Not only have we "been there, done that":
We approved the first B-scale, which dominoed to other airlines;
We were the last to get rid of B-scale: guys hired in 2000 still had to do a few months of B-scale after they got off probation. B-scale is a VERY ugly word at APA, and I never see it happening again.
To get back to the point of the OP, "AA Plans", I think Don Carty is accomplishing both of his objectives: positioning AA for a successful future, and lowering pilot's expectations during contract negotiations. There are many things going on here, but the most important are:
1. Passenger traffic has returned strongly. Sun July 7th AA set a record for RPMs (ever).
2. AA pilots are making up to 30% less than UAL and DAL pilots.
After parking airplanes, writing down the cost, and flying an 87% load factor on Jul 7th, AMR still claims to be losing money.
If a 30% pilot pay advantage combined with a record RPM day done with fewer airplanes cannot produce a profit, then the business model is flawed.
Now comes the kicker: what can be done? Do we scale back costs to meet the lower revenue? Or do we expand, and begin to charge small increases in fares? Don Carty says (during contract negotiations) that we have to shrink, and either lay off workers or accept XXX crappy deal. After we sign XXX crappy deal to prevent more threatened furloughs, watch for AA to expand like they should, but with the pilots holding the proverbial bag. Such is the job of the CEO, and such is the job of unions to prevent the bag from being too full.
While talking about this, why are AWA and AAA still in the game? Should we be forced into fare wares with companies that would be bankrupt except for federal loan guarantees? How about letting a couple of these companies go under and instantly getting rid of the excess capacity?
Just a thought as almost all companies struggle to make money. This is a capitalist market, right? Not a socialist one?