CalB737FO said:
Now let's speak of the arrogance and sheer impropriety of second-guessing a very senior, experienced captain when not a soul on this message board was anywhere near the cockpit at the time of the event. After take-off, or maybe during, the aircraft suffered an engine failure. Captain elected to go out over the sea and figure it out. Captain elected to press on to England with the aircraft. By himself? Probably not. Most likely had the concurrence of the First Officer and the dispatcher. Most likely had a plan for what would happen if a second motor failed over land or water. Had an entire continent to find out if a second motor was going to fail.
Cruise speeds in large jets don't vary too much when one of three or four engines fail. Overall time not too much different that initial flight planned time. Add to that state-of-the-art navigation and flight performance data from three (count 'em) FMC's, and you've got an exceedingly accurate display of all aircraft metrics.
Pete
Well, obviously not that "exceedingly accurate" when it comes to forecasting the larger and more important question of divining fuel state at the end of the trip;
Did they land at their destination with reserve fuel?....No. Did they have to land early?....Yes. Did they land at the diversion airport with reserve fuel?.....No. Did they transmit PAN, and then MAYDAY due to fuel concerns?....Yes. Did the Captain think they had enough to even go around?...No.
With those events happening, there's no arrogance involved in questioning a decision that had major fuel implications (lower cruise altitude, higher burns, long ETE) for a pax-carrying flight that ended up landing with a PAN and MAYDAY calls due to fuel because in the end they didn't have enough to get to their destination, or even a go-around at the one they diverted to.
3 FMC's are neato stuff, yet the old adage applies; Garbage in, garbage out. "Garbage" into an FMC for any flight IS A GIVEN to some degree until the day comes that we know EXACTLY what the winds and temps aloft will be for an aircraft along the route and altitude (and a long ETE means small errors are magnified), or exactly when ATC might assign lower altitudes, etc. Currently, there is no way to know this. Limitations like this are basic FMC knowledge, not recognizing them is fooling yourself, and obviously the answers the Captain was getting from the FMCs early on were incorrect....but it's his job to know it's limitations. This is especially true when considering the castrated role of Dispatch. No doubt the FMCs and forecasts plugged in were the main tools for basing his decision, but we use FMCs to double check the numbers from the flight plan, not as the primary flight planning tool. Obviously, they cut it to the gnat's a$$ and further, as evidenced by how the flight terminated.
Nobody is above being questioned, and if you think it's "sheer impropriety" just because the Captain was very-senior (who cares) or experienced (everyone by now knows that's no guarantee against messing up), then you must adhere to that whole European mindset about commanding an aircraft that goes something like "You weren't there, and nobody died, so therefore you have no right to question the Duke..I mean the Captain". I fly among them, and you wouldn't believe how many will try to defend the indefensible based on this Old School sailing-ship nonsense. Well, the Brits have always thought we are improper at least as far back as when we dressed up as Indians and tossed their tea into Boston Harbour. Ho hum.
What's legal or SOP isn't necessarily smart or using good judgement when things have gone non-standard early on, especially when your fuel load is based on optimum cruise altitudes with reserves and no more (since that costs $$). Ignoring the fact that your route takes you over the North Atlantic and thousands of miles over land with no options is a question of judgment and weighing risks.
The loss of the engine occured just after T/O (LAX control reported seeing flames coming from the engine), and the Captain elected to conduct what was essentially a long-haul, oceanic 3-engine ferry flight. Now there's no question that neither the CAA or FAA would allow such a ferry with revenue pax onboard if BA had wanted to conduct it as such from the beginning. They wouldn't, but those few minutes on 4 after breaking ground put the Captain into the realm of being legal.
But my main question is this...for a legitimate 3-engine ferry conducted at the same weight that existed with revenue pax flight, over that same route and 3-engine altitude to Heathrow, what would have the minimum fuel with reserves for an alternate have been for departure at LAX?
Obviously, something went wrong if they didn't make their destination...which they didn't... let alone the PAN/MAYDAY calls.
