NTSB To Determine The Probable Cause Of Pinnacle 3701

[Rogue5]

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NTSB ADVISORY
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National Transportation Safety Board
Washington, DC 20594

January 4, 2007

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NTSB TO DETERMINE THE PROBABLE CAUSE OF THE 2004 PINNACLE
AIRLINES ACCIDENT IN JEFFERSON CITY, MISSOURI

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Washington, DC. -- The National Transportation Safety Board
will hold a public Board meeting Tuesday, January 9, 2007 at
9:30 a.m., in its Board Room and Conference Center, 429
L'Enfant Plaza, S.W., Washington, D.C.

The Board will consider a final accident report on the
following case: On October 14, 2004, at about 2215 central
daylight time, N8396A, a Bombardier CL-600-2B19 operated by
Pinnacle Airlines (doing business as Northwest Airlink)
flight 3701 crashed in a residential area in Jefferson City,
Missouri, about three miles south of the Jefferson City,
Missouri, airport. The airplane was destroyed by impact
forces and a post crash fire. The two crew members were
fatally injured. There were no passengers on board and no
injuries on the ground. The flight was a repositioning
flight from Little Rock, Arkansas to Minneapolis-St. Paul,
Minnesota.

A live and archived webcast of the proceedings will be
available on the Board's website at www.ntsb.gov. Technical
support details are available under "Board Meetings." To
report any problems, please call 703-993-3100 and ask for
Webcast Technical Support.

A summary of the Board's final report, which will include
findings, probable cause and any safety recommendations,
will appear on the web site shortly after the conclusion of
the meeting. The entire report will appear on the web site
several weeks later.

Directions to Board Room: Front door located on Lower 10th
Street, directly below L'Enfant Plaza. From Metro, exit
L'Enfant Plaza station at 9th and D Streets escalator, walk
through shopping mall, at CVS store take escalator down one
level. Board room will be to your left.

-30-

NTSB Media Contact:
Terry N. Williams
(202) 314-6100
williat@ntsb.gov


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[be-400xpdriver]

Why the hell do they need a public meeting? The causes were not following SOP's, flying to slow at altitude, and poor piloting skills. There that was easy.

Oh I forgot the the sudden impact of the jet when it hit the ground as another cause of the accident.

 

[DoinTime]

Why the hell do they need a public meeting? The causes were not following SOP's, flying to slow at altitude, and poor piloting skills. There that was easy.

Oh I forgot the the sudden impact of the jet when it hit the ground as another cause of the accident.

I'm glad your not on the NTSB.

 

[The Drizzle]

I'm glad your not on the NTSB.

Yeah, he used too many words. The first single word probable cause in NTSB history. Idiocy.

 

[Guitar Guy]

Why the hell do they need a public meeting?

In part, because the NTSB needs to keep their profile up for when budget talks come around.

But I agree - this will be a pretty easy probable cause for them to find. I wonder if core lock will even get a cursory mention.

 

[LowlyPropCapt]

My hope is that the findings will not be confined to the actions of the crew. There can be no doubt that they, especially the PIC, were the cause of the accident, but it would be gratifying to see the NTSB explore training and corporate culture at the regional level. I would be curious to see if they think that the regional airlines have reached safety parity with the majors, i.e. the "one level of safety" the industry and FAA like to brag about so much.

 

[n32jk]

My hope is that the findings will not be confined to the actions of the crew. There can be no doubt that they, especially the PIC, were the cause of the accident, but it would be gratifying to see the NTSB explore training and corporate culture at the regional level. I would be curious to see if they think that the regional airlines have reached safety parity with the majors, i.e. the "one level of safety" the industry and FAA like to brag about so much.

The problem is that the industry seeks to make that parity closer to the regionals and bringing the majors down to this level. One level of $afety

 

[DoinTime]

But I agree - this will be a pretty easy probable cause for them to find. I wonder if core lock will even get a cursory mention.

There is no doubt that the pilots will get the lions share of the blame for this unneccesary tradgedy but the fact that the aircraft could not perform something it is certified to do (in flight engine relights either widmilling or APU assisted) will not go unnoticed and nor should it.

The training program at PCL also should not go unscathed. These guys had no idea what they were doing was so incredibly dangerous. I find it hard to believe that a 121 carrier can be allowed to put such clueless pilots at the controls. It may not be PCL's responsibility to teach these kinds of things but it certainly should be their responsibility to make sure that these concepts are known.

 

[ImbracableCrunk]

Why the hell do they need a public meeting?

I'm pretty much sure that's just the next step in the NTSB's usual methods. Nothing special, nothing that hasn't happened at all the other 121 accident cases.

 

[crjskipper]

doin time - engines are not certified to be abused the way these morons abused them - how can you expect to cook a motor at FL410 then super cool it and expect it to spin properly.

GE should sue the pilots for wrongful death

 

[CFIT]

It's not that the engines were rapidly cooled it's that they were taken way over temperature. I have shut down these engines hundreds of times in flight during flight training and never had a problem doing relights. Ive even slowed the aircraft down to get the core to 0% and shown how long it takes to get them up to speed to relight, but still never a problem.

May God rest their soles and that of their families, but the cause of this started when they were switching seats.

 

[PCL_128]

It's not that the engines were rapidly cooled it's that they were taken way over temperature.

And again with the lack of facts. Read the reports. Only one engine suffered heat damage, and it was determined that it should still have been able to start, just not produce max rated thrust. The other engine never over-temped. Whatever you think of the crew, the engines still should have cranked back up.

 

[filejw]

And they never should has been put in a position to have to be restarted either.Lots of blame to go around and I am sure glad after 30 yrs as an ALPA member you ALPA guys are still around to defend the inexcusable.

 

[CitationLover]

The training program at PCL also should not go unscathed. These guys had no idea what they were doing was so incredibly dangerous.

then they really were idiots. even the controller thought it was weird. those red flags coming up from the bottom isn't a good thing to see in a climb or cruise.

pride got the best of these two. their deaths are not in vain as (hopefully) a lot more attention is paid to high altitude aerodynamics at both the majors (who have had their faire share of stalls in cruise/climb) and the regionals.

 

[Rottweiller]

There is no doubt that the pilots will get the lions share of the blame for this unneccesary tradgedy but the fact that the aircraft could not perform something it is certified to do (in flight engine relights either widmilling or APU assisted) will not go unnoticed and nor should it.

If they had followed the checklist / QRH then they would have more than likely started the engines.

It was a stupid accident that should never have happened in the first place but did through a string of errors and operating outside of certified procedures.

 

[EngineThunder]

Correct me if I am wrong, but I didn't think that they were going fast enough for a windmilling start.

 

[PCL_128]

The QRH was followed perfectly for an APU assisted relight. The engines still wouldn't turn.

 

[kmox29]

Do we really need to debate this again?

I watched the NTSB hearings (was on reserve in the crashpad).

The crew should take 99% the blame for causing the accident. Contributing factors (all debatable) are the engine not re-starting, the poor training department at 9E, and the "safety culture" that existed there.

It's too bad they died, but when you do something THAT stupid in an airplane, what do you expect?

 

[LowlyPropCapt]

The QRH was followed perfectly for an APU assisted relight. The engines still wouldn't turn.

CRJ drivers and those really "in the know" about this accident correct me if I am wrong, but:

The engines would not have relit during a properly executed APU start because the cores were already cooked. This was potentially due to the crew trying to windmill start the motors without enough airspeed (and thus N2 rotation) earlier in the accident chain.

 

[CFIT]

The QRH was followed perfectly for an APU assisted relight. The engines still wouldn't turn.

Ya the guys performed like true pro pilots, at some point you are going to step off of the union platform and admit they made huge mistakes. I've read the report too, the QRH was NOT followed correctly. Quit blaming the engines and place resposibility where it is do.