Air France 447, automation and the pilot

[enigma]

Not true. I assume you are referring to Pierre-Cedric Bonin. He had a glider rating. The pilots I have flown with who have a glider rating are a pretty good stick. That makes this whole accident more puzzling. Not accusing or defending anybody. Those are the facts.

This is true and it's about the only item I've seen in this entire thread that is factual.

I highly suggest that everyone download the official reports from the French BEA website and read all of those reports.

http://www.bea.aero/en/enquetes/flight.af.447/flight.af.447.php would be your starting point.


This accident was not as simple as most seem to think! We had some cheese with lots of holes, and on that night they all lined up.

The only thing I personally consider "pilot error" is the Captains actions. Other than that, it's way too complicated to blame on the pilots. The Captain came back into the cockpit and was told, "We lost all control of the airplane we don 't understand anything we've tried everything". This happened at 2h 11min 46.7 s of flight. (What I wrote is an exact quote from the official BEA accident report) I can't for the life of me understand why the Captain did not at that time, having been given that assessment of the flight, WHY HE DIDN'T TAKE HIS SEAT? ? ? He never attempted to fly the airplane. He either stood over their shoulders or sat in the jumpseat all the way to sea level.

 

[enigma]

They may have discussed it. They didn't do it. That's my point. Why? That's the part I find so puzzling

I don't know how to post a picture from the BEA report, but the interim report dated 27 May 2011 shows their flight path. They began a left deviation of about 10 degrees 80 or Kilometres before the upset.

 

[freightdogfred]

I don't know how to post a picture from the BEA report, but the interim report dated 27 May 2011 shows their flight path. They began a left deviation of about 10 degrees 80 or Kilometres before the upset.

I understand that. If you look at the links I posted previously, they were already in the thick of it by then

 

[enigma]

I understand that. If you look at the links I posted previously, they were already in the thick of it by then

You said that they didn't deviate. They did deviate. Maybe not to the extent required to avoid all the weather, but it isn't fair to them to state that they did not deviate.

As far as the weather pics on the site you linked to, they seem to be using the same images that the BEA used, and the BEA stated that those images were not sufficient to determine the conditions at the time of the accident. Additionally, the turbulence recorded by the doomed FDR's showed nothing more than light turbulence indicating that the w/x at time of upset was not particularly dangerous from a turbulent viewpoint.

 

[gmsguy]

[/U]

The only thing I personally consider "pilot error" is the Captains actions. Other than that, it's way too complicated to blame on the pilots.

Seriously?

"Above all, this was a stall accident. Initial prevention of the stall was possible. This is proven by a number of other flights with the same malfunction that maintained control, often with little effort. All indications show that the pitch up that resulted in the loss of airspeed and excessive angles of attack were pilot induced." - Bill Palmer, Understanding Air France 447.

Pilot sidestick inputs resulting in pitch attitudes exceeding 15 degrees nose up (at FL 350 in a transport category aircraft) and the loss of over 50 knots of airspeed within 30 seconds of the autopilot disconnecting is not something you consider pilot error?

Incidentally, didn't the BEA's final report say that by the time the Captain returned to the flight deck that it was "too late" to recover control of it? Perhaps the Captain's actions prior to returning to the flight deck contributed more to the crash than his inaction afterwards.

 

[nwaf16dude]

[/U]

Seriously?

"Above all, this was a stall accident. Initial prevention of the stall was possible. This is proven by a number of other flights with the same malfunction that maintained control, often with little effort. All indications show that the pitch up that resulted in the loss of airspeed and excessive angles of attack were pilot induced." - Bill Palmer, Understanding Air France 447.

Pilot sidestick inputs resulting in pitch attitudes exceeding 15 degrees nose up (at FL 350 in a transport category aircraft) and the loss of over 50 knots of airspeed within 30 seconds of the autopilot disconnecting is not something you consider pilot error?

Incidentally, didn't the BEA's final report say that by the time the Captain returned to the flight deck that it was "too late" to recover control of it? Perhaps the Captain's actions prior to returning to the flight deck contributed more to the crash than his inaction afterwards.

If the captain had returned to the cockpit, gotten into a control seat, immediately recognized the problem, and did the exact right thing, he theoretically could have recovered the airplane. Considering that he most likely just woke up from REM sleep, all of the above was probably impossible.

 

[gmsguy]

If the captain had returned to the cockpit, gotten into a control seat, immediately recognized the problem, and did the exact right thing, he theoretically could have recovered the airplane. Considering that he most likely just woke up from REM sleep, all of the above was probably impossible.

Perhaps...but not according to the BEA final report. Also, isn't there debate concerning the whereabouts of the Captain once he left the flight deck?.

If I recall correctly from the book, the Captain didn't acknowledge the repeated calls from the crew with the normal "knock" on the wall. Furthermore, I believe the author (Palmer) remarks about the way the Captain enters the flight deck as if he was not answering a call. Instead, he believes the Captain was returning to the flight deck because of his own curiosity and not from the rest area.

So his actions leaving the flight deck and before returning are questionable, and for me, where he is most culpable - not his actions once he was back in the flight deck.

Again, it was a stall accident above everything else. For two professional pilots unable to maintain straight and level flight for 1 minute while hand flying is baffling to me...and where the blame should be placed.

 

[Wesb737fo]

Again, it was a stall accident above everything else. For two professional pilots unable to maintain straight and level flight for 1 minute while hand flying is baffling to me...and where the blame should be placed.

Yeah, seems basically just that. A high altitude stall. Maybe not so baffling that the less experienced FO stalled the plane after the auto-pilot suddenly handed him the plane in a less than smooth ride at 350, but more so why Robert David called out the fact that he was climbing and then directed his attention somewhere else until the plane stabilized. I suppose there was a lot of puckering going on in that flight deck. Didn't help that the boss apparently had partied a little too hard the night before.

 

[freightdogfred]

You said that they didn't deviate. They did deviate. Maybe not to the extent required to avoid all the weather, but it isn't fair to them to state that they did not deviate.

As far as the weather pics on the site you linked to, they seem to be using the same images that the BEA used, and the BEA stated that those images were not sufficient to determine the conditions at the time of the accident. Additionally, the turbulence recorded by the doomed FDR's showed nothing more than light turbulence indicating that the w/x at time of upset was not particularly dangerous from a turbulent viewpoint.

I find that very hard to believe. Entering a cell with tops upwards of 56,000 ft will contain more than light turbulence, don't ask me how I know.

 

[SpauldingSmails]

Mmm, yeah. Tops don't get to 56,000' on the shear will of moisture alone.