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What was the controller doing??

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HighSpeedClimb

Well-known member
Joined
Jan 25, 2006
Posts
464
Traffic Controller Didn't See Takeoff
By JEFFREY McMURRAY
AP
LEXINGTON, Ky. (AP) - Federal investigators are looking into several possible factors that could have contributed to Sunday's deadly crash: a repaving project that had changed the taxiway route, the staffing in the control tower, even the pilots themselves.

In the tower, only one traffic controller was on duty, a violation of Federal Aviation Administration policy, the FAA acknowledged Tuesday.

The controller cleared the regional jet for takeoff, then turned his back to handle administrative work and didn't see it head down the wrong runway, a strip that wasn't long enough for the twin-engine jet.

The crew struggled to get the plane airborne on the too-short runway and crashed in a nearby field, killing everyone aboard but the first officer, James Polehinke, who was pulled from the burning plane. Polehinke remained hospitalized Wednesday in critical condition.

Polehinke was flying the plane when it crashed, but it was the flight's captain, Jeffrey Clay, who taxied the aircraft onto the wrong runway, Hersman said.


Both crew members were familiar with the Lexington airport, Hersman said. She said Clay had been there six times in the past two years, and Polehinke had been there 10 times - but neither had been to the airport since a repaving project just a week before the crash altered the taxiway.

Wednesday morning, pieces of the charred aircraft are still scattered at the site, a field just beyond the airport that is now stained with fuel.

In an airport parking lot nearby, pens hung from the banner for writing remembrances. Someone had scrawled "I miss you." Next to it sat a large wreath from Kentucky Gov. Ernie Fletcher.

Authorities said the pilots and control tower talked about using the 7,000-foot main runway, but somehow the plane turned onto the shorter, 3,500-foot runway instead.

The air traffic controller, a 17-year veteran at the airport who has not been publicly identified, had an unobstructed view of the runways and had cleared the aircraft for takeoff from the longer runway, Hersman said.

Then, "he turned his back to perform administrative duties," she said.

FAA spokeswoman Laura Brown said the controller at Lexington had to keep track of airplanes on the ground, those in the air up to a few miles away, and watch the radar - even though a November 2005 FAA directive required control tower observations and radar approach operations be handled by separate controllers.
 
reading off a departure clearance?

giving taxi instructions to a GA aircraft?

clearing airport equipment to cross a taxiway?

talking to a center controller?

getting an EDCT window secured for a flight?

just a few of the items that 1 controller might be tasked with. everytime i hear that all airport traffic is relegated to 1 frequency with 1 human watching the whole thing...i go to high alert.

maybe the result of something like this will shed light on the UNSAFE practices of a multi-frequency terminal environment burdening ONE controller. it's flat unsafe and has been for a long time. we lose several layers of safety with such an arrangement.

it might not have changed things at LEX, but it could affect the future
 
"administrative duties" could include going click-click on the traffic counter, scratching out the flight from his note pad, chucking the strip block in a milk crate or resetting the playstation.

I flew for the first time today since the crash and took an extra one second to look and see that the runway and my heading bug matched. I'll be dedicating that one second of every flight I make to the passengers and crewmembers of that flight. They made me safer for it and I think them and hope they rest in piece.
 
I was flying into an airport with one controller who, while we were on APP Control, gave us a clearance for the visual, cleared us to land, taxi to our gate, and are you ready to copy your clearance to the next airport we were going to, all in one breath. Talk about working it all..
 
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What was the controller doing?

The same thing any of us would have done. Clear the flight for takeoff and then go about our business. I'm responsible for making sure I am on the right runway, not the controller. They tell us where to go and we are supposed to do it. In typical american culture fashion we are going to try and blame as many people as we can.

I've taxied onto the wrong runway before and it was no one else fault but mine. I have a chart, co-pilot/captain and several instruments to verify what I am doing. If I am confused I ask!
 
Lake Alice said:
What was the controller doing?

The same thing any of us would have done. Clear the flight for takeoff and then go about our business. I'm responsible for making sure I am on the right runway, not the controller. They tell us where to go and we are supposed to do it. In typical american culture fashion we are going to try and blame as many people as we can.

I've taxied onto the wrong runway before and it was no one else fault but mine. I have a chart, co-pilot/captain and several instruments to verify what I am doing. If I am confused I ask!

I agree!!
 
Since the pilot made the turn early and was in the middle of a rolling take-off, the controller probaby wasn't expecting him to be "on the roll" yet. This also suggests that the controller cleared the pilot for take-off before he was at the end of runway 22. You can bet there won't be any early clearances at LEX for a while.
 
Maybe we could lose the "ramp tower" at every aiport that has that unecessary position and properly staff the positions that do make a difference.

Yet another technique to offer ... at the "80 knots" callout (or whatever lowspeed/last minute/abort for almost anything callout you have) sanity check the distance remaining markers.
 
If we have any former civilian controllers on the board I would like to ask you if this paricular controller, from what we know, did anything wrong.

Is there any legality issues with clearing someone for takeoff before they reach the end of the taxi way?

Does the controller have to monitor the entire takeoff roll?
 
Lake Alice said:
If we have any former civilian controllers on the board I would like to ask you if this paricular controller, from what we know, did anything wrong.

Is there any legality issues with clearing someone for takeoff before they reach the end of the taxi way?

Does the controller have to monitor the entire takeoff roll?

It's not really a question of whether the controller did anything wrong. It's a matter of what the FAA did wrong. The FAA's policy is to have no less than 2 controllers in that tower. One controller is not authorized to handle both ground and flight operations by himself. The FAA understaffed the tower in an attempt to save a few bucks, and that became one of many links in this accident chain.
 
ivauir said:
Maybe we could lose the "ramp tower" at every aiport that has that unecessary position and properly staff the positions that do make a difference.

Yet another technique to offer ... at the "80 knots" callout (or whatever lowspeed/last minute/abort for almost anything callout you have) sanity check the distance remaining markers.

Ramp tower controllers are not Federal Employees.......easier said then done.
 
I'm pretty sure the new controller contract goes into effect next week also. Allowing for longer shift hours and a 2nd tier pay scale for newhires.
 
No lights on the runway means no lights in the distance remaining markers. I thought of that, too after noting the markers on the right side of the runway in several photos and my recollection of that runway. It is a different story on a stormy (calm at take-off) and wet early summer morning compared to a photo taken at 2pm on a clear (next) day.

100-1/2
 
Are we sure there are even any "distance remaining markers" on 26? When I flew in there more than seven years ago, there weren't any. The paint and pavement on 26 was rather lacking, and obviously not intended for IFR operations.
 
Photos from Monday clearly show distance markers on right side. There is also fairly good paint. A huge clue of the wrong runway should have been the 25 ft shoulder on either side of the runway limiting the actual width to 100'. It should have looked and seemed very "odd". We were however, NOT there and don't know what they saw. from the take-off roll of 26 you can see the rwy 8 inidications in the paint at the 'end' of 26. CRM teaches to interrupt the 'error' chain of events leading to an mishap. I only count 3 here in the cockpit and 2 in the tower cab. I always though the chain had to be longer to kill someone. If something doesn't seem right, it probably isn't. Stop and ask.

Now that I think of it, seems like the 1970's crash in the Florida everglades was a fairly short chain as well with a link or two in the Radar Operator's chair.

100-1/2
 
The markers might be there but if the lights were not on, the markers probably wouldn't have been either, and wouldn't have been visible during the night takeoff.
 

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