SF340, the Shorts, etc. They were delighted at what they perceived to be an improvement in service. They had a quiet, comfortable jet to fly. A few years later airline management began to use the equipment differently. They flew long-thin routes which were previously incapable of being flown by turboprops. They also acted as "hub raiders" -- allowing the airline to successfully fly into another airline's hub. Maintain market share at low cost.
Pilots: Before the introduction of the RJ pilots looked at the regionals largely as a stepping stone. There were a few lifers, sure -- but nowhere near as many as there are today. As airline managers very quietly parked their DC9s, F28s/F100s, 737-200s, BAe146s... the job opportunities which used to be "entry level" began to disappear.
More and more RJs appeared at commuter airlines... and fewer and fewer of the traditional mainline jobs were available. Why? Because American didn't HAVE an F100 anymore. Continental didnt HAVE a DC9 anymore. USAir didnt HAVE an F100 or a DC9 anymore. Instead Eagle had CRJ700s, Continental had an armada of E145s, and USAir had RJs flown by Mesa, Trans-States, CHQ, and anybody else who was willing to take the chance.
The pilots -- anxious to make themselves more qualified in order to get that "dream job" -- were more than willing to work for sub-par wages in order to get that PIC turbine in the new jets. Thus "Shiny Jet Syndrome" (SJS) was born.
Management: It didn't take management long to see that the RJ was more than a hub-raider --- it was a union killer. They finally had a tool that they could use to successfully outsource the mainline jobs to a lower bidder. With the fee-per-departure program and effective marketing they could make MORE money at lower costs even though the RJ is a high-cost per ASM product.
After all, they weren't giving the customers a discount for flying an RJ! Airfares were still high, but costs were a fraction of what they were at the mainline (and thanks to FPD they were fixed).
They soon realized that, not only could they play the major airlines against the regionals, but they could play regionals against each other. The Portfolio concept was born. Each airline could build a collection of regional "partners" who would bid against each other for additional flying. The only losers were the employees who were forced to take lower pay and reduced benefits at every turn to remain competitive. But they kept lining up to do it!!! The trap was set...
To be continued....the E-Jet revolution...
