WSJ article
Interesting article from the Wall Street Journal, written by a retired fighter pilot.
http://www.opinionjournal.com/extra/?id=110002966
From Tragedy to Justice
Taking stock of the "friendly fire" case.
BY THOMAS MCINERNEY
Sunday, January 26, 2003 12:01 a.m. EST
On April 17, 2002, around 12:52 a.m., an Airborne Warning and Control Aircraft (Awacs) controller told the two F-16 pilots of Coffee 51 Flight: "Hold fire--need more details on Safire," the acronym for surface-to-air fire that one of the pilots thought was tracking the other's aircraft. The two F-16s in the sky near Kandahar, Afghanistan, were on what is termed an "on call interdiction" mission, circling the area to respond to any calls from ground units needing their cover fire. Shortly after the Awacs order to hold fire, the wingman--Coffee 52--rolled in on a target declaring, "I got some men on a road and it looks like they are firing at us. I am rolling in in self-defense."
American rules of engagement always authorize a response in self-defense. Coffee 52 dropped a 500-pound laser-guided bomb and scored a direct hit on Alpha Company, Third Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, which was engaged in night live-fire training at Tarnak Farms Range. Four Canadian soldiers were killed, and eight wounded.
Four minutes elapsed from the time Coffee Flight initially saw the firing on the ground to the time it released the laser-guided bomb. Eight seconds after impact, Awacs called out, "Friendlies."
People make mistakes in the heat of combat. Was this one that we should accept as a tragic error and write off as an honest mistake? Many were made during Desert Storm, when we had around 30% of our casualties attributed to friendly fire. Why hadn't this live-fire exercise been briefed to the pilots, Maj. William Umbach and Maj. Harry Schmidt, two very well-qualified pilots from the Illinois Air National Guard? What was the urgency of this target that it had to be attacked after Awacs had already told Coffee 52 to "hold fire" when he initially requested to fire on the location with his 20mm cannon? We all know that they would not deliberately fire on friendly forces. What went wrong that night?
The military has a process to answer these questions, and it is under way. Earlier, a coalition investigation board found the cause of this friendly-fire incident to be the failure of the two pilots to exercise appropriate flight discipline. This resulted in a violation of the rules of engagement and inappropriate use of lethal force. Commander of the U.S. Central Command, Gen. Tommy Franks, approved the investigation board's findings and returned the report to the Air Force for action.
Earlier this month, an Article 32 hearing (the military equivalent of a grand jury) started at Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana. Prior to the start of the Article 32, the case had been well-publicized in the media by the pilots' lawyers and supporters. Unfortunately, virtually all those who have appeared on television are not fighter pilots and have not experienced surface-to-air fire at night. In addition, none were in the chain of command as a General Court Martial Authority. Because I have served in both of those capacities, I want to explain to the public the facts as I understand them.
We have an extraordinary amount of recorded audio and video to reconstruct this case, and most of it is in the public domain. I have personally reviewed the audio and video tapes from both cockpits and talked to Air Force members who have appeared at the Article 32 hearing.
The issue is whether Coffee 52, Maj. Schmidt, was acting in self-defense when he dropped the laser-guided bomb on friendly forces. The initial evidence does not support this contention for several reasons.
First, he had been told to "stand by" and "hold fire" by the Awacs controller.
Second, surface-to-air fire--for those who have experienced it at night--is very easy to distinguish from ground-to-ground fire, and Maj. Schmidt apparently mistook ground fire for fire aimed at his flight leader. Coffee 51 Flight was at 18,000 feet or higher, and surface-to-air fire is not very effective at that altitude--which is why they were there.
Third, if the surface-to-air fire was tracking them, they took no evasive action nor discussed it when it happened. There was never any urgency expressed on the audio recordings.
Fourth, from the time he locked his forward-looking infrared pod on the target, there was no enemy fire coming at either plane, according to both their cockpit video recorders. After bomb impact, and only when asked by Awacs, Coffee 52's audio recording did say "it seemed like it [Safire] was tracking around us and trying to lead us, with some sort of continuous fire with tops around 10,000 feet."
Fifth, the daily airspace control order had stipulated that Tarnak Farms was a restricted operating zone with small arms firing up to 11,000 feet 24/7! Unfortunately, the pilots had not seen this nor had their squadron intelligence briefed them about this continuous restricted zone.
These facts compel me to say that there is sufficient reason for the CIB to have acted, and for the Article 32 investigation to proceed. We have an important obligation to protect the integrity of our command-and-control system and our support of coalition ground forces. People make mistakes in combat, and we accept that, but when it appears that there is a violation of the rules of engagement we must investigate and take appropriate action. This was not a split-second life-or-death decision. This was done during a very slow night of no combat activity by two very skilled pilots.
That said--and this cannot be stressed enough--there is absolutely no evidence to support the spurious claims made in the media that "go pills," faulty night-vision goggles or, most incredibly, U.S.-Canada relations had anything to do with why the rules of engagement were violated that night above Afghanistan.
As Coffee 52 was exiting the area after being told by Awacs that there were "friendlies" in the area, he said, "I hope that was the right thing to do," and his leader, Coffee 51, responded, "Me too." Both men knew they would be scrutinized closely for their actions that night. What counts most now is that the process of military justice be fair, as I have every expectation it will be. The Air Force must continue to do the right thing, as must Majs. Schmidt and Umbach. A tragic mistake was made and four brave Canadian soldiers were killed and eight injured. We--and they--are entitled to a full and fair accounting by our military authorities. Trying this case in the media would be a great injustice to both men, and to the service to which they belong.
Gen. McInerney, a retired three-star Air Force lieutenant general and former assistant vice chief of staff, is now a Fox News military analyst.
