What would you have done? (Engine out on 747-400)

[Lead Sled]

Okay, as long as we are what-ifing here, how about this scenario for our Part 91 GV,IV,GEX or similar equipment drivers. Your on your way to Lutton with the big man on board. Knowing that he has a full schedule ahead of him when he is scheduled to arrive, you are focused on that Lutton arrival. BIKF and EINN are the last two ETP airports on your flight plan and just as you pass 125W you have to shut down the right engine because of a low oil pressure warning. You follow the non-normal procedures to the letter. What do you do now? Overfly EINN and continue on to Lutton, or drop into EINN and arrange for alternate transporation for the big guy in the back?

Just curious to see what kind of answers might be dropped on me for this question. Remember you are Part 91, not 135, 121, 125.

It's not a comparable situation. In our operation, the boss would have to hitchhike to Lutton after landing at EINN. However, thanks to the marvels of satellite technology, we would have phoned ahead and a had a shiny GIV and its crew eagerly awaiting our arrival.

'Sled

 

[CatYaaak]

Okay, as long as we are what-ifing here, how about this scenario for our Part 91 GV,IV,GEX or similar equipment drivers. Your on your way to Lutton with the big man on board. Knowing that he has a full schedule ahead of him when he is scheduled to arrive, you are focused on that Lutton arrival. BIKF and EINN are the last two ETP airports on your flight plan and just as you pass 125W you have to shut down the right engine because of a low oil pressure warning. You follow the non-normal procedures to the letter. What do you do now? Overfly EINN and continue on to Lutton, or drop into EINN and arrange for alternate transporation for the big guy in the back?

Just curious to see what kind of answers might be dropped on me for this question. Remember you are Part 91, not 135, 121, 125.

There's no decision to make and no pressure in your scenario...you land at the nearest suitable airport.

The "pressure from the back" to get to a destination or take risks/bust regs is more a cliche than a reality. The reality is, with one engine out the boss will be as eager to get to the nearest airport as the regs state. If in your scenario the boss is such a big wheel, then schedules are re-arranged for him/her and other people meet them, not the other way around.

They pay you to fly the plane safely, comply with the regs, and do it as comfortably as possible. That's what you're hired to do. A company hires others to re-schedule things.

 

[CalB737FO]

My original point stands

And here I said no further comment. You do bring up some valid points, though, and I'll credit you with them. And I'm not going to sit idly by and let some fool kill me. Further, I have extensive experience with FMC-equipped aircraft, and I am full aware of their limitations.

As I see it, there are two basic issues here: First - Questioning of the captain (and the FO, as I see it) when nobody was there and could have access to the information that he had; and second - confusing "personal limitations" with "aircraft capabilities."

Garbage in, garbage out. At my airline, next-generation 737's and higher aircraft all have the capability to downlink actual winds. I'd be amazed if BA did not have the same capability. The dispatch flight-plan most likely had highly accurate winds. The FMC undoubtedly had a drag factor, which allows for airframe degradation, built into it. So why would the flight plan be so far off? Several reasons:

1- Improper or marginally improper flight control configuration. A minor increase in drag = a large increase in fuel burn given the duration of the flight.

2- Difference in wind, or improper selection of cruise speed, or improper implementation of cruise speed.

Other possibilities exist, of course. Point is, who knows?

LAST QUESTION -- If flying a 747-400 across the pond with three engines was such an inherently dangerous notion that no fool in his right mind would accept the option, do you not feel that there would be a company directive about it? BA is a huge company with a lot to lose -- we're not talking about a 30 yr old Falcon running night freight.

That's all,
Pete

 

[Spooky 1]

Next question

There's no decision to make and no pressure in your scenario...you land at the nearest suitable airport.

The "pressure from the back" to get to a destination or take risks/bust regs is more a cliche than a reality. The reality is, with one engine out the boss will be as eager to get to the nearest airport as the regs state. If in your scenario the boss is such a big wheel, then schedules are re-arranged for him/her and other people meet them, not the other way around.

They pay you to fly the plane safely, comply with the regs, and do it as comfortably as possible. That's what you're hired to do. A company hires others to re-schedule things.

Okay I don't disagree with you at all on anything you have said in your response EXCEPT, I don't think there is a reg. in Part 91 that says you have to land at the nearest suitable airport. That is where I was coming from. Our comapny Ops Manual (Part 91) has language that would direct to land at the nearest suitable (in time) airport, but I don't think there is a Part 91 reg that requires this. Might be wrong about that. Woudn't be the first time either.

 

[Spooky 1]

The B-747 has four engines because the designers determined four engines were needed. It is not a three-engine airplane with an onboard spare. I believe i have as much four-engine time as most on this board, including time in the B-747 classic. With that said, there's absolutely no way a company management type is going to talk me into a nine+ hour overwater flight with pax onboard. There's not a lot of options available if a second engine craps out, and going into a North Atlantic divert airport with two engines out on the same side is not my idea of a safe operation. BTW, a two engine transport category airplane with an inop engine is a piece of cake compared to a four engine with two out on the same side.

Transpac.........from your previous experience in the Classic or for that any other four engine aircraft you already know that all the ETPs for these aircraft are based upon a 2 engine out scenario. One engine out does not enter into the flight planning structure. That alone does not give you absolute authority to continue with 1 engine out, but it does codify the regulations about continuing on to your destination in the event of a single engine failure on either a 3 or 4 engine aircraft. The fact is that this is not the first, nor the last time something like this will be done. Had this particular flight not diverted later on in the trip, we would have heard nothing about and life would have gone on just fine.

 

[GravityHater]

I won't dismiss the comments about less experienced people second-guessing very well trained and experienced crews... BUT what is wrong with talking about a situation and trying to learn from it? Even if we are wrong because we have incomplete information or weren't on board that flight we can discuss it "hypothetically" or with the 'assuming the info we have is correct' in the back of our minds.
To just Shut Up About The Whole Thing is not really productive, and to talk about the information we have is not necessarily disrespectful of the crew. In addition, we should be able to respect even those who make errors... who among has not screwed up in at least some small way?

 

[GravityHater]

So, with great respect of those involved, I ask this question:
No one has discussed much of the (purported) flames/sparks seen coming from the engine by the crew or atc.
In the assumption that this (the inflammable event) did indeed occur, does that change anyone's mind about the correct action?

The question of pushing on with an engine caged is to me less important than that of "Is this airplane airworthy" because of the evidence of flames/sparks in flight at one point (if the report is true).

Even as a hypothetical event, ignoring this particular flight, is it reasonable to assume that evidence of extreme or excess heat emanating from an engine or airframe at any point in a flight, even if it APPEARS to be extinguished, may have caused some damage to a necessary structure, or may commence once again?

Fire, and its subsidiaries, is one thing that makes me want to let gravity have its way.... right now.

 

[A Squared]

Most everybody here flies single or twin-engine aircraft, so we're conditioned to find a spot on the ground for most major emergencies. I would encourage all of us to stay within our realms when commenting on the actions of other pilots, especially those who have a lifetime of experience and a wealth of information that we, sitting behind our keyboards, do not have.

Well pete, I fly 4 engine airplanes. And just for the record I have plenty of experience with engine failures. Depending on circumstances, I have: Returned to the departure airport, continued on to destination, and diverted enroute. I've also taken off on 3 engines. So you can drop your condescending "you guys all fly single engine airplanes" crap.

Furthermore, the idea floated by you and others that a pilot's judgement is not to be questioned because he's very senior or has X thousand hours, is nothing more than horsecrap. Having a certain number of years or hours doesn't magically place you above criticism.

In your zeal to defend this captains actions, you seem completely blind to the fact that his plan didn't work. It's pretty hard to defend decision making which results in an emergency landing short of destination without enough fuel for a go-around (if reports are accurate)

If making an emergency landing with only glider fuel remaining isn't enough to make you consider that there might have been a better course of action, I have to wonder: How bad would it have to get for you to concede that maybe they should have done something different? I assume that if the airplane had crashed in the ocean and killed everyone, you would then agree that the decision was flawed ... but I wonder.

As for those who claim that it's legal. Even without addressing the specifics that is an inane argument. There are plenty of things which are legal, but are not necessarily safe. Using what is legal as your sole guide to what you should do is a pretty flawed approch to life in general and aviation specifically.

That aside, was it legal? Frankly, I'm not entirely sure which regulations apply. BA is a foreign carrier. I would guess that they are a part 129 carrier, but I don't know for sure.

If they were a 121 carrier, then this would be regulated by 121.565 (b)
One could make the case that the PIC was not in compliance with this reg because he had not adequately considered fuel remaining and weather conditions enroute (winds).

121.565 (b) If not more than one engine of an airplane that has three or more engines fails or its rotation is stopped, the pilot in command may proceed to an airport that he selects if, after considering the following, he decides that proceeding to that airport is as safe as landing at the nearest suitable airport:

(1) The nature of the malfunction and the possible mechanical difficulties that may occur if flight is continued.

(2) The altitude, weight, and usable fuel at the time of engine stoppage.

(3) The weather conditions en route and at possible landing points.

(4) The air traffic congestion.

(5) The kind of terrain.

(6) His familiarity with the airport to be used.

 

[KeroseneSnorter]

The original question of what would you do has brought up some interesting answers.

The info we have is incomplete. None of us were there so the only thing we have to go on is the news reports.

So we are going on the known (reported facts.)

1. Engine failure right after takeoff, with assumed internal damage, not just a shut down, but visible fire and audible report from the motor.

2. Resulting fuel emergency. reported 9000 lbs left on board at landing. With a declared emergency and divert.

Responses from the lower time folks here is mixed, a couple that saw nothing wrong with it came from not being knowledgable about large aircraft. Example would be the poster that thought that 9000lbs remaining sounded like a lot of fuel. On an RJ it is, 747 it is not.

Other responses come from folks like myself. Airline pilots with lots of Narrowbody jet time, 737's DC-9's etc. but with limited 4 engine time. Most in that catagory went with the feeling that it was not a smart move continuing on across the pond.

The rest of the responses from the widebody guys, especially from the whale drivers seem to be almost all that it was a bad idea to continue, even though it was probably legal to do so. I also called a buddy that is currently flying a 74-400 for a freight outfit and asked him what he thought....His answer, "What the F was that guy thinking?" His thoughts were the same as mine, too many variables and unknowns about the extent of the damage and possible related system failures. (The report of not being able to transfer fuel being one, possibly as a result of the initial engine failure.)

My thoughts on the subject, coming from narrowbody jet transport experience from both the right and left seat, stands at "Not the best choice in my opinion." Continuing to JFK, not a big deal for me. My questions come from the decision to continue the Atlantic crossing with so many unknown variables. Even the Military would not run an operation like that during a wartime mission if it could possibly be helped. With 351 passengers on board, and the potential libel risk that it entails, I still cannot come up with a senario that makes it a good idea.

One thing is for sure, had they not diverted, we would have heard nothing of it. Had they crashed.........

Each pilot has to make decisions based on his judgement and experience. If the facts are correct, and they did land with only 9000 lbs on board. It is clear that they got lucky. Each accident or incident is a chain of events, Personally I would have stopped the chain at the engine failure in LAX. At that point, the what if's out weighed the knowns in my opinion. I feel that there had to be pressure coming from the company to continue the flight for financial reasons, as I have yet to meet a pilot in the flesh that would continue in this situation on his own accord with no outside pressure.

Landing with 3% fuel onboard, (if accounts are accurate) should never happen. Continued flight on a transatlantic crossing with known damage, and unknown side effects, on a revenue flight, in my opinion is breaking the flying publics trust in your airline. B.A. is not some third world airline flying out of an African dirt strip.

 

[CSY Mon]

I am not sure what "Emergency Fuel" is in pounds for the -400 but I bet it is less than 9000, not much perhaps, but less.

Well, each company probably have their own definiton of "Emergency Fuel" or when to decleare an emergency based on fuel remaining.

On the -200 series Boeing defines a "Minimum Fuel" condition in the emergency / abnormal procedures as 8000 lbs. TOTAL

That is 2000 lbs or less in each main tank.
Do not exceed 8 degrees pitch up, all boost pumps on, all cross feeds open, etc, etc.

Personally I would decleare a fuel emergency in a B-747 if I had 12000 lbs or less onboard and not on short final in VMC conditons.

On a side note:
I was operating a 747 as the next aircraft behind the Avianca 707 that ran out of gas over JFK in 1990, or 91.

We were all holding in crappy weather for a couple of hours, heard those guys on the radio all the time, the kept requesting priority, low on fuel, but they never said the magic word "Emerency" and therefore never got priority.
The got cleared for the approach, a few minuttes later, we got cleared.
The 707 however had to go missed as they had neither flight director nor auto-pilot and got off the localizer on short final..(Bare minimums, snow, dark, stormy and nasty)
As we touched down, they flamed out on all 4 and crashed.

All they had to do was to decleare an Emergency, like the BA 747-400 did.

 

[A Squared]

Okay I don't disagree with you at all on anything you have said in your response EXCEPT, I don't think there is a reg. in Part 91 that says you have to land at the nearest suitable airport. That is where I was coming from. Our comapny Ops Manual (Part 91) has language that would direct to land at the nearest suitable (in time) airport, but I don't think there is a Part 91 reg that requires this. Might be wrong about that. Woudn't be the first time either.

91.7 doesn't specifically address the case of an engine shut down in a twin, but 91.7 requires you to discontinue a flight when "unairworthy mechanical, electrical, or structural conditions occur." An engine shutdown is considered an unairworthy condition. Here's a link to an NTSB order in which a pilot got violated for continuing a flight under part 91 with one engine shutdown.

http://www.ntsb.gov/O_n_O/docs/AVIATION/3628.PDF

Briefly, he was flying a metro on a part 91 non-rev leg from Billings to Stapelton. He shut down an engine enroute and continued to Stapelton, overflying several airports suitable for the metro to land. He was found in violation of 91.29 (earlier version of 91.7)

§91.7 Civil aircraft airworthiness.


(a) No person may operate a civil aircraft unless it is in an airworthy condition. (b) The pilot in command of a civil aircraft is responsible for determining whether that aircraft is in condition for safe flight. The pilot in command shall discontinue the flight when unairworthy mechanical, electrical, or structural conditions occur.

 

[CalB737FO]

Yikes, A-squared

Calm the F-bomb down. I have a civilian background and grew up at a regional airline. I know all about low time pilots and their opinions. And I don't condescend to a single one of them.

My point is, was, and remains: Quit second-guessing the guy. Another poster brought up the fact that there's nothing wrong with working out a situation on the message board, and I agree with that, too. I hold a minor degree in Aviation Safety, with Accident Investigation as the focus. I'm well aware of the value of learning from another pilot's mistakes.

Talk about horsecrap and condescension, you did it to me. "I FLY FOUR-ENGINE AIRPLANES, SO LEMME TELL YA SOMETHING...." Anybody who flies airliners, and most pilots who just know people who fly airliners, understand that there are a TON of regulations under which we operate. The mechanics of flying an airplane are the least of the skill-set that one needs to get by in this industry.

Regardless of whether or not a plan looks good at first, it can go bad. It can go bad with all four engines running, like the guy who flew through volcanic ash. In my opinion, the captain worked out a plan that was to his satisfaction, and it didn't work -- SO HE DID SOMETHING ELSE. Sometimes the operation of airplanes leads us to a place we'd rather not have been. As an aircraft commander, I strive for that to never happen, but perfection does not exist on this planet.

Give the guy the benefit of the doubt. He's flying an advanced widebody jet for a tight outfit. They don't do anything by the seat of their pants. Discussing what you or I or anybody else would have done is completely understandable, but roasting the guy for not doing what you would have is completely absurd.

Pete

 

[Some guy]

Good thing they didn't lose all 4 engines, they would have run out of fuel in less than a hour. (kind of goes along with the following joke)...

Paddy and Seamus were flying from Boston to Dublin on a 747. Half way across the Atlantic, there was a loud noise outside the plane - one of the engines fell off the wing.
A short while later the captain announced ‘Ladies and gentlemen, we’re very sorry to advise that we have lost one of our engines. However, there is no need to worry - the plane can fly perfectly safely on three engines. However, because we now have one less engine, we’re unable to fly quite so fast, and we estimate that we’ll now be approximately 45 minutes late arriving into Dublin.’

Seamus nodded to Paddy, and they each calmly ordered another Bushmills.

The flight continued, then all of a sudden, the plane lurched sharply to the left, then straightened up again. Paddy looked out the window, and saw flames streaming out of one of the two engines on that wing. After a minute or two, the flames died out.

The captain made another announcement. ‘Ah, sorry about that, but we’ve just had a fire break out in one of our three remaining engines. Fortunately, the fire extinguishing system worked perfectly, but of course we’ve had to shut that engine down. Don’t worry - we still have two perfectly good engines, and the plane is continuing safely. So as not to overstress the two remaining engines, we’re cutting back our cruise speed, and estimate that we’ll now be about two hours late arriving into Dublin’.

Seamus and Paddy looked anxiously at their watches, then relaxed and ordered another Bushmills.

Well, bad things happen in threes. Half an hour later, Paddy said to Seamus ‘Did you hear that - the engines sound different?’. They discussed what that might mean for several minutes, and then the Captain’s voice came over the announcement system again.

‘Ah, ladies and gentleman, I don’t quite know how to tell you this, but we’ve had a problem with another engine. We’ve had to shut it down, but, if my math is correct, that still leaves us with one perfectly good engine, and I promise you we’re going to look after that one very carefully, all the rest of the way to Dublin. We’ll probably now be about three or four hours late.’

Seamus looked at his watch, calculated when they would now be arriving into Dublin, and said to Paddy ‘We’re running very late already. I sure hope we don’t lose the last engine or else we’ll be up here all day’.

 

[Spooky 1]

91.7 doesn't specifically address the case of an engine shut down in a twin, but 91.7 requires you to discontinue a flight when "unairworthy mechanical, electrical, or structural conditions occur." An engine shutdown is considered an unairworthy condition. Here's a link to an NTSB order in which a pilot got violated for continuing a flight under part 91 with one engine shutdown.

http://www.ntsb.gov/O_n_O/docs/AVIATION/3628.PDF

Briefly, he was flying a metro on a part 91 non-rev leg from Billings to Stapelton. He shut down an engine enroute and continued to Stapelton, overflying several airports suitable for the metro to land. He was found in violation of 91.29 (earlier version of 91.7)

§91.7 Civil aircraft airworthiness.


(a) No person may operate a civil aircraft unless it is in an airworthy condition. (b) The pilot in command of a civil aircraft is responsible for determining whether that aircraft is in condition for safe flight. The pilot in command shall discontinue the flight when unairworthy mechanical, electrical, or structural conditions occur.

A SQARED, thanks for setting me straight on this. I was not aware of it and how it could be applied to this situation.

I think the term "Minimum Fuel" and "Emergency Fuel" were both developed as a result of the Avianca accident. At my last employer each aircraft had a number for both of those values. I only served as a judgement value to assist both the crew and ATC in putting a number on the seriousness of the situation.

Thanks again!

 

[A Squared]

Talk about horsecrap and condescension, you did it to me. "I FLY FOUR-ENGINE AIRPLANES, SO LEMME TELL YA SOMETHING...."

No, pete, in addition to misquoting me, you're also misunderstanding me.

Remember YOU were the one who claimed that someone wasn't qualified to comment unless they were typed in a 4 engine aircraft. I was bringing up my experience merely to demonstrate that I met your absurd qualification for commenting.

 

[A Squared]

A SQARED, thanks for setting me straight on this. I was not aware of it and how it could be applied to this situation.

Actually, neither was I, until I ran across this decision a while back. Apparently the FAA and the NTSB see it differently

 

[CatYaaak]

And here I said no further comment. You do bring up some valid points, though, and I'll credit you with them. And I'm not going to sit idly by and let some fool kill me. Further, I have extensive experience with FMC-equipped aircraft, and I am full aware of their limitations.

As I see it, there are two basic issues here: First - Questioning of the captain (and the FO, as I see it) when nobody was there and could have access to the information that he had; and second - confusing "personal limitations" with "aircraft capabilities."

Garbage in, garbage out. At my airline, next-generation 737's and higher aircraft all have the capability to downlink actual winds. I'd be amazed if BA did not have the same capability. The dispatch flight-plan most likely had highly accurate winds. The FMC undoubtedly had a drag factor, which allows for airframe degradation, built into it. So why would the flight plan be so far off? Several reasons:

1- Improper or marginally improper flight control configuration. A minor increase in drag = a large increase in fuel burn given the duration of the flight.

2- Difference in wind, or improper selection of cruise speed, or improper implementation of cruise speed.

Other possibilities exist, of course. Point is, who knows?

LAST QUESTION -- If flying a 747-400 across the pond with three engines was such an inherently dangerous notion that no fool in his right mind would accept the option, do you not feel that there would be a company directive about it? BA is a huge company with a lot to lose -- we're not talking about a 30 yr old Falcon running night freight.

That's all,
Pete

Well, you have no idea if they had "highly accurate winds", and the only time you know what the "actual wind" or temp is when you are in them, unless of course BA and your company has suspended wind anemometers and thermometers at all altitudes along the routes you fly to give you instant real-time info, with the added magical ability to forecast what they will be with the same exactitude when you pass by there say, eight hours later. Yes, we can downlink forecast winds/temps into our FMC's while airborne as well, and do it all the time.....but these numbers are still limited predictors even with fancy pants technology to pass them along.

In many conversations and from what I've read, there's a big difference between the U.S. and U.K./Europe regarding the use of reserve fuel. In the Euro/UK model, the captain can decide to use his reserve fuel before diverting to the alternate, and if the engines flame-out from starvation while taxiing in after arriving there, then it means everything's "quite alright my good chap that's what reserve fuel is for". Dispatch doesn't come into play because they don't share the legal responsiblity like they do here in the U.S, and quite frankly many pilots in the U.S. would be horrified at how little fuel remains in many Euro airliners when they do indeed divert to an alternate because of this discretionary use.

Frankly, I wouldn't be suprised if this mindset of "it's OK if they quit running at the alternate because anything more can be used at the Captain's discretion" rather than a requirement of what should remain in the tanks after you get there, played a part in this aircraft failing to make it to its destination and having to put down early. Given this well-known view towards fuel, my question would be just how early in the flight did the Captain know he would be burning his reserve (or discretionary) fuel before reaching the other end? Experience can cut both ways if it bites you.

As for you last question...flying is inherently dangerous. What we are paid to do is assess risks and try to minimize them through the use judging various options, especially if our gig is to fly around paying passengers. 3-engined 4-holers are ferried safely all the time, but there's a reason no civil authority will allow revenue flying under such conditions...risk assessment. Aside from the fuel problem, there's the question of visible flames and uncontrollable engine surges necessitating the shutdown. Any collatoral damage?..the flight crew has limited means to assess this while airborne, and we all know problems can manifest themselves hours later...not a good thing if hour later means over the North Atlantic in winter.

They landed with 9000 lbs of fuel...not much..but the Captain believed he had only 4000 lbs usable because of the transfer problem..wich is virtually nothing if in fact he was right. So was this transfer problem related to the shutdown?....it will come out I guess.

We plan by the numbers, but there is always, always a fudge factor involved because our numbers are fallible, inaccurate, or merely forecasts. These guys blew their entire fudge factor out the tailcone immediately after takeoff, relegating them to an unplanned altitude in the high 20's, and obviously believed in a plan that would only work if everthing else magically became perfect, optimized, and infallible. There's no reason to assume in the ensuing hours they would become so however, because we all know that rarely, if ever, happens.

So you can debate about 3 engine safety on the 744 and salute BA uniforms all you want if it makes you feel better, but the fact remains that there's really no excuse for professionals to press on for hours with other options available, and then almost run out of fuel short of ther destination. The fact remains that's what happened, and hopefully, the mere absence of dead bodies is not the only barometer by which professionals measure judgement.

 

[CatYaaak]

Regardless of whether or not a plan looks good at first, it can go bad. It can go bad with all four engines running, like the guy who flew through volcanic ash. In my opinion, the captain worked out a plan that was to his satisfaction, and it didn't work -- SO HE DID SOMETHING ELSE. Sometimes the operation of airplanes leads us to a place we'd rather not have been. As an aircraft commander, I strive for that to never happen, but perfection does not exist on this planet.

Give the guy the benefit of the doubt. He's flying an advanced widebody jet for a tight outfit. They don't do anything by the seat of their pants. Discussing what you or I or anybody else would have done is completely understandable, but roasting the guy for not doing what you would have is completely absurd.

Pete

You whine about anyone questioning this captain and appeal to give him the benefit of the doubt because "he's flying an advanced widebody jet for a tight outfit"? Big friggin' deal....they landed on fumes prior to their destination, that deserves questioning. That lamo "don't question the captains decision because he's the captain", the assertion that BA pilots would never do anything "by the seat of the pants", and terming yourself an "aircraft commander" points to your probable Euro-roots which would certainly explain your desire to uphold the myth that pilots are some kind of special, righteous breed. It's all a bunch of **CENSORED****CENSORED****CENSORED****CENSORED**e.

Seems we've heard the same "Don't dare judge because you weren't there" defense for the A-320 guys who elected not to turn on the onboard WX radar on while running through imbedded CB's over the Alps, and then proceeded to take an aircraft-ruining hail-thrashing. The aircraft ahead took the turn around it, but they motored on straight ahead. Tell me, how does NOT questioning these decisions promote safety, or reinforce and enhance the learning process?

Yes, they love to "command" everything, but be responsible for nothing.

 

[SiuDude]

I would've diverted to Gander while another plane flew from LHR to Gander (if available) to pick up the pax. Crossing the pond? Thats nutz.

 

[Vector4fun]

Well I don't have any 4 engine time, but were I a Passenger on the flight, I'd be pissed, frankly, that the crew elected to cruise on over the polar regions on three. I'd have been OK with continuing on to ORD, JFK, or Some airport in Canada where suitable maint. facilities exist; mainly because there's probably an emergency field suitable for a 747 within 45 min flying time all along the route. But I have a healthy respect for large bodies of very cold water/ice. This has nothing to do with whether a 747 flies wonderfully on two or three engines, or whether it's legal to do so. If I'm paying to be flown over a few thousand miles of desolate ice, I'd want all the major systems functioning normally. Has nothing to do with whether the aircraft has 2, 3, 4, or 6 engines.

My Dad used to do 3 engine ferries from time to time. It's a bit different in an empty airplane. He also had to cage a second engine on the same side during one. Those things do happen, (L-100-20)

 

[secks]

If I'm paying to be flown over a few thousand miles of desolate ice, I'd want all the major systems functioning normally. Has nothing to do with whether the aircraft has 2, 3, 4, or 6 engines.

Not only that, but I'd wager that if 1 engine dies, there is a much higher probability that another engine will. I haven't read the entire thread, but isn't there a good chance that the engine failure could have been indicative of a much more severe problem which had yet to surface?

 

[727gm]

The BA crew surely discussed it, and elected to continue as is legal, considering wx, daylight, fuel, expected winds. The flight plan said London, the pax had paid to go there, the aircraft still had more engines remaining than most people happily take off with heading overwater these days, and since we weren't there, it's hard to put ourselves into the cockpit with that same problem. Three engine ferries have no payload on them because they are dispatched that way, this occurred after takeoff. There would seem to be a point of discussion on whether he should have diverted sooner if actual fuel burn was not going as well.

I'm always amazed that people think nothing of launching overwater on only two engines, and 180 minute ETOPS is now thought of as normal. That is airline economics in action, and the pax and safety be d8mned. I believe that whenever 180 minute ETOPS(+15%) is discussed in an official forum, it should be required to be expressed as Three Hours and Twenty Seven Minutes Overwater on One Engine Emergency as it doesn't sound so innoccuous as the former term.

 

[CalB737FO]

You whine about anyone questioning this captain and appeal to give him the benefit of the doubt because "he's flying an advanced widebody jet for a tight outfit"? Big friggin' deal....they landed on fumes prior to their destination, that deserves questioning. That lamo "don't question the captains decision because he's the captain", the assertion that BA pilots would never do anything "by the seat of the pants", and terming yourself an "aircraft commander" points to your probable Euro-roots which would certainly explain your desire to uphold the myth that pilots are some kind of special, righteous breed. It's all a bunch of **CENSORED****CENSORED****CENSORED****CENSORED**e.

Seems we've heard the same "Don't dare judge because you weren't there" defense for the A-320 guys who elected not to turn on the onboard WX radar on while running through imbedded CB's over the Alps, and then proceeded to take an aircraft-ruining hail-thrashing. The aircraft ahead took the turn around it, but they motored on straight ahead. Tell me, how does NOT questioning these decisions promote safety, or reinforce and enhance the learning process?

Yes, they love to "command" everything, but be responsible for nothing.

CatYak,

You're taking what I'm saying and then stretching it to the extreme. You talk about questioning captain's authority being absurd, but when I disagree with one of your points, you can't help but to attempt to insult. And I say attempt, because it falls on deaf ears.

I'll make it as plain as possible: WHAT I'M SAYING is that the captain of the ship had a lot of resources at his disposal that you do not. He made a choice. We can discuss what we would have done in a similar situation, but it's just an exercise. Perhaps he made the right choice -- maybe he didn't. That is not a point I've ever discussed here. I've simply said that he deserves the benefit of the doubt until further evidence proves incompetence or negligence.

So far as you're concerned, my opinion is also simple: reactionary. You can whip it out and we'll see who's is bigger, but I'd prefer not to do that. Just take my opinions for mine, and I'll take yours for what they're worth.

I'll leave you with this thought: Aircraft certification is a many-fold process that directly involves the manufacturer (Boeing, in this case) and the civil aviation authority, be it the FAA or another country's. If Boeing or any other authority involved in the certification program thought that flying a 744 on 3-engines for a continuous period of time was dangerous, there would be a checklist prohibition against it.

I'm sure that Cat-Yak will find something to complain about, but such appears to be the nature of things.

Pete

 

[atrdriver]

5 (metric) tonnes = 4.54 net tons = approx 9000 lbs of fuel. That seems like a sizable quantity to me. A 747-400 can hold 55,000- 60,000 lbs of fuel. Not quite 3% there

A 747-200 holds 335,000 Lbs of fuel....a 774 engine at T/O power burns about 4,000/hour/engine. You need to check you numbers. Do you REALLY think that a 747-400 only holds 6 times the amount of fuel that a 50 deat Rj does?

 

[atrdriver]

I don't know about BA, but TWA used to not be about to cross if they lost an engine before the halfway point. I know my dad had to turn around 2 or 3 times because they lost one before getting halfway across, but then again, that was on -200's...Maybe there is a difference since it was a -400.

 

[CatYaaak]

CatYak,

You're taking what I'm saying and then stretching it to the extreme. You talk about questioning captain's authority being absurd, but when I disagree with one of your points, you can't help but to attempt to insult. And I say attempt, because it falls on deaf ears.

I'll make it as plain as possible: WHAT I'M SAYING is that the captain of the ship had a lot of resources at his disposal that you do not. He made a choice. We can discuss what we would have done in a similar situation, but it's just an exercise. Perhaps he made the right choice -- maybe he didn't. That is not a point I've ever discussed here. I've simply said that he deserves the benefit of the doubt until further evidence proves incompetence or negligence.

So far as you're concerned, my opinion is also simple: reactionary. You can whip it out and we'll see who's is bigger, but I'd prefer not to do that. Just take my opinions for mine, and I'll take yours for what they're worth.

I'll leave you with this thought: Aircraft certification is a many-fold process that directly involves the manufacturer (Boeing, in this case) and the civil aviation authority, be it the FAA or another country's. If Boeing or any other authority involved in the certification program thought that flying a 744 on 3-engines for a continuous period of time was dangerous, there would be a checklist prohibition against it.

I'm sure that Cat-Yak will find something to complain about, but such appears to be the nature of things.

Pete

I've never said flying it on 3 was was "dangerous", but you keep trying to assign me this notion to avoid the real subject, which was the fuel situation they arrived in...and that WAS dangerous. Even the Captain thought so, or why and PAN and MAYDAY calls due to his fuel state? Ghosting in on fumes should never happen no matter how many engines you have running except in extreme unforseen circrumstances, which didn't exist here. They couldn't even make it to their intended destination, let alone somewhere else if need be. Obviously the degradation in performance due to the engine loss and resulting higher fuel burns etc, would contribute to the fuel issue, which is why the engine loss is relevant in a major way. "Being able to fly on 3" does NOT equate to "Flying on 3 is no different than flying on 4". They rolled the dice on the fuel burn predictions, pressed on, boxed themselves in, and they lost.

It was NOT a successful flight, because holding those certificates and positions mean you are held to a higher standard of what is successful, and I've never heard that we are paid to box ourselves in by stretching things past the limit. You can spin whiz wheels until you're dizzy, plug numbers into FMCs until you're happy, pretend the forecasts are spot on, tell yourself everything's "legal and SOP", dive into the minutia of perf numbers, but if you're having to do all those things on the fly to convince yourself it will work out with no buffer left over, perhaps its not a good idea in the first place when there are better options around. You're getting paid to take the better options.

Now, you can kid yourself all day long there's a big question as to whether the Captain made the right decision, pretend you don't have enough information, and even think it's "improper to question", but the proof is in the pudding as they say. A PAN and MADAY call due to a near fuel-exhaustion event (if indeed they couldn't transfer that last couple tons), or at best (if they could) landing with a load of pax at an airport short of their destination due to critical fuel state. This clearly points to....making the wrong decision, or a string of them.

Just because BA did it doesn't mean it turns this basic and elementary standard into some nebulous, relative gray area. Even the greenest student pilot learns that the only thing more inexcusable than forgetting to put the gear down for landing is running and airplane out of gas. This doesn't change just because your callsign is Speedbird or you're flying a widebody....it's not rocket science.

If a 3-engined aircaft with everything running perfectly had landed short of destination under the same fuel-critical circumstances, nobody here would be excusing it. For some reason, however, the act of shutting an engine down after T/O seems for some to mitigate the arrival situation into something defensible. I fail to see why it does.

There's no doubt that if Pakistani Airlines or EgyptAir did the same thing nobody would be defending the decision. Once again, I'd like to find out when the crew figured out they would need to burn into their 4-engined planned fuel reserves just to make Heathrow (which of course they didn't) with the degraded performance of operating on 3 . If their FMC numbers, forecasts, etc., were as accurate as you maintain, then they must have known early on they were cutting it close JUST TO GET THERE let alone have reserves upon landing. Of course, that would make what happened even more inexcusable, and probably negligent.

But hey, that's what happens when you defend your "command authority" to the point of not even allowing Dispatchers to share responsiblity on fuel issues or operational decisions like diverting. When you demand and recieve complete control and authority, there's nobody else to look to when things go awry, is there?

 

[CSY Mon]

A 747-200 holds 335,000 Lbs of fuel....a 774 engine at T/O power burns about 4,000/hour/engine

Hmm, not to split hairs, but the above numbers seems off by a small margin.
The 335,000 lbs is probably -100 numbers.
The -200 have bigger tanks, and some of them came with reserve 2 & 3 and some with reserve center tank fuel, approaching the tankage of the -400.

Ya could fly a standard -200 with max fuel and optimum altitudes about 14 hours before the flame went out.

As for a 774 engine burning 4000 lbs / hr on T/O power....Not even close.
Try 12,000 lbs or more.

These BA guys were probably in compliance with company ops. spec, procedures and all that, but it still seems like a bad idea to continue the flight as if noting happened.

On the -200 we had some flexibility in the above scenario, as in "Nearest Suitable Airport" being the one most convenient for maintenance and pax, but not across a continent AND an ocean.

 

[Hawker rider]

OK, will everybody that DOESN't have a 747 typerating please refrain from posting their thoughts???

5 tonns of fuel certainly IS legal to land with in a 747. As is flying on 3 engines, or 2 engines even...

Lot of people giving their "decisions" about things that they have no clue about

 

[Hawker rider]

Actually, you know what we should do? Everybody without current or past 747 typerating and knowledge of JAA regs, should edit and clean out their posts...

 

[mzaharis]

Given that I posted the article, I should probably weigh in.

I simply thought the article would be interesting to many of you. My subject line may have been a bit unfortunate, but it wasn't my intention to "second-guess" the PIC, SIC, or BA's dispatch rules. Obviously, unless I'm lying about my experience by orders of magnitude (and I'm not), I have neither the knowledge or experience to do so authoritatively. Of course, though, this was going to become a discussion of the pilot's decision to proceed to his intended destination under these conditions. If nothing else, it has inspired a conversation on those "go/no go" decisions that has been interesting to me, and hopefully to you.