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WSJ slams Colgan (5/11)

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In general, I feel that a low time FO is not a safety hazard alone, but when combined with an inexperienced captain, it is a recipe for disaster. The problem lies with the rapid upgrade times. A 1000hr FO knows enough to watch and learn for a few years. However, he will not learn enough in two years to then be ready to captain the ship with another 1000hr FO.

I think you find a safer approach to flying at places like Eagle and ComAir (despite the Lexington accident) because you don't have low time upgrades. Same applies with the major airlines. You are going to see places like RAH and Skywest develop a safer approach to flying as the sit in the right seat grows from 2 years to 5.

As for 250 and 500 hour FOs, well that is just stupid. I have seen those guys fly the heck out of the sim, but they just haven't seen enough to develop proper reactions to sudden events, or thorough thought processes for handling complex weather or rerouting situations.

I think that part 135 PIC minimums ought to apply to part 121 FO's as well. If you aren't ready to handle a cherokee with checks, you aren't ready to wrestle a Dash 8 or a CRJ full of people. Also, if everyone had to acquire 1200 hours to make it, the herd waiting outside the gate would be a lot thinner.
 
In general, I feel that a low time FO is not a safety hazard alone, but when combined with an inexperienced captain, it is a recipe for disaster. The problem lies with the rapid upgrade times. A 1000hr FO knows enough to watch and learn for a few years. However, he will not learn enough in two years to then be ready to captain the ship with another 1000hr FO.

I think you find a safer approach to flying at places like Eagle and ComAir (despite the Lexington accident) because you don't have low time upgrades. Same applies with the major airlines. You are going to see places like RAH and Skywest develop a safer approach to flying as the sit in the right seat grows from 2 years to 5.

As for 250 and 500 hour FOs, well that is just stupid. I have seen those guys fly the heck out of the sim, but they just haven't seen enough to develop proper reactions to sudden events, or thorough thought processes for handling complex weather or rerouting situations.

I think that part 135 PIC minimums ought to apply to part 121 FO's as well. If you aren't ready to handle a cherokee with checks, you aren't ready to wrestle a Dash 8 or a CRJ full of people. Also, if everyone had to acquire 1200 hours to make it, the herd waiting outside the gate would be a lot thinner.

I had alot to say, then I read your post. I concur. A little stagnation can do wonders for wisdom.
 
Did this guy first start flying in his early 40's at some sort of ALLATPs bridge program for Colgan?

I hate to be a wet blanket, but what is your opinion on guys who begin flight training (with the goal to become a professional pilot) at such a late age. The mind does not absorb information or training like it does as a teen/ early 20's student. Your attitudes and perceptions are much different between those two ages.
In a nutshell I'd tend to think those guys are more mature and have better judgement than the 20-year-olds. See, you can argue it either way:cool:

Seriously J. Otto, ski bunny? This is looking bad for the crew, and I know it's Flightinfo and all, but c'mon. She was a young wife and daughter and several families are going through hell that you and I probably can't imagine. Just a smidgen of respect, there but for the grace of God go we? Anything?
 
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In general, I feel that a low time FO is not a safety hazard alone, but when combined with an inexperienced captain, it is a recipe for disaster. The problem lies with the rapid upgrade times. A 1000hr FO knows enough to watch and learn for a few years. However, he will not learn enough in two years to then be ready to captain the ship with another 1000hr FO.

I think you find a safer approach to flying at places like Eagle and ComAir (despite the Lexington accident) because you don't have low time upgrades. Same applies with the major airlines. You are going to see places like RAH and Skywest develop a safer approach to flying as the sit in the right seat grows from 2 years to 5.

As for 250 and 500 hour FOs, well that is just stupid. I have seen those guys fly the heck out of the sim, but they just haven't seen enough to develop proper reactions to sudden events, or thorough thought processes for handling complex weather or rerouting situations.

I think that part 135 PIC minimums ought to apply to part 121 FO's as well. If you aren't ready to handle a cherokee with checks, you aren't ready to wrestle a Dash 8 or a CRJ full of people. Also, if everyone had to acquire 1200 hours to make it, the herd waiting outside the gate would be a lot thinner.

I agree to a point, probably most if not all of us have flown with low timers in 121 op's. You can't classify all low timers as "not experienced" enough. You really need to weigh the person and not the group. I have flown with some 500 wonders that were on their A game, I have flown with some 3500 wonders I truly wonder why they were still employed!

It boils down to the training and checking. FAA standards are one thing, line standards is something else, and what you need to know in the environment you will be operating in should be the standard. At 9E for years all we did was MEM based sim training, did nothing for the guys up north but it met the FAA standards. The clean out of the Colgan training department sounds very similar to the clean out of the 9E training department after 3701.

Unfortunately at most lower end regionals, the only way to attract qualified applicants is with lower upgrade times. We can only blame ourselves to be honest, we are our own worst enemy when it comes to our chosen profession.
 
That would be the old "if the minumum wasn't good enough, it wouldn't be the minimum" argument. True. However, you can bump standards up to the point where NO ONE can pass.

And then there's the law of supply and demand. We're talking the regionals here. Just last spring, they were hiring 500/50. You can't give those guys a NASA checkride. When there's lots of job candidates you can be stricter.

The telling point is that Colgan has "fired" Check Airmen and had a couple big Kahunas in the Training Department "resign". You don't think there was a little FAA pressure to make that happen? Slack standards have come home to roost, apparently.


Should this raise questions as to the qualifications and competence of all colgan pilots?
 
Should this raise questions as to the qualifications and competence of all colgan pilots?

No. I'd think the Colgan pilots are probably under plenty of FAA and company scrutiny after this accident. What it should do is force the FAA to implement a minimum standard for 121 FO applicants. It certainly won't fix everything however the minimum standard should be higher than the minimum hours required to take a commercial multiengine checkride. You can't blame the pilots for taking the jobs but you can blame the FAA and the companies for enabling them to.

Watching Colgan shed all the blame of this accident and hang it on the flight crew is disgusting. Sure they made some deadly mistakes which they should be held accountable for, but this accident started a long time ago.
 
Watching Colgan shed all the blame of this accident and hang it on the flight crew is disgusting. Sure they made some deadly mistakes which they should be held accountable for, but this accident started a long time ago.

C'mon now.. the lawyers are doing this or directing this.. with the litigation of 50 something cases you can see the driving force. It is either admit fault and head down bankruptcy row or pass the buck and save the collective backsides of the management.
 

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