10 JAN 2007 NTSB determines cause of fatal CRJ crash in Jefferson City

[acaTerry]

and 2) the airplane flight manuals that did not communicate to pilots the importance of maintaining a minimum airspeed to keep the engine cores rotating. (NTSB)

To me, this is like having to tell someone to wipe their azz when the take a sheet.

 

[ATRCA]

I agree as far as the crew goes, however PCL, and the industry as a whole absolutely not. This was a bell weather event in the regional industry, and despite some very good people it also highlights some HUGE shortcomings in training, standardization, experience, duty day, and on and on...

To blame it on the dead guys and move on is exactly what we do not want to do, because there are any number of crews out there now who are capable of repeating in one form or another some of the mistakes made.

To wit look at the preliminary results of the investigation into the Corporate Airlines crash in 2004. Informal Banter, professional demeanor, and failure to comply with standard operating procedure were front and center in this accident as well.


http://www.ntsb.gov/events/2006/Kirksville/human_performance.pdf

I see nothing in your profile that would suggest you know the first thing about the "regional industry." Is there something missing? Have you been employed by said airlines or are you just assuming we are inferior airmen? BTW, a brief glance at the last 20 yrs of accidents in this country will prove without a doubt that aircrew have been at the very tip of the spear with regard to blame. If I am wrong and you have infact worked on our side of the business then I appologize in advance.

As an aside, I knew the Capt. on this flight, good guy but this was probably one of the worst EVER examples of what not to do, how not to behave and they deserve every bit of blame that was placed on them.

 

[Fly4hire]

I see nothing in your profile that would suggest you know the first thing about the "regional industry." Is there something missing? Have you been employed by said airlines or are you just assuming we are inferior airmen?

I didn't realize you have to be, or been from the regional side to comment on the NTSB findings? I fly and talk constanly with pilots who are from the feeders, and it is well recognized by just about everyone that the experience level is much less for entry, and the training is frequently lacking.

I never said anything about "inferior airman". Close to half the excellent pilots I work with are from that background. I do think that lack of experience and training, coupled with poor judgement are a deadly combination - and one you are much more likely to see at a feeder operation strapped for crews and lowering minimums.

 

[Lear70]

and 2) the airplane flight manuals that did not communicate to pilots the importance of maintaining a minimum airspeed to keep the engine cores rotating. (NTSB)

To me, this is like having to tell someone to wipe their azz when the take a sheet.

That's a very elitist approach to take.

Are you trying to tell me that EVERY 400 hour pilot should AUTOMATICALLY KNOW from ANY of the FAA basic manuals they studied to obtain their Commercial Multiengine ratings swept-wing jet aerodynamic and turbine engine theory?

Here's a hint, there's NOTHING in those manuals that even BEGINS to deal with this, nor is it in the PCL manuals.

Therefore, it falls to an operator who KNOWS they are hiring pilots with ZERO experience in this environment to adequately train their new-hire pilots, even Street Captains if they have zero jet time. Remember, an airline is supposed to train to the lowest common denominator in the interest of safety.

This is not to say that the pilots had no responsibility to find out this information for themselves, but that speaks more to the current generation of pilot and their general laziness and disinterest in improving their professional knowledge and skill set than any disregard for safety. Not ALL young pilots fit this "mold", but I saw this a LOT at PCL, and this accident is an excellent example of it.

I honestly and truly believe these guys had NO clue they were endangering themselves to that degree until it was too late. I KNOW it was the case with the F/O, I had just flown with him a few weeks prior to the accident, and he was simply too green to know any better, period.

In short, they were inadequately trained, inadequately experienced, as well as inadequately professional in their behavior. The NTSB report reflects that lack of training and experience as well, so it's not JUST my professional opinion, but theirs as well (which I was also saying LONG before this report came out).

Maybe your airline better trains its pilots... let's hope that they ALL train better after this tragedy.

 

[Joe Schmo]

I didn't realize you have to be, or been from the regional side to comment on the NTSB findings? I fly and talk constanly with pilots who are from the feeders, and it is well recognized by just about everyone that the experience level is much less for entry, and the training is frequently lacking.

I never said anything about "inferior airman". Close to half the excellent pilots I work with are from that background. I do think that lack of experience and training, coupled with poor judgement are a deadly combination - and one you are much more likely to see at a feeder operation strapped for crews and lowering minimums.

What's a feeder?

 

[DiverDriver]

and 2) the airplane flight manuals that did not communicate to pilots the importance of maintaining a minimum airspeed to keep the engine cores rotating. (NTSB)

To me, this is like having to tell someone to wipe their azz when the take a sheet.

It didn't tell them? You mean they didn't have the same 2 engine out procedure memory item of MAINTAIN 240 KIAS / .75 MACH until ready to relight? That wasn't in their procedure? Really?

But I will agree that there is more to learn about this situation. "What if" your flame out at high altititude was the result of volcanic ash or lightning (which has caused other flameouts on CF-34s). The cause of the flameout in this case is horrible yet is it possible to find yourself in the same situation from other causes? Yes? So what are you going to do about it? I've sat many hours thinking about this situation. Night. Dual flame out. Only CA side screens on. ADG autodeployed. Sitting in wrong seat (ok that one I'm sure I won't have to face unless I'm doing OE some day). Stall warbler going off. Stick shaker. Stick pusher. Trying to fly out of the upset from the right seat looking at screens on the left side of cockpit. Depressurizing. Trying to decide which procedure I want to start with. Dual engine failure? Emergency power? Depressurization? There was a sh!tload of things going wrong all at once. Trying to decide which to handle first is mind numbing if you think about it by putting yourself in that situation. Sitting here on the ground I have an idea of what I'd try to do. And that's a good thing. It has really made me think about some things and how they interrelate on the CRJ. Does it make me think "that can't happen to me"? No. If it happens once it can happen again for other reasons.

 

[Amish RakeFight]

Or on an industry, that as a result of socio-political-economic forces fostered by an administration hostile to labor, has been able to reduce wages and benefits to the point where this sort of inexperience and immaturity is all they can attract to fly thier new lower cost airlines.

These guys had the old PCL mins - now they want to reduce the Captain minimums to 1800 hrs vs. 3000.

I'm sure in some dark room somewhere, NWA and PCL have caclulated the cost of not having enough Captains to fly thier planes vs. the business impact of dead bodies and bad press and made thier pact with the devil. Of course the cost of paying a better wage and increasing hiring minimums to attract a better qualified candidate is not in that calculation....

Actually, this occured during the Ford Pinto era.

In a rush to compete with the onslaught of foreign (mostly Japanese) vehicles flooding the market, Ford began a race to build a car that would compete with thier rivals for sales. The car they created was the Ford Pinto and it required that it be built to very specific limits in terms of weight, price, fuel economy, etc. All of this in as short a time as possible to enter the emerging small car market.

Now Ford put their engineers to work, and soon enough the Pinto was born. Testing to push it through to production had to be quick. Finally, the vehicle they designed under the name Pinto was road tested and released.

At some point either just before or after production on the already constructed assembly lines, Ford learned of a flaw in their vehicle. Ford realized that this particular vehicle was highly susceptible to rear-end collisions which almost invariably trapped the occupants and caused a explosive fire. This was all due to the design of the rear-end of the car. When impacted from behind, the poor design casued the gas tank to crush which created a fire and the impact itself crushed the doors in such a way that they were unable to evacuate. This scenario, as you can imagine, casued a few deaths when hit from behind.

Ford realized the implications of this. In order to resolve the problem, they would need to recall the Pinto and retrofit a 10 cent part which prevent this type of horrific incident to occur. Recalls are no good they reasoned. It would also cost money to make any changes to the asembly line process. Also no good.

Ford's actuaries firgured out that it would be CHEAPER to have a given amount of fatalities per year due to this type of accident rather than recall or install the part. It was determined by them that you can put a value on someones life. It was far cheaper to anticipate a certain amount of these rear-end collisions, which may or may not end up in litigation and if so, pay out in settlements, than recall every vehicle with this 10 cent part.

Go figure.


.

 

[Rez O. Lewshun]

Actually, this occured during the Ford Pinto era.

In a rush to compete with the onslaught of foreign (mostly Japanese) vehicles flooding the market, Ford began a race to build a car that would compete with thier rivals for sales. The car they created was the Ford Pinto and it required that it be built to very specific limits in terms of weight, price, fuel economy, etc. All of this in as short a time as possible to enter the emerging small car market.

Now Ford put their engineers to work, and soon enough the Pinto was born. Testing to push it through to production had to be quick. Finally, the vehicle they designed under the name Pinto was road tested and released.

At some point either just before or after production on the already constructed assembly lines, Ford learned of a flaw in their vehicle. Ford realized that this particular vehicle was highly susceptible to rear-end collisions which almost invariably trapped the occupants and caused a explosive fire. This was all due to the design of the rear-end of the car. When impacted from behind, the poor design casued the gas tank to crush which created a fire and the impact itself crushed the doors in such a way that they were unable to evacuate. This scenario, as you can imagine, casued a few deaths when hit from behind.

Ford realized the implications of this. In order to resolve the problem, they would need to recall the Pinto and retrofit a 10 cent part which prevent this type of horrific incident to occur. Recalls are no good they reasoned. It would also cost money to make any changes to the asembly line process. Also no good.

Ford's actuaries firgured out that it would be CHEAPER to have a given amount of fatalities per year due to this type of accident rather than recall or install the part. It was determined by them that you can put a value on someones life. It was far cheaper to anticipate a certain amount of these rear-end collisions, which may or may not end up in litigation and if so, pay out in settlements, than recall every vehicle with this 10 cent part.

Go figure.


.

And on a related point.... why do we need ALPA when Corporations have it all figured out....

 

[flyboyike]

That's a very elitist approach to take.

Are you trying to tell me that EVERY 400 hour pilot should AUTOMATICALLY KNOW from ANY of the FAA basic manuals they studied to obtain their Commercial Multiengine ratings swept-wing jet aerodynamic and turbine engine theory?

Here's a hint, there's NOTHING in those manuals that even BEGINS to deal with this, nor is it in the PCL manuals.

I don't know about AUTOMATICALLY, but this information is available to every 400hr pilot from any number of sources. Thing is, he/she has to give enough of a damn to go get it. Therein lies the problem. Somewhere along the line the concept of self-education got lost on the average pilot.

 

[Lear70]

I don't know about AUTOMATICALLY, but this information is available to every 400hr pilot from any number of sources. Thing is, he/she has to give enough of a dang to go get it. Therein lies the problem. Somewhere along the line the concept of self-education got lost on the average pilot.

No doubt.

Completely agree with you...