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Air France Crash - Report out today

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I would think this would be an easy fix. At least an amber alert on the ECAM.

there is a warning, It screams at you " DUAL INPUT !! " ( enough with the jokes)

Also, Stall recovery in the airbus has changed. You are now instructed to lower the nose, decrease the bank angle, and gain airspeed. Basically forget what you were ever taught.
 
ATP standards for stall recovery: "Recovers to a reference airspeed, altitude and heading with minimal loss of altitude, airspeed, and heading deviation."

Commercial standards for stall recovery: "Recognizes and recovers promptly as the stall occurs by simultaneously reducing the angle of attack, increasing power to maximum allowable, and leveling the wings to return to a straightand-level flight attitude, with a minimum loss of altitude appropriate for the airplane."


We teach people to try not to lose altitude during stall recovery. Seems crazy when you realize how much altitude is required to recover from a high altitude stall in a transport category airplane.
 
I have to say he's exactly right (something I've mentioned before on this forum about the design of the Airbus that I simply do not like as a pilot).

Was the F/O in error pulling the stick back the whole time? Absolutely. Would it have happened in a Boeing? Highly, highly unlikely. With the yoke crushing the IRO's crotch, it would have been painfully obvious (excuse the pun) that he was pulling back too far to recover the aircraft.

As soon as the F/O told the other two what he'd been doing the whole time (full back stick), the Captain immediately recognized what had been happening. The IRO realized it too after the Captain pointed it out, but too late to recover the aircraft.

I know a lot of people on here love Airbus and for the most part they have a good safety record, but there are several accidents that, in all likelihood, wouldn't have happened in a Boeing because of the way the flight control system is designed. Are there Boeing accidents that wouldn't have happened in an Airbus? Sure. But the point, like the man said, is how do we make sure it doesn't happen again?

Give me ONE good reason why they shouldn't, as a safety issue, build force-feedback into the stick mechanisms through a basic servo that makes them act in tandem... Besides money, give me one good reason why not.

I'd argue that a few hundred million is worth 228 lives from this accident, and who knows how many possible saved in the future.
 
For the most part Boeing (and other aircraft with yokes) has a good safety record. How do we stop pilots from pulling back when airspeed bleeds off (or from lining up on the wrong runway?)
 
Interesting info about the dude in the video...
http://www.cnn.com/2012/07/05/world/europe/france-air-crash-report/index.html?hpt=hp_t2

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/04/18/richard-quest-cnn-reporte_n_97466.html :eek:

CNN personality Richard Quest was busted in Central Park early yesterday with some drugs in his pocket, a rope around his neck that was tied to his genitals, and a sex toy in his boot, law-enforcement sources said.[...]

Quest was initially busted for loitering, the source said. Aside from the oddly configured rope, the search also turned up a sex toy inside of his boot, and a small bag of methamphetamine in his left jacket pocket.
It wasn't immediately clear what the rope was for.
 
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A friend that I gave OE back in the day is now an RTC on the 320, he gave me a good explanation about pilots developing a false sense of security on the bus with all this protections that are built into the contraption, he tells me that he sees a trend of people even knowing that they are on alternate law (I think that is the phrase he used) but still they don't have a good comprehension that the airplane has no protections at those times, it seems that in the process of making a pilot proof airplane, they have created many other problems with the interphase between humans and the equipment. I like the 76, is an airplane design for a dumb pilot like me.
 
We teach people to try not to lose altitude during stall recovery. Seems crazy when you realize how much altitude is required to recover from a high altitude stall in a transport category airplane.
In my last CQ, we did a high-altitude stall and recovery, a la AF447. It was training at this point, and the instructor had us just sit with the yoke in our laps (Boeing, of course) and watch the world go by for a while. It was some of the more valuable time I've spent in the sim in the last few years.

I think this was driven by our training department, not the FAA. Even the training department at my old regional finally realized that the "with minimal loss of altitude" did not mean "no altitude loss." Sounds like the feds need to wake up.
 
Different stalls for different scenarios . . . . The minimm altitude loss technique is usually an approach stall or a departure stall; not much altitude to lose.

A High-altitude stall is something else entirely and should be practiced in the sim as well. I have flown with a surprising number of pilots who have never hand-flown at FL410 . . . . Not hard to do when it's smooth and you're light, but when you're at the max altitude in moderate or severe turbulence, it's a different animal. Even the engines don't respond as you might think.
 
Well, at least as of my last PT a month or so ago, Southwest does stall recoveries different than we used to. We used to go to emergency thrust and "relax" back pressure, and essentially just ride it out, with "minimal" altitude loss, exactly as you all describe. Now, our procedures are different, and they're emphasizing this change in the simulator. Now it's lower the nose specifically to increase airspeed, and power addition is secondary. Altitude loss is less important. (However, it's still done at the shaker, so it's more an "approach to stall.") It's more like how you learned in little airplanes, and obviously a change attributable to that Air France crash, seeing as how we did it at high altitude. I'm assume all the other training departments are doing the same thing; our guy said the change was FAA-driven.

On another note, we once did a full stall in a military 707 for training, and didn't recover until it looked like we might start to spin. However, we applied the same recovery technique that everyone here learned back in the day, and damn if the thing didn't recover just like a Cessna 152. Quite the exciting ride, I might add. I guess that sh1t really works. :)

Bubba
 
Regarding the Airbus design flaws -

Can anybody remember a respected operator that has crashed one due to pilot error ? No, Air France is not a respected operator in terms of their flight crews and training.

A Qantas A330 and a Northwest A330 had exactly the same problem as the Air France A330. In both cases the problem was solved with little fuss and certainly not a hull loss.

The Airbus could be improved; Sidesticks that move together and thrust levers that move in Autothrust mode. However, it's the quality of the pilot and the training that will be the deciding factor.
 
A direct indicating AOA indicator (not computer generated) would be a big help too. These guys did not identify they were stalled. If you don't recognize what the problem is you won't respond with the correct action. All the new training would not have helped. All this computer generated information is great when it works but there are to many failure modes that have yet to be seen. As this has demonstrated. If they had a simple AOA indicator I find it hard to believe they would have held back stick as long as they did.
 
I haven't read the report but all the post here seem to be blaming the pilots for failing to recover from a stall... Fair enough, but WTF put the plane in the stall to begin with...

Is it true that no one can put an Airbus into a stall except Airbus?
 
A direct indicating AOA indicator (not computer generated) would be a big help too. These guys did not identify they were stalled. If you don't recognize what the problem is you won't respond with the correct action. All the new training would not have helped. All this computer generated information is great when it works but there are to many failure modes that have yet to be seen. As this has demonstrated. If they had a simple AOA indicator I find it hard to believe they would have held back stick as long as they did.

+1. such a simple instrument, such a huge piece of information.
 
I haven't read the report but all the post here seem to be blaming the pilots for failing to recover from a stall... Fair enough, but WTF put the plane in the stall to begin with...

I thought it was the PF by increasing pitch.
 
Not defending the Bus v.s. Boeing here but as a Bus driver when the other guy pushes the stick you can see what he is doing on your PFD. Correct me if I'm wrong but when you do the flight control checks the cross moves on your side. I'm sure when the poopy hits the fan you are not all aware of what's going on but doesn't the PFD show you what Sideshow Bob is doing. Not arm chair QB'ng here.
 
No hardware improvement or software change will fix an inexperienced pilot with poor training.


Fly. The. Wing.

You only have to miss the hard or wet stuff by 1 inch.

No mention that I have seen in these media reports about backgrounds of the pilots other than that they were "experienced". But were they experienced in anything outside the bell-jar of 121 Ops?? MPL maybe?? A lot of jibber-jabber after Colgan 3407 on these interwebs about Renslow and Shaw, and about the technicalities of her moving the flaps, yada, yada, yada.. Kinda like all this minutae about the bus. Seems pretty irrelevant to me compared to the fact that a certificated pilot held a deep stall all the way to the crash site. Always seems like a lot of arguments about experience and training and quality vs. quantity or how GA experience doesn't matter in 121, etc, etc. This is my personal high-horse, but: Seems like another example where a year or two of flight instruction or banner towing would've done a world of good. The simplest explanation is usually the right one.

Don't stall.
If you do, recover.
Try not to hit anything, but if the wing ain't flying, you're gonna.
 
I have that book sitting right over here on my bookshelf. One heck of a good read/study, although I haven't cracked it since a couple years after college when I got a copy after my (old-school) Lear Captain pointed me to it.

I agree with your post 100%. Most pilots coming out of the puppy mills lack a thorough understanding of swept-wing aerodynamics. Hell, at PCL we were taking pilots fresh out of GIA or other places who had never flown a jet, giving them ZERO information on how they're aerodynamically different and the affects of altitude on the wing, and throwing them in the plane. Hence 3701 where they took the plane higher than its envelope that night, then accelerated stalled / spun the aircraft when they tried to hold on to that altitude, even overriding the pusher.

3407 and this flight, same basic idea. No one recovered the plane.

There but for the grace of God go I, as I've said before, but I gotta think if you put someone with a lot of experience hand-flying airplanes who has a thorough understanding of Aerodynamics, those accidents don't happen, the error chain gets broken somewhere before the actual impact.

That's why I will never, ever, ever be supportive of ab-initio training. In any country. People need years of hand-flying experience before they need to be flying airliners around, especially since they're so automated and stick skills suffer anyway. If you don't have them to begin with, the deterioration of what little skill they have is only going to be that much more pronounced.

I still practice hand-flying the airplane (including disconnecting the a/t) up to cruise and out of 18,0 in the descent on the arrival if the weather is decent, just to keep my skills at least half-a$$ decent. I don't care if it's accepted standard practice or not. Might save my own butt someday. YMMV
 
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BINGO.

"...there is a takeover switch that allows you to cancel the other input....with the airbus... you can't see the other pilot's input. Unlike a Boeing where both control columns will move from one pilot's input."

So....you can't see what is happening with the other person's input with the stick/yoke ( at night, in the dark, in this case ) and therefore, one doesn't even have the knowledge that they should implement this "takeover switch".

Poor design.

Again, in a "real" aircraft.....As the upset/stall began at Cruise, the erroneous inputs would have been recognized immediately / visually by the Captain/ACM as the F/O would have hauled the yoke back into his gut.

They might have lost a few thousand feet, and recovered in the Flight Levels....Most likely just a few thousand feet below Cruise after the initial upset/confusion.

Not so with the Bus, and things that don't move correspondingly, and the " Laws of Averages" .

A shame.

But, as Marie Antoinette said...." Let them eat cake."


YKW

Don't be so quick to judge. An Airbus is as a 'real' airplane like any other, provided you understand it. A 'real' airplane Birgenair B757 crashed into the Ocean after the crew took off with only the Captain-side pitot probe blocked. The entire time, the standby and FO airspeed was accurate, and the attitude indicator (ADI) was always accurate. The CA was pilot flying, his airspeed readings were erroneous, and he got the stick shaker. He flew it the entire time in the stick shaker, and stalled it into the ocean. The entire time, his FOs sat there without providing any help, nor did they have an understanding of what was going on.

Even a real airplane will stall and crash into the ocean if there's lack of specific proper procedures and training.
 

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