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saw runway at 50' w/GS out of service

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Oooops...sorry Huck...mis-read. Yes, our LNAV/VNAV are AP off no later than 50' below mda...NOT 50' above HAT.

That's pretty much std with respect to the regs I think.

At the risk of arm-chairing just a little bit, I suspect they disregarded the ATC notam of the unusable GS due to the snow. It's pretty common to put the GS status as unusable once you get up to a certain amount of snow around it. What is NOT common is for the tower cab to place it out of service.

I suspect this crew saw they still had a usable signal and pressed on with a coupled approach.

As much as it pains me to say this, I HOPE that's the case...because I shudder to think that I'm sitting in the back when these folks are flying a coupled NP approach in LAT mode only , 50 freaking feet about the ground!

WTF???
 
because I shudder to think that I'm sitting in the back when these folks are flying a coupled NP approach in LAT mode only , 50 freaking feet about the ground!

Would it make you feel any better if it were coupled to a bad glideslope?
 
If you read the article clearly, it doesn't say that 50 feet was the FIRST sight of the runway and approach lights. It says that at 50 feet when the autopilot was turned off by the first officer, the runway and approach lights were both in sight. They could have seen them a mile out at 300 feet or anywhere else for that matter according to that statement.

That's a defensive copout avpro. I think we all know what 'seeing the runway at 50 feet' means. If he saw the runway before that, he would have told the FAA and we would've read it as such. What's the min ALT the E-170 AP can be coupled down to on a LOC only Non-Prec approach? Surely not 50 ft.

At my airline we can't leave the MDA until we have the runway environment in sight - approach lights aren't the runway environment of course. Is this 121 regulatory, do other airlines have this requirement? If yes, what was SA doing below the MDA with only approach lights in sight?

Two interesting items were posted on my company board as inside information: (1) the crew used an FMS VNAV glideslope, (2) A Colgan pilot waiting for TO on one of the RWY 24's (located very near RWY 28) saw the E-170 high on landing on RWY 28.

Finally, why did the crew not make one single PA to the passengers? They didn't evacuate (heavy snow, but what about a fuel leak and fire risk, the nosegear had buckled and the a/c took out lighting towers). They didn't tell them to evacuate or not evacuate. They didn't show themselves to the passengers in person.

I may be harsh, but consider that I'm holding back. I'm glad no one was hurt.
 
for all the armchairers here are a couple of regs being discussed.

§ 121.579 Minimum altitudes for use of autopilot.

(a) En route operations. Except as provided in paragraphs (b), (c), and (d) of this section, no person may use an autopilot en route, including climb and descent, at an altitude above the terrain that is less than twice the maximum altitude loss specified in the Airplane Flight Manual for a malfunction of the autopilot under cruise conditions, or less than 500 feet, whichever is higher.

(b) Approaches. When using an instrument approach facility, no person may use an autopilot at an altitude above the terrain that is less than twice the maximum altitude loss specified in the Airplane Flight Manual for a malfunction of the autopilot under approach conditions, or less than 50 feet below the approved minimum descent altitude or decision height for the facility, whichever is higher, except—

(1) When reported weather conditions are less than the basic VFR weather conditions in §91.155 of this chapter, no person may use an autopilot with an approach coupler for ILS approaches at an altitude above the terrain that is less than 50 feet higher than the maximum altitude loss specified in the Airplane Flight Manual for the malfunction of the autopilot with approach coupler under approach conditions; and

(2) When reported weather conditions are equal to or better than the basic VFR minimums in §91.155 of this chapter, no person may use an autopilot with an approach coupler for ILS approaches at an altitude above the terrain that is less than the maximum altitude loss specified in the Airplane Flight Manual for the malfunction of the autopilot with approach coupler under approach conditions, or 50 feet, whichever is higher.

(c) Notwithstanding paragraph (a) or (b) of this section, the Administrator issues operations specifications to allow the use, to touchdown, of an approved flight control guidance system with automatic capability, in any case in which—

(1) The system does not contain any altitude loss (above zero) specified in the Airplane Flight Manual for malfunction of the autopilot with approach coupler; and

(2) He finds that the use of the system to touchdown will not otherwise affect the safety standards required by this section.

(d) Takeoffs. Notwithstanding paragraph (a) of this section, the Administrator issues operations specifications to allow the use of an approved autopilot system with automatic capability below the altitude specified in paragraph (a) of this section during the takeoff and initial climb phase of flight provided:

(1) The Airplane Flight Manual specifies a minimum altitude engagement certification restriction;

(2) The system is not engaged prior to the minimum engagement certification restriction specified in the Airplane Flight Manual or an altitude specified by the Administrator, whichever is higher; and

(3) The Administrator finds that the use of the system will not otherwise affect the safety standards required by this section.
 
§ 121.651 Takeoff and landing weather minimums: IFR: All certificate holders.

(a) Notwithstanding any clearance from ATC, no pilot may begin a takeoff in an airplane under IFR when the weather conditions reported by the U.S. National Weather Service, a source approved by that Service, or a source approved by the Administrator, are less than those specified in—

(1) The certificate holder's operations specifications; or

(2) Parts 91 and 97 of this chapter, if the certificate holder's operations specifications do not specify takeoff minimums for the airport.

(b) Except as provided in paragraph (d) of this section, no pilot may continue an approach past the final approach fix, or where a final approach fix is not used, begin the final approach segment of an instrument approach procedure—

(1) At any airport, unless the U.S. National Weather Service, a source approved by that Service, or a source approved by the Administrator, issues a weather report for that airport; and

(2) At airports within the United States and its territories or at U.S. military airports, unless the latest weather report for that airport issued by the U.S. National Weather Service, a source approved by that Service, or a source approved by the Administrator, reports the visibility to be equal to or more than the visibility minimums prescribed for that procedure. For the purpose of this section, the term “U.S. military airports” means airports in foreign countries where flight operations are under the control of U.S. military authority.

(c) If a pilot has begun the final approach segment of an instrument approach procedure in accordance with paragraph (b) of this section, and after that receives a later weather report indicating below-minimum conditions, the pilot may continue the approach to DH or MDA. Upon reaching DH or at MDA, and at any time before the missed approach point, the pilot may continue the approach below DH or MDA if either the requirements of §91.175(l) of this chapter, or the following requirements are met:

(1) The aircraft is continuously in a position from which a descent to a landing on the intended runway can be made at a normal rate of descent using normal maneuvers, and where that descent rate will allow touchdown to occur within the touchdown zone of the runway of intended landing;

(2) The flight visibility is not less than the visibility prescribed in the standard instrument approach procedure being used;

(3) Except for Category II or Category III approaches where any necessary visual reference requirements are specified by authorization of the Administrator, at least one of the following visual references for the intended runway is distinctly visible and identifiable to the pilot:

(i) The approach light system, except that the pilot may not descend below 100 feet above the touchdown zone elevation using the approach lights as a reference unless the red terminating bars or the red side row bars are also distinctly visible and identifiable.

(ii) The threshold.

(iii) The threshold markings.

(iv) The threshold lights.

(v) The runway end identifier lights.

(vi) The visual approach slope indicator.

(vii) The touchdown zone or touchdown zone markings.

(viii) The touchdown zone lights.

(ix) The runway or runway markings.

(x) The runway lights; and

(4) When the aircraft is on a straight-in nonprecision approach procedure which incorporates a visual descent point, the aircraft has reached the visual descent point, except where the aircraft is not equipped for or capable of establishing that point, or a descent to the runway cannot be made using normal procedures or rates of descent if descent is delayed until reaching that point.


(d) A pilot may begin the final approach segment of an instrument approach procedure other than a Category II or Category III procedure at an airport when the visibility is less than the visibility minimums prescribed for that procedure if that airport is served by an operative ILS and an operative PAR, and both are used by the pilot. However, no pilot may continue an approach below the authorized DH unless the requirements of §91.175(l) of this chapter, or the following requirements are met:

(1) The aircraft is continuously in a position from which a descent to a landing on the intended runway can be made at a normal rate of descent using normal maneuvers and where such a descent rate will allow touchdown to occur within the touchdown zone of the runway of intended landing;

(2) The flight visibility is not less than the visibility prescribed in the standard instrument approach procedure being used; and

(3) Except for Category II or Category III approaches where any necessary visual reference requirements are specified by the authorization of the Administrator, at least one of the following visual references for the intended runway is distinctly visible and identifiable to the pilot:

(i) The approach light system, except that the pilot may not descend below 100 feet above the touchdown zone elevation using the approach lights as a reference unless the red terminating bars or the red side row bars are also distinctly visible and identifiable.

(ii) The threshold.

(iii) The threshold markings.

(iv) The threshold lights.

(v) The runway end identifier lights.

(vi) The visual approach slope indicator.

(vii) The touchdown zone or touchdown zone markings.

(viii) The touchdown zone lights.

(ix) The runway or runway markings.

(x) The runway lights.

(e) For the purpose of this section, the final approach segment begins at the final approach fix or facility prescribed in the instrument approach procedure. When a final approach fix is not prescribed for a procedure that includes a procedure turn, the final approach segment begins at the point where the procedure turn is completed and the aircraft is established inbound toward the airport on the final approach course within the distance prescribed in the procedure.

(f) Unless otherwise authorized in the certificate holder's operations specifications, each pilot making an IFR takeoff, approach, or landing at a foreign airport shall comply with the applicable instrument approach procedures and weather minimums prescribed by the authority having jurisdiction over the airport.
 
Maybe you are all looking a little too deep into this. It didn't say he GOT the runway in sight at 50 ft., it said he HAD the runway in sight at 50 ft. He may have had the runway in sight at 1000 ft., still had it in sight at 50 ft, and lost it below that.

Who knows...
 
Maybe you are all looking a little too deep into this. It didn't say he GOT the runway in sight at 50 ft., it said he HAD the runway in sight at 50 ft. He may have had the runway in sight at 1000 ft., still had it in sight at 50 ft, and lost it below that.

Who knows...

I agree, although doubtful given the metars, I suppose it's possible the wx was much better out there on the approach ;-).

In any event, it was a LOC only approach, and it will be interesting to see if the NFP had the required environment in sight at 500 feet, called it out, thereby authorizing the FP to continue descent below MDA. The knew it was a LOC only, so lets see what their call-outs where as they tracked the LOC.

Shouldn't bee too much longer before we can read the CVR. That ought to be interesting, as they always are.
 
There seems to be a lot of inferences to what this actually says. It's a preliminary report, which means it could contain errors. In addition, it's written very poorly (my opinion).

Below is the paragraph that is getting the most attention. Let's break it down and see what it really says.

The first officer was flying the airplane at the time of the accident. The captain reported they were cleared for the ILS runway 24R approach. He stated that approximately 10 minutes prior to landing, air traffic control changed the landing runway to runway 28. The captain stated they were informed that the runway visual range (RVR) was 6,000 feet and that the braking action was fair.

Pretty straight forward so far.

He reported that after passing the final approach fix, they were informed that the RVR had decreased to 2,000 feet. The captain stated he had the approach lights in sight and at 50 feet above the ground, he had the runway in sight.

This doesn't say when he first saw the approach lights or the runway. What it does say is the Captain, who was the non-flying pilot, had the runway at sight at 50' agl. We can't infer by this sentence that the Captain did or didn't have the approach lights or runway in sight at a higher (legal) altitude. More importantly we can't infer that the FO, who was the PF, did or didn't have the approach lights or runway in sight at any time.

The captain stated he had the approach lights in sight and at 50 feet above the ground, he had the runway in sight. He stated the first officer then turned off the autopilot to land.

The first sentence is a carry over. If we were to take these sentences in sequence (we have no reason not to), it appears the autopilot was not disconnected until 50' agl, or lower. Unless this is an error, it sounds pretty bad, considering they knew the GS was out of service.

The captain stated that at 30 feet above the ground he momentarily lost sight of the runway. He stated he then regained sight of the runway and the airplane was landed.

This says the Captain, who was the NFP, lost sight of the runway at 30' agl. It doesn't mention what the FO saw. It's possible the FO never lost sight of the runway, but based on this, we don't know.

He stated they encountered strong gusty winds during the landing flare and after touchdown they could barely see the runway lights and taxiway turn-offs. The captain reported that despite the use of full reverse and braking, the airplane did not seem to slow down. The airplane traveled off the runway and into the snow covered grass where the nose gear collapsed and the airplane came to rest. The crew and passengers deplaned using a ladder with assistance from the fire department.

Self explanitory.

It's pretty obvious something went wrong as evidenced by the Jet in the grass. History suggests the pilots probably screwed up, but I think it's premature to indict these guys based on this preliminary report, which doesn't quote the first officer or offer any sequence of events outside of the very basic chain of events.
 
Does the 170 have the capability to fly an IAN approach? This would give you LOC/GP - with the GP standing for glide path. This will give you vertical guidance which looks just like the GS on an ILS.
This is still a non precision approach. Autopilot off by 50' below mins applies (well it does where I work). I would like to think that with reported visibility of 1/4 or 2000, I would be ready to execute a go-around and proceed to our alternate.
There is a lot of info we don't have - what things did the crew discuss prior to the approach? Where did they really see the runway environment? Did the FO have sight of the runway the whole time? Did they land long?
 
I landed in lake effect snow in SYR a few weeks ago. Had the approach lights and runway in sight from 2 miles out. Lost everything at 50'. Also landed in CLE 2 months ago. 1/2 mile vis, and then pulling into the gate, the sun came out... of course, both times, the GS was working.
 
This guy I know was landing a 170 in Pit on a snow covered
runway and landed long and made an RJ go around.
Here's what happened:
10 knot additive to ref if aircraft detects ice.
20 knot additive to Vapp due to 40 knot steady state headwind
Gentle touchdown on contaminated runway, so the airplane
didn't detect 50 knot wheel speed and did not immediately
allow brakes. If it would have been CLE, I, (I mean this guy I
know) maybe would've gone four wheelin' too.
 
Last time I was on a Shuttle America jumpseat, both guys looked like they were in high school. When you get an airline job before you shave for the first time, these things happen.

Because no one on here was ever young...who cares what they look like. Not to mention that just about every other airline has put one off that runway in similar conditions...United, USAir, CO, and so on...search the NTSB site. Despite what was said it could have happened to anyone (see NTSB)...but the loosing site of the runway in the statement, not smart.
 
Last time I was on a Shuttle America jumpseat, both guys looked like they were in high school. When you get an airline job before you shave for the first time, these things happen.


Ignorant statement! You obviously have never read accident reports from "back in the day." Accidents where entire hulls were lost and hundreds killed when 10,000+ hr pilots were all staring at a gear position light, or a chief pilot of an airline starts a takeoff roll without verifying that another airplane is clear of a foggy runway!

Unfortunately, Sh*t happens, REGARDLESS of flight time!
 
Lots of armchair quarterback action here.


What I would like to know is why did they go off the end. Did they land long? Was braking action not good enough?? Did the airplane exhibit an abnormal characteristic?


All I know is that I went to CLE one night in Jan (ish) 07, late flight, landed 24R, tower was reporting braking action fair, CA landed, we could barely see the centerline, he said the braking was nil!
 
One more twist to the story ........................... Capt ALLEGEDLY called in fatigued the day of the accident ......................... was pressured by company to fly that day ............... not sure if it's true, but the FAA have been calling random pilots to ask about how the company reacts to a fatigue/sick call (this part is fact).
 
Capt ALLEGEDLY called in fatigued the day of the accident ......................... was pressured by company to fly that day

Forget the "pressue." If you're fatigued, you're fatigued. Give 'em the bird! Call up ALPA for support later if needed.
 
The captain stated they were informed that the runway visual range (RVR) was 6,000 feet and that the braking action was fair. He reported that after passing the final approach fix, they were informed that the RVR had decreased to 2,000 feet.

The minimum for this approach is 5000 RVR. Would you continue?
 
The captain stated they were informed that the runway visual range (RVR) was 6,000 feet and that the braking action was fair. He reported that after passing the final approach fix, they were informed that the RVR had decreased to 2,000 feet.

The minimum for this approach is 5000 RVR. Would you continue?

Yes, I would continue...down to MDA, with a quick briefing on go around procedures as I descended. RVR is never equal to flight visibility, and is subject to change in the minute and 30 seconds that would pass between the report and actual MAP.

At least no one was hurt, and the airline industry as a whole can benefit from someone else's misfortune for once without blood. I hope the company did pressure the pilot after a fatigue call...let there big a large FAA crackdown on how poorly US airlines are approaching staffing issues and the lengths they go to to get the job done. Maybe Shuttle America needs some procedural changes when it comes to low visibility approaches, or on how the the approach is briefed to ensure that everyone knows if the approach has all components usable. Again, lets not beat these guys down and say it would never happen to us. Lets trust that the captain had many moments of good judgement along the way, and lets find out where the decision making broke down.

And as for the engines being spooled down at 30'.... on the E170, the A/T go into retard mode at 30' RA. However, those little buggers spool up real quick, and will lift you up in a hurry.
 
The captain stated they were informed that the runway visual range (RVR) was 6,000 feet and that the braking action was fair. He reported that after passing the final approach fix, they were informed that the RVR had decreased to 2,000 feet.

The minimum for this approach is 5000 RVR. Would you continue?

NOPE. Remember, these guys were supposed to be shooting a LOC only non-precision approach. I'd really have to ask myself why I'd want to continue down to a 2000 rvr in blizzard conditions on a short runway, etc...

Makes no sense.
 

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