Air France Crash - Report out today

[Green]

they are averaged in all laws. If one pilot goes full left and the other full right the plane will remain wings level. Same in pitch. there is a takeover switch that allows you to cancel the other input. But in the heat of the moment it could be easy to forget. Also the problem with the airbus is you can't see the other pilot's input. Unlike a Boeing where both control columns will move from one pilot's input.

 

[Whine Lover]

BINGO.

"...there is a takeover switch that allows you to cancel the other input....with the airbus... you can't see the other pilot's input. Unlike a Boeing where both control columns will move from one pilot's input."

So....you can't see what is happening with the other person's input with the stick/yoke ( at night, in the dark, in this case ) and therefore, one doesn't even have the knowledge that they should implement this "takeover switch".

Poor design.

Again, in a "real" aircraft.....As the upset/stall began at Cruise, the erroneous inputs would have been recognized immediately / visually by the Captain/ACM as the F/O would have hauled the yoke back into his gut.

They might have lost a few thousand feet, and recovered in the Flight Levels....Most likely just a few thousand feet below Cruise after the initial upset/confusion.

Not so with the Bus, and things that don't move correspondingly, and the " Laws of Averages" .

A shame.

But, as Marie Antoinette said...." Let them eat cake."


YKW

 

[Whine Lover]

Simple fix for poor design / training:

- Full Stall Recovery training for everyone. ( You know...Just like we all had in that C-150/2 or PA-128 )



- Airbus Specific:

- Captain performs the Maneuver.

- Memory Item: "Takeover Switch" - SELECTED.


( Yeah, I know....In a perfect World. )


YKW

 

[Smarta$$]

There should also be a caution message telling the crew of conflicting inputs...

 

[SKC]

There should also be a caution message telling the crew of conflicting inputs...

I would think this would be an easy fix. At least an amber alert on the ECAM.

 

[anewunion]

I would think this would be an easy fix. At least an amber alert on the ECAM.

there is a warning, It screams at you " DUAL INPUT !! " ( enough with the jokes)

Also, Stall recovery in the airbus has changed. You are now instructed to lower the nose, decrease the bank angle, and gain airspeed. Basically forget what you were ever taught.

 

[Beetle007]

ATP standards for stall recovery: "Recovers to a reference airspeed, altitude and heading with minimal loss of altitude, airspeed, and heading deviation."

Commercial standards for stall recovery: "Recognizes and recovers promptly as the stall occurs by simultaneously reducing the angle of attack, increasing power to maximum allowable, and leveling the wings to return to a straightand-level flight attitude, with a minimum loss of altitude appropriate for the airplane."


We teach people to try not to lose altitude during stall recovery. Seems crazy when you realize how much altitude is required to recover from a high altitude stall in a transport category airplane.

 

[WSurf]

http://video.foxnews.com/v/16159895...dly-crash/?playlist_id=86857&intcmp=obnetwork

Design Flaw???? Side stick great for single pilot fighters, not for CRM.....

 

[Lear70]

I have to say he's exactly right (something I've mentioned before on this forum about the design of the Airbus that I simply do not like as a pilot).

Was the F/O in error pulling the stick back the whole time? Absolutely. Would it have happened in a Boeing? Highly, highly unlikely. With the yoke crushing the IRO's crotch, it would have been painfully obvious (excuse the pun) that he was pulling back too far to recover the aircraft.

As soon as the F/O told the other two what he'd been doing the whole time (full back stick), the Captain immediately recognized what had been happening. The IRO realized it too after the Captain pointed it out, but too late to recover the aircraft.

I know a lot of people on here love Airbus and for the most part they have a good safety record, but there are several accidents that, in all likelihood, wouldn't have happened in a Boeing because of the way the flight control system is designed. Are there Boeing accidents that wouldn't have happened in an Airbus? Sure. But the point, like the man said, is how do we make sure it doesn't happen again?

Give me ONE good reason why they shouldn't, as a safety issue, build force-feedback into the stick mechanisms through a basic servo that makes them act in tandem... Besides money, give me one good reason why not.

I'd argue that a few hundred million is worth 228 lives from this accident, and who knows how many possible saved in the future.

 

[jonjuan]

For the most part Boeing (and other aircraft with yokes) has a good safety record. How do we stop pilots from pulling back when airspeed bleeds off (or from lining up on the wrong runway?)

 

[jonjuan]

Interesting info about the dude in the video...
http://www.cnn.com/2012/07/05/world/europe/france-air-crash-report/index.html?hpt=hp_t2

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/04/18/richard-quest-cnn-reporte_n_97466.html

CNN personality Richard Quest was busted in Central Park early yesterday with some drugs in his pocket, a rope around his neck that was tied to his genitals, and a sex toy in his boot, law-enforcement sources said.[...]

Quest was initially busted for loitering, the source said. Aside from the oddly configured rope, the search also turned up a sex toy inside of his boot, and a small bag of methamphetamine in his left jacket pocket.
It wasn't immediately clear what the rope was for.

 

[Dumb Pilot]

A friend that I gave OE back in the day is now an RTC on the 320, he gave me a good explanation about pilots developing a false sense of security on the bus with all this protections that are built into the contraption, he tells me that he sees a trend of people even knowing that they are on alternate law (I think that is the phrase he used) but still they don't have a good comprehension that the airplane has no protections at those times, it seems that in the process of making a pilot proof airplane, they have created many other problems with the interphase between humans and the equipment. I like the 76, is an airplane design for a dumb pilot like me.

 

[ImbracableCrunk]

We teach people to try not to lose altitude during stall recovery. Seems crazy when you realize how much altitude is required to recover from a high altitude stall in a transport category airplane.

In my last CQ, we did a high-altitude stall and recovery, a la AF447. It was training at this point, and the instructor had us just sit with the yoke in our laps (Boeing, of course) and watch the world go by for a while. It was some of the more valuable time I've spent in the sim in the last few years.

I think this was driven by our training department, not the FAA. Even the training department at my old regional finally realized that the "with minimal loss of altitude" did not mean "no altitude loss." Sounds like the feds need to wake up.

 

[Ty Webb]

Different stalls for different scenarios . . . . The minimm altitude loss technique is usually an approach stall or a departure stall; not much altitude to lose.

A High-altitude stall is something else entirely and should be practiced in the sim as well. I have flown with a surprising number of pilots who have never hand-flown at FL410 . . . . Not hard to do when it's smooth and you're light, but when you're at the max altitude in moderate or severe turbulence, it's a different animal. Even the engines don't respond as you might think.

 

[SWA Bubba]

Well, at least as of my last PT a month or so ago, Southwest does stall recoveries different than we used to. We used to go to emergency thrust and "relax" back pressure, and essentially just ride it out, with "minimal" altitude loss, exactly as you all describe. Now, our procedures are different, and they're emphasizing this change in the simulator. Now it's lower the nose specifically to increase airspeed, and power addition is secondary. Altitude loss is less important. (However, it's still done at the shaker, so it's more an "approach to stall.") It's more like how you learned in little airplanes, and obviously a change attributable to that Air France crash, seeing as how we did it at high altitude. I'm assume all the other training departments are doing the same thing; our guy said the change was FAA-driven.

On another note, we once did a full stall in a military 707 for training, and didn't recover until it looked like we might start to spin. However, we applied the same recovery technique that everyone here learned back in the day, and damn if the thing didn't recover just like a Cessna 152. Quite the exciting ride, I might add. I guess that sh1t really works.

Bubba