Vindication for the Pinnacle TVC Crew

[Inconceivable]

This was passed on to me to be posted here. The pilot's named has been redacted by me. Remarks about other FOQA data have been removed.

A few thoughts for our younger pilots:

1. You can always count on the company to look out for themselves at your expenses. Always.

2. A little knowledge in the wrong hands can be dangerous. Nowhere is that more true then with your FAA POI.

3. What does ALPA do with my 2%? How about protect you from morons like these in management, training, the airport authority, and the FAA.

4. If something seems like a bad idea, ask why. If you don't like the answer, keep asking. Your career, or life, may depend on it. Seven and a half years ago I asked why we flew Ref+5 and couldn't get an answer. It took this to change it.

The author of the remainder is the Central Air Safety Chair at PCL. Read on:

As I sit here and type the report for the 4712 accident and think about some recent conversations with first officers I think we need to talk about the company landing standard of the first 1500' of the runway. This first part is background that almost none of you know.

Background
At 0443Z on April 12, 2007 N8905F operating as Flagship 4712 ran off the end of runway 28 in Traverse City. Some of the things that all came together to make this accident happen:

Pressure from the top of the management organization to achieve a high completion factor.
A forecast that did not include heavy snow.
No timely weather reporting available because the tower was closed.
"Whishy Washy" surface condition reports from the airport who didn't want to close the airport.
Pilot Fatigue
Improper procedures for computing Vref

The point that we need to focus on for this thread is the computation of Vref. Before the accident all of our landing performance was computed using Bombardier data except ... we always added 5 knots to Vref. Nobody ever took the time to correlate the effect of a measly five additional knots onto the published Vref speeds or how pilots would be able to fly it during difficult conditions.

The accident flight was just under 47,000 lbs and the speed card indicated 142 knots for Vref at flaps 45. As was company procedure the crew bugged and flew 147 (Vref+5) for the approach. The flight data recorder shows that when the airplane crossed the threshold for runway 28 it was at 148 knots. The whole approach the airplane is at 147 knots +/- 2 knots. That's pretty good considering the winds were strong that night and producing light turbulence as it crossed over the hilly terrain that surrounded the airport.

ALPA took the time to expand on the FDR data for the flair and touchdown. When you zoom into the landing you see that the airplane crosses the threshold at 50' agl and 148 knots (Vref+5). The power reduction is normal. At this point the airplane is held 10 feet (radar altimeter) over the runway with the nose pitched down about 2 degrees. If the airplane is pitched up to rapidly the airplane balloons back into the air. If he drops it nose first it's most likely the airplane would have slide off the side of the runway with catastrophic results. Don't forget there is a tail wind pushing the aircraft. So he holds the airplane at 10 feet and as airspeed decreases, pitch is slowly increased until the airplane is at only 2 degrees nose up (and the nose wheel is finally above the mains) and the airplane is quickly settled down onto the runway. If you're reading this ***** you're hot sh*t with the stick and rudder.

The airplane is too far down the runway and the runway is too slick. The airplane ends up off the end of the runway.

About 36 hours after the accident and many people had lots of time to think about what had happened that night, most if not all of the airport operations personnel stated in their interviews with the NTSB that they observed the airplane touchdown 3600' from the threshold of runway 28. Without any marks on the runway to confirm this their comments were noted but not taken to seriously and the NTSB decided to wait for the aircraft performance group to determine the exact touchdown point.

Some how the airports determination that the airplane touched down 3600' from the threshold makes it to our local office of the FAA. It wasn't a coincidence. The airport has been on the hot seat for several years and 4712 wasn't even close to being the first airplane to go off the end of the runway in TVC. There is some sort of relationship between the airport and our FAA and the information was given to them intentionally.

So our POI has this information that the airplane touched down 3600' from the threshold and gets crazy. There are meetings held with the company and the check airman, threats are made, everyone gets in a barrel and goes over the falls together and we had a 10 page thread on being disqualified if we didn't get the airplane into the 1500' zone. At the same time, and very quietly, our Vref bugging procedure is changed to use the published speed without adding five knots.

Fear is the worst possible motivator for safety and usually leads to new accidents and revolution against the tyrants.

A few months later two reports are issued by the NTSB. The first one is the performance factual report. I've uploaded this into the general documents section. On page 14 you can see that the computed touchdown point was actually 2300' from the threshold, not 3600'. Another report we have that I'll make available soon shows that at 142 knots instead of 147 knots, the airplane would have stopped before the end of the runway. ***** didn't blow the landing, he hit it dead on using the companies procedures.

<end quote>

Fly safely.

 

[motch]

Great Post...

As someone who use to do vol. work for ALPA Safety, I can not speak highly enough of that organization.

Been said before, got to fly on speed and get it into the touchdown zone. After that, whatever may happen, you did your job. Let the FDR/CVR/FOQA cover your ass....

Fly Safe,
Always
Motch

 

[TOOL CRIB]

At ASA we use ref + 5 for approach, but "over the fence" we are supposed to be at ref. Power reduction at 100ft with power to idle by 50ft (I believe) under normal conditions.

 

[Inconceivable]

I have never understood this. Bombardier is (rightfully) concerned about the unrecoverable full-stall characteristics of the wing, so ref for a given weight is 1.3 x Vs0 in a 20 degree bank! And then you add gust factors!

There is so much margin already built in this "five knots for Mom" is not only ridiculous, it's unsafe. As shown above.

 

[The_Russian]

Inconceivable,

GREAT POST!

 

[PCL_128]

This was passed on to me to be posted here. The pilot's named has been redacted by me. Remarks about other FOQA data have been removed.

A few thoughts for our younger pilots:

1. You can always count on the company to look out for themselves at your expenses. Always.

2. A little knowledge in the wrong hands can be dangerous. Nowhere is that more true then with your FAA POI.

3. What does ALPA do with my 2%? How about protect you from morons like these in management, training, the airport authority, and the FAA.

4. If something seems like a bad idea, ask why. If you don't like the answer, keep asking. Your career, or life, may depend on it. Seven and a half years ago I asked why we flew Ref+5 and couldn't get an answer. It took this to change it.

The author of the remainder is the Central Air Safety Chair at PCL. Read on:

As I sit here and type the report for the 4712 accident and think about some recent conversations with first officers I think we need to talk about the company landing standard of the first 1500' of the runway. This first part is background that almost none of you know.

Background
At 0443Z on April 12, 2007 N8905F operating as Flagship 4712 ran off the end of runway 28 in Traverse City. Some of the things that all came together to make this accident happen:

Pressure from the top of the management organization to achieve a high completion factor.
A forecast that did not include heavy snow.
No timely weather reporting available because the tower was closed.
"Whishy Washy" surface condition reports from the airport who didn't want to close the airport.
Pilot Fatigue
Improper procedures for computing Vref

The point that we need to focus on for this thread is the computation of Vref. Before the accident all of our landing performance was computed using Bombardier data except ... we always added 5 knots to Vref. Nobody ever took the time to correlate the effect of a measly five additional knots onto the published Vref speeds or how pilots would be able to fly it during difficult conditions.

The accident flight was just under 47,000 lbs and the speed card indicated 142 knots for Vref at flaps 45. As was company procedure the crew bugged and flew 147 (Vref+5) for the approach. The flight data recorder shows that when the airplane crossed the threshold for runway 28 it was at 148 knots. The whole approach the airplane is at 147 knots +/- 2 knots. That's pretty good considering the winds were strong that night and producing light turbulence as it crossed over the hilly terrain that surrounded the airport.

ALPA took the time to expand on the FDR data for the flair and touchdown. When you zoom into the landing you see that the airplane crosses the threshold at 50' agl and 148 knots (Vref+5). The power reduction is normal. At this point the airplane is held 10 feet (radar altimeter) over the runway with the nose pitched down about 2 degrees. If the airplane is pitched up to rapidly the airplane balloons back into the air. If he drops it nose first it's most likely the airplane would have slide off the side of the runway with catastrophic results. Don't forget there is a tail wind pushing the aircraft. So he holds the airplane at 10 feet and as airspeed decreases, pitch is slowly increased until the airplane is at only 2 degrees nose up (and the nose wheel is finally above the mains) and the airplane is quickly settled down onto the runway. If you're reading this ***** you're hot sh*t with the stick and rudder.

The airplane is too far down the runway and the runway is too slick. The airplane ends up off the end of the runway.

About 36 hours after the accident and many people had lots of time to think about what had happened that night, most if not all of the airport operations personnel stated in their interviews with the NTSB that they observed the airplane touchdown 3600' from the threshold of runway 28. Without any marks on the runway to confirm this their comments were noted but not taken to seriously and the NTSB decided to wait for the aircraft performance group to determine the exact touchdown point.

Some how the airports determination that the airplane touched down 3600' from the threshold makes it to our local office of the FAA. It wasn't a coincidence. The airport has been on the hot seat for several years and 4712 wasn't even close to being the first airplane to go off the end of the runway in TVC. There is some sort of relationship between the airport and our FAA and the information was given to them intentionally.

So our POI has this information that the airplane touched down 3600' from the threshold and gets crazy. There are meetings held with the company and the check airman, threats are made, everyone gets in a barrel and goes over the falls together and we had a 10 page thread on being disqualified if we didn't get the airplane into the 1500' zone. At the same time, and very quietly, our Vref bugging procedure is changed to use the published speed without adding five knots.

Fear is the worst possible motivator for safety and usually leads to new accidents and revolution against the tyrants.

A few months later two reports are issued by the NTSB. The first one is the performance factual report. I've uploaded this into the general documents section. On page 14 you can see that the computed touchdown point was actually 2300' from the threshold, not 3600'. Another report we have that I'll make available soon shows that at 142 knots instead of 147 knots, the airplane would have stopped before the end of the runway. ***** didn't blow the landing, he hit it dead on using the companies procedures.

<end quote>

Fly safely.

As usual, excellent information from the CASC Chair at PCL. A perfect example of why the ALPA safety structure is so important.

 

[Spooky 2]

Not qualified on any RJ's so perhaps I'm not even qualified to speak here, but all the Boeings, MD's use a V approach number of Vref + 5. With proper airspeed control and thrust mangement, touchdown occurs at no less than Vref -5.

So are you saying the Bombradier is now going to revise the AFM/FCTM to say all approaches should be flown at Vref, assuming no wind correction?

 

[SSDD]

Not commenting on this crew, but on my own experience in the 200. We were taught to fly Vref+5, start power reduction at 100' and idle by 50'. The problem is that too many people carry Vref+5 and power until they start the flare at 10'. They then float another 2000' down the runway. This also comes into play when compensating for gusty conditions...you shouldn't have to add anymore speed in most situations.

 

[Inconceivable]

Speaking for Airlink 2000-2001, what SSDD describes is the method taught. Ref + 5 + factor at the top of the pipe and hold that speed until retarding thrust levers at 50'. Hence, the floating. No power reductions are taught, even now (I understand).

 

[PCL_128]

Up until the time I left just earlier this year, the overwhelming majority of checkairmen were still teaching no power reductions until the computer calls "50" feet, and there was nothing in the FCOM/AFM to suggest otherwise. I always started a power reduction at 100 ft, but even then you had to be pretty aggresive in pulling power to arrive over the threshold at 50 ft and land within the first 1500 ft of the runway.

 

[Crossky]

At ASA we use ref + 5 for approach, but "over the fence" we are supposed to be at ref. Power reduction at 100ft with power to idle by 50ft (I believe) under normal conditions.

Exactly the same for Air Wisconsin. If you carry approach thrust all the way to 50 ft before reducing for flare, you're already 5 kts fast in the flare. You're begging to float unless you can fly it on using perfect technique. And then you've touched down 10 kts or more faster than you could've if you had started reducing thrust for the flare at the 100 ft call.

BTW 2,300 ft down the RWY is still in the 'touchdown zone'; 1,300 feet past the 1,000 foot markers. At about 120 kts that's about six seconds of float past the 1,000 ft markers. Must have been very slick.

 

[PUNISHER]

Good post,

I've always wondered why 9E Rjs usually landed long. I used to flight instruct in TVC, seen a lot of landings on 28 and very rarely did I see a 9E RJ touchdown within the first 1500 feet. They usually looked like nice smooth touchdowns, but long. Not sure what the Blue Ridge/AirWis guys did different but they were considerably more consistent at hitting the mark.

Just an observation.

 

[Rez O. Lewshun]

Everybody does it the same... they all carry thrust to the 50ft call and beyond... bleed the energy off in ground effect as they sail down the runway and past the first and second turn off.... so they can get a smooth landing... it is the human desire to "look good" under the pretense that THAT is what defines a good landing...

IOW that is the perceived cultural value within pilot groups of a "good stick"....

 

[Oakum_Boy]

Yeah. All correct. You actually have to start reducing thrust well before the 100' call. More like at 200' to get the speed back to Vref. Try telling that to a newhire who has been told by the training dept. to make a mindless landing. Then they look at you like WTF are you talking about. "But the training department told me to do it this way..."

 

[BoilerUP]

...I wonder how many RJs have landed nosewheel first because the pilot flying carried too much speed, floated too far, and decided to just put the airplane on the runway so they could get it stopped.

 

[Rez O. Lewshun]

A Dude did that on Rwy 33 at DCA back on 2000. He was yanking the TR's to deploy all while doing the "wheelbarrow". Finally got it stopped at the end... the jumpseater chewed him out... the FO was speechless...

 

[Stifler's Mom]

I saw one in CLT land nosewheel first. I thought for sure the nosegear would collapse, but it didn't.

 

[SSDD]

Extra speed is also dangerous in a strong x-wind condition. Newbys start rocking the wings back and forth while they bleed the speed off. Most of the wing strikes have been on the downwind side.

 

[CA1900]

... the jumpseater chewed him out...

I'd have paid good money to see that! :laugh:

 

[Rook]

. I always started a power reduction at 100 ft, but even then you had to be pretty aggresive in pulling power to arrive over the threshold at 50 ft and land within the first 1500 ft of the runway.

Which is the technique I always taught my IOE newbies regardless of 'sim technique'. They were always surprised that it worked.

Inconceivable, thanks for the post. The CA in question and I interviewed together and we were roomies during new-hire ground school.

 

[Mario]

Good post,

I've always wondered why 9E Rjs usually landed long. I used to flight instruct in TVC, seen a lot of landings on 28 and very rarely did I see a 9E RJ touchdown within the first 1500 feet. They usually looked like nice smooth touchdowns, but long. Not sure what the Blue Ridge/AirWis guys did different but they were considerably more consistent at hitting the mark.

Just an observation.

I did a whole month of TVC when I was at ACA/blue ridge out of ORD. That was of course before Independence and we all know what happened with that. I dont recall TVC being any more difficult than anywhere else. When I was flying the CRJ Into an airport with a shorter runway I didn't mess with it much just got it on the ground. While it has been sometime I dont recall adding any speed, just putting the numbers from the speedcards for the weight. Thrust reduction started at 100' with full idle by 50'. Just a tiny bit of back pressure and let it fly onto the runway If it is not pretty so what.
I had a CA float halfway down the runway at CRW, not the place to land long. I STRONGLY urged him to go around fortunately he was a pretty decent guy, but new to the plane. So he went around and landed fine coming back.

 

[~~~^~~~]

Good discussion... Much of this is basic airmanship that no one seems to have the time to teach (or listen to) anymore. One factor many pilots overlook on contaminated runways is the need to get the airplane stopped sooner rather than later.

Most on this thread are making excellent points about how to get the airplane on the ground. I would add that once on the ground many pilots let the airplane coast another 1,000 feet or more before they get on the brakes.

When the runway is contaminated, a firm, constant and even brake application as soon as the spoilers deploy will generate the most stopping power with less heat.

Going 80 down the last 1,000 feet of runway is a bad time to realize the braking action is fair to poor.

Save your really nice landings for the clear, uncluttered runways. In the weather, safety comes first.

 

[Jmoney]

Skynation.....

Idiots like Skynation don't realize how important a union is in situations like this. If these guys had not had help from ALPA they would have been hung out to dry, and more importantly, we would only know the "company version" of it is all the stupid pilot's fault-always the pilot's fault, and nothing else matters.

-You truly are a shortsighted fool-Sky!

 

[Rez O. Lewshun]

Idiots like Skynation don't realize how important a union is in situations like this. If these guys had not had help from ALPA they would have been hung out to dry, and more importantly, we would only know the "company version" of it is all the stupid pilot's fault-always the pilot's fault, and nothing else matters.

-You truly are a shortsighted fool-Sky!

Its ok.... OO pilots went off the runway a while back and everything was ok.... I am still waiting for CFIT to answer the tough questions... but he always seems to avoid those.... those bitchin' Rose colored glasses!

 

[nethan]

A few years ago I did a few days of initial sim training in Montreal due to the local sim being broken. one of the instructors up there was talking about how the 200 was designed to land almost 3 pointed in anything but a dead calm wind. Basically if you look at the spoiler logic, as soon as the mains spin up, you are done flying and the unless you are really cranking in the back elevator, the nose is going to drop. Because of that he recommended taking out about 20% of your power between 100 and 50 feet and then taking out the rest between 50 and 40. All it takes is arresting your descent rate to about 150 fpm and the nose will be about 1 foot higher then the mains. Also, you'll be REF-5 to REF-10 as the mains comes down. Works pretty well for me, but then again, I don't expect too much from my landings anyways.

 

[bluefishbeagle]

A vref of 142+5 and a tailwind, snow, unknown runway conditions and nightime ops should cause any pilot with enough experience alarm bells to go full volume.

This is a case where following proceedures was the wrong thing to do as I read this thread. Pilots are not allowed to "do their own thing" and if you do and it turns out bad "shame on you."

Screw the company GO to your alternate, don't be a hero because you will be fed to the wolves if anything goes wrong.

One other thing guys, lose the ego, it will hurt your decision making skills. I'd rather be sleeping peacefully at my alternate than staying up three days stright trying to figure out what went wrong.

 

[Minimaniac]

You have to know what conditions your performance numbers are based on!

Most every airplane we fly for a 121 carrier has landing data calculated upon crossing the runway threshhold at 50' at Vref. If you are doing anything besides that, you are a test pilot. Many newhires I have flown with or observed are under the impression that Vref must be maintained all the way to the runway. I have heard my share of "Ref minus5, Ref minus 10" while below 50' in the flare. Most of us have been there, so I'm not throwing any stones. I just want to encourage everyone, epsecially those who are new to an aircraft type or new to airliner operations, to ask where your landing data comes from and how the airplane was flown to acheive those numbers.

On the plane I fly, we used to use landing data based on Ref at 50'... the usual. However, the manufacturer who supplied those numbers also recommended that the airplane be flown at Ref plus 5 down to 50' with the autothrottles engaged, leaving power reduction techniques out of the equation. The result was we had numbers that did not match up to how we were supposed to fly the airplane. The FAA did not want to budge on using Ref at 50', but finally they did. Now we have numbers that reflect flying Ref plus 5 to 50'. Until then, every landing was either flown against company procedure or against performance data.

Even still, none of those numbers allow for flying Ref plus 20 (wind additive maximum) down to 50'. I think the timing and technique of speed reduction and energy management on windy days is something that is not being passed along to our less experienced pilots in a standardized way.

Like them or not, we are all going to be flying with low time guys. We need to make sure our training departments are preparing them thoroughly. Ask your check airmen how this is being taught, and ask your rookies what they think they were taught. Find the differences and let higher ups know (not rat people out, but take it up the correct chain). We are ALL responsible for safety, and we are all going to have to be more proactive about it.

Merry Christmas. Enjoy your friends, family, or holiday pay! Lets get holiday pay to cover the other observed holiday seasons as well!

 

[bluefishbeagle]

The above post is right on. Could this accident have been avoided if the approach had been flown at vref? The original poster thinks so but that's still cutting it close if 5 knots makes the difference in going off the end or not.

In my opinion if the same crew were faced with the same conditions (both known and unknown) they would most likely not elect to land. But that's hind sight. Also it's most likely if you, I, or the same crew HAD to make the approach and land due to an emergency it was do-able but not using vref+5 and using standard procedures.

In an emergency I'd be at vref on final and vref minus 5 to 10 in the flare and touch down in the first 500 ft.

If anything goes wrong be prepared to explain why you were using procedures not authorized by your company and the FAA, of course as this case proves even if you do everything right you can still end up off the runway and face a potentially career ending carpet dance.

Do you want to play "let’s bet your career" or just go to your alternate and let the company worry about the inconvenience to the passengers?

 

[Caveman]

Anybody that's flown more than 10 minutes in a CRJ knows you can not be fast over the fence. I disagree with that companys +5 policy, but according to the original post it looks to me like the crew flew a damn near perfect approach. More importantly, everybody got to go home that night. Good job guys.

I'm no ALPA fan, but this is one area where they excel. Nobody does a better job looking out for pilots involved in an incident/accident than ALPA. Period.

IMO ALPA should get out of the labor business. It should be a fraternal organization that provides aeromedical, legal, and insurance services and lobbying efforts on behalf of propilots. I'd gladly pay 1% of my check to have those resources available. Let each pilot group decide whether or not they want to be unionized and by whom (IBT? inhouse?). ALPA should be more like AARP. They should stick to advocacy and get out of the labor business. If they did you would eliminate all this BS infighting about scope and DFR. Each shop could negotiate for what they want. In theory the ALPA faithful will tell you this is how it's supposed to work. However, ALPA National always sticks their nose's into things and when they do they complicate the whole thing and usually make it worse. If they would just stick to things like safety and other nonlabor stuff they could quickly gather the hearts and minds of almost every propilot I know.

 

[Rez O. Lewshun]

, ALPA National always sticks their nose's into things and when they do they complicate the whole thing and usually make it worse.

For example?