Air France Crash - Report out today

[Whine Lover]

Or, if you don't care to read the whole article...here's the last part/short version. ( Bonin is the Copilot. )



" As the plane approaches 10,000 feet, Robert tries to take back the controls, and pushes forward on the stick, but the plane is in "dual input" mode, and so the system averages his inputs with those of Bonin, who continues to pull back. The nose remains high.

02:13:40 (Robert) Remonte... remonte... remonte... remonte...
Climb... climb... climb... climb...

02:13:40 (Bonin) Mais je suis à fond à cabrer depuis tout à l'heure!
But I've had the stick back the whole time!

At last, Bonin tells the others the crucial fact whose import he has so grievously failed to understand himself.

02:13:42 (Captain) Non, non, non... Ne remonte pas... non, non.
No, no, no... Don't climb... no, no.

02:13:43 (Robert) Alors descends... Alors, donne-moi les commandes... À moi les commandes!
Descend, then... Give me the controls... Give me the controls!

Bonin yields the controls, and Robert finally puts the nose down. The plane begins to regain speed. But it is still descending at a precipitous angle. As they near 2000 feet, the aircraft's sensors detect the fast-approaching surface and trigger a new alarm. There is no time left to build up speed by pushing the plane's nose forward into a dive. At any rate, without warning his colleagues, Bonin once again takes back the controls and pulls his side stick all the way back.

02:14:23 (Robert) Putain, on va taper... C'est pas vrai!
Damn it, we're going to crash... This can't be happening!

02:14:25 (Bonin) Mais qu'est-ce que se passe?
But what's happening?

02:14:27 (Captain) 10 degrès d'assiette...
Ten degrees of pitch...

Exactly 1.4 seconds later, the cockpit voice recorder stops.

Read more: Air France 447 Flight-Data Recorder Transcript - What Really Happened Aboard Air France 447 - Popular Mechanics
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[Dumb Pilot]

Okay...as usual the media has no clue whatsoever.

The final report may not be out offically, but the reason for the crash is well known as of several months ago.

In short, it was an Airbus and the inputs from the control sticks are unlike "normal" aircraft in that one pilot can be doing something that gives no visual input to the other.

The F/O, it was revealed by the CVR, was applying full aft stick all the way to the water. Unbeknownst to the Captain or the ACM.

Had it been a conventional aircraft, the other Crewmembers would have seen the copilot with the yoke pulled back to his gut and quickly corrected the situation many thousands of feet above the water/impact.

Read the transcripts for yourself...it's pretty messed up.


YKW

I have, and I agree with you up to a point, there is more here than the fact that the pilot monitoring couldn't see control movement, I believe one of the problems here is that as somebody mentioned there is only training of an approach to a stall in a departure scenario, it is emphasize that you should apply max power and ride the shaker, training that over and over again is causing people to associate the shaker with that recovery maneuver, we have had too many examples of pilots doing the same thing when confronted with a stall, the Colgan accident, a West Carribean MD80 I think it was that crashed in Venezuela, the Pinncle crash, the 757 off the coast of Puerto Plata back in 96, there are many other stalls that were recovered thus never made the news, that the recovery was done late in the event and the initial action the crews took was to ride the shaker and apply max power while at altitude, all these other cases were conventional cases where the pilot monitoring had a control column in front of him and could see the control inputs, I believe there are training/ behavioral issues at play here as well.

 

[Whine Lover]

Very good point. Totally agreed it may have been a contributing factor, although ultimately not the cause.

I have been quietly ranting about this since I began 121 flying many years ago.

I believe I asked my first Instructor in my first real 121 Ground School " Well, shouldn't we lower the nose a tad to decrease AOA also? "

I got the "Who farted, what-the-hell-do-you-know-Probie..? " look.

It was then that I realized.... Airline Operating Manuals and Federal Regulations supercede the Laws of Physics, The Universe, and Common Sense.




Pull to the shaker. All the way to the trees ( or water ). Right. Got it!

YKW

 

[redflyer65]

It's amazing how far behind the power curve they became. You would think that with engines that size that at some lower altitude you would have seen some performance gain at max thrust. Very sad.

 

[airplane wizard]

Are the inputs to each stick averaged out only in alternate law, or in normal and direct law too?

 

[Green]

they are averaged in all laws. If one pilot goes full left and the other full right the plane will remain wings level. Same in pitch. there is a takeover switch that allows you to cancel the other input. But in the heat of the moment it could be easy to forget. Also the problem with the airbus is you can't see the other pilot's input. Unlike a Boeing where both control columns will move from one pilot's input.

 

[Whine Lover]

BINGO.

"...there is a takeover switch that allows you to cancel the other input....with the airbus... you can't see the other pilot's input. Unlike a Boeing where both control columns will move from one pilot's input."

So....you can't see what is happening with the other person's input with the stick/yoke ( at night, in the dark, in this case ) and therefore, one doesn't even have the knowledge that they should implement this "takeover switch".

Poor design.

Again, in a "real" aircraft.....As the upset/stall began at Cruise, the erroneous inputs would have been recognized immediately / visually by the Captain/ACM as the F/O would have hauled the yoke back into his gut.

They might have lost a few thousand feet, and recovered in the Flight Levels....Most likely just a few thousand feet below Cruise after the initial upset/confusion.

Not so with the Bus, and things that don't move correspondingly, and the " Laws of Averages" .

A shame.

But, as Marie Antoinette said...." Let them eat cake."


YKW

 

[Whine Lover]

Simple fix for poor design / training:

- Full Stall Recovery training for everyone. ( You know...Just like we all had in that C-150/2 or PA-128 )



- Airbus Specific:

- Captain performs the Maneuver.

- Memory Item: "Takeover Switch" - SELECTED.


( Yeah, I know....In a perfect World. )


YKW

 

[Smarta$$]

There should also be a caution message telling the crew of conflicting inputs...

 

[SKC]

There should also be a caution message telling the crew of conflicting inputs...

I would think this would be an easy fix. At least an amber alert on the ECAM.