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saw runway at 50' w/GS out of service

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densoo

Well-known member
Joined
Nov 2, 2004
Posts
2,054
I guess seeing the approach lights counts as "runway environenment" but 50 feet seems pretty low to go on a non-precision approach before seeing the runway. Losing sight of the runway at 30 feet seems like it would qualify for automatic go-around though.

NTSB Identification: CHI07MA072
Scheduled 14 CFR Part 121: Air Carrier operation of Shuttle America (D.B.A. Delta Connection)
Accident occurred Sunday, February 18, 2007 in Cleveland, OH
Aircraft: Embraer ERJ-170, registration: N862RW
Injuries: 74 Uninjured.

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.

On February 18, 2007, at 1506 eastern daylight time, an Embraer ERJ-170, N862RW, operated by Shuttle America, as Delta Connection flight 6448, was substantially damaged when it overrun the end of runway 28 (6,017 feet by 150 feet, snow covered) while landing at the Cleveland Hopkins International Airport (CLE), Cleveland, Ohio. The airplane contacted the localizer antenna and a fence prior to coming to rest approximately 150 feet off the end of the runway. The captain, first officer, 2 flight attendants, and 70 passengers were not injured. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed and the flight was operating on an instrument flight plan. The scheduled passenger flight was operating under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121. The flight originated from the Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport (ATL), Atlanta, Georgia, at 1331.

The first officer was flying the airplane at the time of the accident. The captain reported they were cleared for the ILS runway 24R approach. He stated that approximately 10 minutes prior to landing, air traffic control changed the landing runway to runway 28. The captain stated they were informed that the runway visual range (RVR) was 6,000 feet and that the braking action was fair. He reported that after passing the final approach fix, they were informed that the RVR had decreased to 2,000 feet. The captain stated he had the approach lights in sight and at 50 feet above the ground, he had the runway in sight. He stated the first officer then turned off the autopilot to land. The captain stated that at 30 feet above the ground he momentarily lost sight of the runway. He stated he then regained sight of the runway and the airplane was landed. He stated they encountered strong gusty winds during the landing flare and after touchdown they could barely see the runway lights and taxiway turn-offs. The captain reported that despite the use of full reverse and braking, the airplane did not seem to slow down. The airplane traveled off the runway and into the snow covered grass where the nose gear collapsed and the airplane came to rest. The crew and passengers deplaned using a ladder with assistance from the fire department.

The glideslope for the ILS runway 28 approach was unusable at the time of the accident due to the snow. The crew stated they were made aware of this by air traffic control when they were cleared for the approach to runway 28.

The weather reported at CLE at 1456 was: wind 300 degrees at 16 knots, 1/4 mile visibility, heavy snow, broken clouds at 600 feet, broken clouds at 1,500 feet, overcast clouds at 4,100 feet, temperature -7 degrees Celsius, dewpoint - 11 degrees Celsius, altimeter 30.01 inches of mercury.

The weather reported at CLE at 1517 was: wind 330 degrees at 13 knots gusting to 19 knots, 1/4 mile visibility, heavy snow, broken clouds at 300 feet, broken clouds at 1,000 feet, overcast clouds at 1,500 feet, temperature -8 degrees Celsius, dewpoint - 11 degrees Celsius, altimeter 30.03 inches of mercury.
 
So much for seeing the runway environment at 100' above TDZE. I would have thought that in the hour or so they waited on there they could have at least got their story to match the FARs
 
Just about every 121 operator has limitations about letting the FO fly/land with reduced vis. I would say that this limitation would apply.

What does Republic's SOP say?

A350
 
Just about every 121 operator has limitations about letting the FO fly/land with reduced vis. I would say that this limitation would apply.

A350

Probably most say 200 - 1/2.
This wasnt a CAT II approach.
 
If I had been the captain, it wouldn't have happened.
 
Last time I was on a Shuttle America jumpseat, both guys looked like they were in high school. When you get an airline job before you shave for the first time, these things happen.
 
Maybe the Captain was thinking his statement would hang the F/O?
 
If you read the article clearly, it doesn't say that 50 feet was the FIRST sight of the runway and approach lights. It says that at 50 feet when the autopilot was turned off by the first officer, the runway and approach lights were both in sight. They could have seen them a mile out at 300 feet or anywhere else for that matter according to that statement.

As for the whacktard with the highschooler comment, I personally know that the captain was in his mid 30's with exceptional experience and skills. Can't say about the FO though. It could happen to all of us just as easily.
 
If you read the article clearly, it doesn't say that 50 feet was the FIRST sight of the runway and approach lights. It says that at 50 feet when the autopilot was turned off by the first officer, the runway and approach lights were both in sight. They could have seen them a mile out at 300 feet or anywhere else for that matter according to that statement.

As for the whacktard with the highschooler comment, I personally know that the captain was in his mid 30's with exceptional experience and skills. Can't say about the FO though. It could happen to all of us just as easily.


It is very poorly written. It doesn't say 50' was the first sight of the runway, but it doesn't say 50' wasn't the first sight of the runway either. I expect the final report will be written more clearly.

As far as loosing the runway at 30' goes, that's a rock and a hard place. Low energy go around (where the engines spooled?) or blind landing? Neither option is very advisable.

I would suggest the decision making process could have prevented this accident by not accepting the short runway, but I obviously have the advantage of hindsight. Everyone's been in situations they wish they (or someone else) didn't put themselves in, most don't end in an accident. I've been with Captains with far more experience than this Captain, who put me in situations I didn't want to be in.
 
The glideslope for the ILS runway 28 approach was unusable at the time of the accident due to the snow. The crew stated they were made aware of this by air traffic control when they were cleared for the approach to runway 28.


So if the glideslope is unusable wouldn't this become a localizer only approach!!!!!! WTF!!!! They should not have never desended below the MDA and should not have been following the glideslope. I am assuming that they were actually following the glideslope and the reason I say this is that the FO still had the autopilot on at 50'. They both should be fired, thier pilot licenses revoked and go to work for Home Depot.
 
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It is very poorly written. It doesn't say 50' was the first sight of the runway, but it doesn't say 50' wasn't the first sight of the runway either. I expect the final report will be written more clearly.

As far as loosing the runway at 30' goes, that's a rock and a hard place. Low energy go around (where the engines spooled?) or blind landing? Neither option is very advisable.

I would suggest the decision making process could have prevented this accident by not accepting the short runway, but I obviously have the advantage of hindsight. Everyone's been in situations they wish they (or someone else) didn't put themselves in, most don't end in an accident. I've been with Captains with far more experience than this Captain, who put me in situations I didn't want to be in.

No question about it...a go-around from 30' is not be a big deal. Attempting to land after losing sight of the runway is not only illegal it's stupid (I'm refering to the statement above, not the incident in question since we DON'T have the facts).
 
armchair quarterbacking appears to be happening here....

the old fart crash list is just as stupid (and these old farts killed people).

two recent examples:
- and old fart AA chief pilot decapitates himself and kills others as they push through a thunderstorm and attempt to land in LIT.
- an old fart SWA CA slides off the runway at MDW killing a boy.

let's not turn this into a young pilot lacks experience nonsense. we all know we're jealous of their youth and only wish to be that young again.
 
Lots of armchair quarterback action here.

Maybe it's spot on. Maybe not.

Youth is good. Experience is good.

The Feds have a habit of pointing out things like failing to eat a balanced breakfast and label it "contributing" or "causal" when it actually is not.

I don't think there is any argument that, as the report reads, it was illegal and unwise to continue. We all know the rules and what is smart. But we don't actually know what happened. I, for one, don't trust the quality of this report or the accuracy of its contents.


What I would like to know is why did they go off the end. Did they land long? Was braking action not good enough?? Did the airplane exhibit an abnormal characteristic?
 
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Be400,

Thank you very much for pointing out the fact that the GS was U/S. This is a point many seem to be missing. If the runway was not in sight until 50', then they should never have been there. They should have never been below 100' above TDZE. Also, to land on a 6000' runway with fair indicated as the braking action, maybe not such a good idea either. This is purely speculation, as none of us have the facts. Perhaps not accepting 28 in the first place would have been the best course of action. Hopefully all works out for these pilots. We have all made mistakes, some of us just haven't had to pay for them....

box
 
FAR 121.651 does not say that you have to have the runway in sight to descend below 100 feet. It says that if you are using [only] the approach light system to descend below DH/MDA, then in order to descend BELOW 100 feet above TDZE you must have the red terminating or red siderow bars [of an ALSF-1 or 2] in sight. It does NOT specify any a height at which the runway must be in sight. 50 feet would be technically legal if the other parameters are met. That includes, by the way, that in order to actually land, the required flight visibility must also be present.

That does not preclude the possibility that they had other elements of the runway enviroment in sight already... any one of these, IN ADDITION to the approach lights, would permit descent below MDA, even with no red terminating bars (i.e. a MALSR.) Remember, since the runway was presumably snow covered, it is possible that the actual runway (as opposed to the runway environment, i.e. some pavement markings) may not have been visible until 50 feet. This is legal.

Be-400 your a Fcuking tool, go study for your ATP loser

Eaglebitch, get back to what you know....slinging gear you 45yr old EMB FO
 
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So if the glideslope is unusable wouldn't this become a localizer only approach!!!!!! WTF!!!! They should not have never desended below the MDA and should not have been following the glideslope. I am assuming that they were actually following the glideslope and the reason I say this is that the FO still had the autopilot on at 50'. They both should be fired, thier pilot licenses revoked and go to work for Home Depot.

Wouldn't Home Depot be a blessing, not to mention a pay raise instead of a punishment?
 
Probably coupled with VNAV engaged. And you can reject the landing anytime up to thrust reverser deployment. It is prudent if you can't see the runway anymore.
 
Probably coupled with VNAV engaged

You're supposed to disconnect by 50' below MDA, right? Leastwise that's true at the 3 carriers I've worked for.
 
The glideslope for the ILS runway 28 approach was unusable at the time of the accident due to the snow. The crew stated they were made aware of this by air traffic control when they were cleared for the approach to runway 28.


Holy crap! Um, me thinks the craft should have not descended below about 400-600 ft HAT in accordance with NON PRECISION APPROACH LOC mins... Oh boy!

What ever happened to the good old reasons to crash, the John Wayne reasons to crash like:

-Autopilot failed while flying over the everglades prior to AP Disc warning horns

-Upper section of fuselage separated from body of aircraft due to corosion

-Engine departed aircraft and all hydraulic fluid on that side of craft drained from systems causeing flap/slat retraction and subsequent unstable flight



WOW!
 
You're supposed to disconnect by 50' below MDA, right? Leastwise that's true at the 3 carriers I've worked for.


Huck, Depends on the equipment flown. Certification thing.

Airbus A320: Autoland capable.

CE560: 180 ft. AGL on a Cat 1 ILS
 
Perhaps I was too vague. I'm current cat IIIb in the MD11 myself.

Let me put it as a question then: is anybody out there allowed to leave the autopilot on below 50' below MDA on a NON-PRECISION approach?
 
All right, from 10 minutes before the overrun to 10 minutes after the overrun, the airport is reported 1/4 mile in heavy snow! And you can assume blowing snow too when you look at the winds. I'm going to go out on a limb and say a fair amount of runway contamination, what do you think?

Ceiling appeared to be right at mins as the chart shows 500 and a mile for a LOC only..or 3/4 depending upon the category.

Maybe these guys were seasoned winter fliers, maybe not, but speaking from a person that is finishing my 19th winter of professional flying in the north east, I surely would NOT have expected to be able to land out of that approach after having received an RVR of 2000.

Blizzard conditions, blowing snow, marginal ceilings, turbojet aircraft and a NON-PRECISION APPROACH???

I count myself lucky this hasn't happened to me since I remind myself every nasty winter day that I can learn from these reports each winter.

It will be interesting to see more of the details as they become available. Couple things that come to mind...

....calculated landing distance vs. available pavement....

.... when they actually SAW the runway environment....

At this point we're simply assuming they had 500/1 or the corresponding ceiling and RVR but there is a fairly big gap from 500/1 and 2000 rvr.

Read and learn.

I don't think so.

This outcome was quite predictable.
 
Probably coupled with VNAV engaged. And you can reject the landing anytime up to thrust reverser deployment. It is prudent if you can't see the runway anymore.

Was this operator authorized to shoot a green source approach with VNAV engaged? That would be the first I have heard of that combo.

Or do they fly this approach in white source with VNAV engaged.

I see the LNAV approach to runway 28 does not have vnav...only lnav.

We can only have vnav coupled when shooting an LNAV/VNAV approach. LOC is a green source approach only.

I wonder if they were cheating and actually using the GS and had it coupled?
 
Perhaps I was too vague. I'm current cat IIIb in the MD11 myself.

Let me put it as a question then: is anybody out there allowed to leave the autopilot on below 50' below MDA on a NON-PRECISION approach?

We are when shooting an LNAV/VNAV. But NOT on a LOC only.
 
We do LNAV/VNAV too, but it still comes off at 50' below (a real easy way to bust a checkride is to forget this - it's so much like a precision approach...).
 

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