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V-22 Osprey Info
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We should start assigning the Osprey out of flight school within the next 2 years. Also, they will start transitioning squadrons starting at MCAS New RIver sometime within 2 years as well.
For more info on the Osprey, go to http://newsobserver.com/collections/osprey/osprey.pdf
For more info on the Osprey, go to http://newsobserver.com/collections/osprey/osprey.pdf
Is it working as advertised?
For those in the know, or at least with some knowledge of the Osprey program, is the aircraft performing as advertised? I also have not heard anything about the program since the crash a number of years ago that killed the Marines on board. From my very limited knowledge (watching Doscovery Wings and reading a few things here and there) the V-22 is a much needed replacement for the aging -46's that the Marines are using. Thanks for any replys.
For those in the know, or at least with some knowledge of the Osprey program, is the aircraft performing as advertised? I also have not heard anything about the program since the crash a number of years ago that killed the Marines on board. From my very limited knowledge (watching Doscovery Wings and reading a few things here and there) the V-22 is a much needed replacement for the aging -46's that the Marines are using. Thanks for any replys.
I suggest reading the link I provided in the post above. The Osprey can do some things, but you need to check the truth behind the advertising. For example, one big problem is that it is unarmed. Eventually, they want to add a gun but you can't do it on the side due to the wing and nacelles. A chin mounted nose turrent is the solution but the Opsrey is having weight problems and then the turrent PLUS some weight added to the rear to maintain Center of Gravity is really going to decrease its performance.
Quite a few other missions the Osprey can't do either. The Corps desperately needs a replacement for the CH-46E (and even more for the ancient CH-53D's) but the Osprey is extremely expensive and not suited for some of the missions it will be asked to perform. Its ironic that the Corps is replacing the CH-46E because the "future is the tiltrotor" but at the same time rebuilding the Huey and the Cobra which are just as old as the CH-46E.
Quite a few other missions the Osprey can't do either. The Corps desperately needs a replacement for the CH-46E (and even more for the ancient CH-53D's) but the Osprey is extremely expensive and not suited for some of the missions it will be asked to perform. Its ironic that the Corps is replacing the CH-46E because the "future is the tiltrotor" but at the same time rebuilding the Huey and the Cobra which are just as old as the CH-46E.
I would say that so many Marine Corps generals and colonels have staked their careers on the Osprey. Just as importantly, look at the number of high level Marine officers that go to work for Bell Helicopter after leaving active duty - you might say they have a vested interest in the Osprey.
The other thing that I forgot to mention earlier is the comparison. The Corps continues to compare the new 55,000 MV-22 to the 1960's era 24,000 lb CH-46E. You compare the Osprey to the 73,000 lb CH-53E, the 55,000 lb CH-47, or new medium lift helos like the EH-101 or the Sikorsky S-92 and the Osprey looks MUCH less cost effective.
The other thing that I forgot to mention earlier is the comparison. The Corps continues to compare the new 55,000 MV-22 to the 1960's era 24,000 lb CH-46E. You compare the Osprey to the 73,000 lb CH-53E, the 55,000 lb CH-47, or new medium lift helos like the EH-101 or the Sikorsky S-92 and the Osprey looks MUCH less cost effective.
Rolling-Thunder
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Came across this link thru a helicopter forum.
Interesting read............
http://www.g2mil.com/V-22struggles.htm
Interesting read............
http://www.g2mil.com/V-22struggles.htm
HueyPilot
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Well, I'll probably be flamed for this, but here's my pitch from a guy who's both RW and FW qual'ed.
One of my old friends who I flew UH-1s with also was a chief pilot for a fairly large helo operator in the southern US. He had the opportunity to take a ride in the XV-15, which is a smaller and less complicated version of the V-22. He said it flew great...easy to handle, and was just an all-round great ship to fly.
The V-22 is very complicated, and yes it does suffer from some setbacks and operational limitations. But I really do believe that tiltrotor technology can and will mature, IF the chorus of naysayers will allow it to. If we all go back to the beginning of every major jump in aviation technology, you'll see the same things. Jets in the 1950s were very noisy, drank gas like crazy, and didn't offer very good high altitude performance compared to todays jets. Yet the technology grew because people had the foresight to understand that jet technology was the future.
As for things that the media has latched on to, like Vortex Ring State (VRS), that's just media hype. Every helicopter I've ever flown or read about can get into serious trouble with VRS (some call it "settling with power"). It's a dangerous flight regime to be avoided, just like you avoid stalling and spinning an airplane.
There is some truth to the rumor that the Marines were forced to take the V-22....but in the same breath, there are plenty of Marine folks who WANT to see the V-22 suceed. I think the "forced" situation occurred after the V-22's development was delayed due to Congressional foot shuffling, and instead of having the aircraft in mid-1990s like they wanted, they were told it would take more time. So the Corps wanted to investigate an alternate to the V-22, or at the very least look at stop-gap measures (like remanufacturing the H-46)...but instead were told to shut up and color. It was only after the fatal Arizona crash that the Corps was allowed to spend a little cash to look into viable alternates.
I think the V-22 will ultimately grow into a very capable aircraft. Maintenance hog notwithstanding (ask any AH-64 maintainers about a mx hog, and you'll get an earfull), it is a very remarkable technology that still has some growing to do. Once the folks figure out improvements and get a mx routine down (and identify areas to keep an eye on), the aircraft will perform well and will serve the Marines, AF and Navy well.
I can list a number of aircraft that have serious drawbacks, but have still contributed greatly to the overall force...the AV-8B, C-5, B-1, AH-64...all of those aircraft have serious issues with fatigue, range, speed, handling, mx problems, and other things that have drawn those airframes considerable flak. But again, they've all matured to a point.
If we can deal with those limited airframes, we can deal with an early technology tilt-rotor and hope that the V-23 (or whatever) will bring the next step in the technology. And remember this...the V-22 is NOT a helicopter. It is NOT an airplane. It is a tilt-rotor, and must be flown and operated like one. What are those parameters? I don't know. But it will find a niche just like everything else.
Just my .02 cents
One of my old friends who I flew UH-1s with also was a chief pilot for a fairly large helo operator in the southern US. He had the opportunity to take a ride in the XV-15, which is a smaller and less complicated version of the V-22. He said it flew great...easy to handle, and was just an all-round great ship to fly.
The V-22 is very complicated, and yes it does suffer from some setbacks and operational limitations. But I really do believe that tiltrotor technology can and will mature, IF the chorus of naysayers will allow it to. If we all go back to the beginning of every major jump in aviation technology, you'll see the same things. Jets in the 1950s were very noisy, drank gas like crazy, and didn't offer very good high altitude performance compared to todays jets. Yet the technology grew because people had the foresight to understand that jet technology was the future.
As for things that the media has latched on to, like Vortex Ring State (VRS), that's just media hype. Every helicopter I've ever flown or read about can get into serious trouble with VRS (some call it "settling with power"). It's a dangerous flight regime to be avoided, just like you avoid stalling and spinning an airplane.
There is some truth to the rumor that the Marines were forced to take the V-22....but in the same breath, there are plenty of Marine folks who WANT to see the V-22 suceed. I think the "forced" situation occurred after the V-22's development was delayed due to Congressional foot shuffling, and instead of having the aircraft in mid-1990s like they wanted, they were told it would take more time. So the Corps wanted to investigate an alternate to the V-22, or at the very least look at stop-gap measures (like remanufacturing the H-46)...but instead were told to shut up and color. It was only after the fatal Arizona crash that the Corps was allowed to spend a little cash to look into viable alternates.
I think the V-22 will ultimately grow into a very capable aircraft. Maintenance hog notwithstanding (ask any AH-64 maintainers about a mx hog, and you'll get an earfull), it is a very remarkable technology that still has some growing to do. Once the folks figure out improvements and get a mx routine down (and identify areas to keep an eye on), the aircraft will perform well and will serve the Marines, AF and Navy well.
I can list a number of aircraft that have serious drawbacks, but have still contributed greatly to the overall force...the AV-8B, C-5, B-1, AH-64...all of those aircraft have serious issues with fatigue, range, speed, handling, mx problems, and other things that have drawn those airframes considerable flak. But again, they've all matured to a point.
If we can deal with those limited airframes, we can deal with an early technology tilt-rotor and hope that the V-23 (or whatever) will bring the next step in the technology. And remember this...the V-22 is NOT a helicopter. It is NOT an airplane. It is a tilt-rotor, and must be flown and operated like one. What are those parameters? I don't know. But it will find a niche just like everything else.
Just my .02 cents
shroomwell
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HueyPilot
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More V-22 stuff
Both prop-rotors are mechanically linked to both engines, so if one should fail, the other should continue to operate both prop-rotors.
The V-22 can autorotate, but obviously there are some differences on how you autorotate the V-22 versus a helicopter. If an engine fails, the V-22 will make an emergency landing just like any helicopter. From what I have heard (just from reading about it), the V-22 can make a controlled (ie non-autorotative) landing on one engine...lightly loaded it can still hover, heavily loaded it can make a run-on landing with about 20 deg. of nacelle tilt.
It's not unusual for twin-engined helicopters to be unable to sustain flight on one engine...reference the UH-1N "Twin Huey"...if one of the two turbines fails, it essentially is forced to make a power-on autorotation if it's carrying any kind of payload.
The V-22 is a fully recoverable aircraft in the event of engine failure.
Another thing I've heard concerns about is what if you induce VRS on one prop-rotor but not the other...just like the Marana AZ crash. The aircraft will initially roll substatially to the stalled side, just like an airplane spinning after a stall.
But like an airplane, it's recoverable if you have enough altitude. Just don't do it close to the ground like the AZ crew did.
Both prop-rotors are mechanically linked to both engines, so if one should fail, the other should continue to operate both prop-rotors.
The V-22 can autorotate, but obviously there are some differences on how you autorotate the V-22 versus a helicopter. If an engine fails, the V-22 will make an emergency landing just like any helicopter. From what I have heard (just from reading about it), the V-22 can make a controlled (ie non-autorotative) landing on one engine...lightly loaded it can still hover, heavily loaded it can make a run-on landing with about 20 deg. of nacelle tilt.
It's not unusual for twin-engined helicopters to be unable to sustain flight on one engine...reference the UH-1N "Twin Huey"...if one of the two turbines fails, it essentially is forced to make a power-on autorotation if it's carrying any kind of payload.
The V-22 is a fully recoverable aircraft in the event of engine failure.
Another thing I've heard concerns about is what if you induce VRS on one prop-rotor but not the other...just like the Marana AZ crash. The aircraft will initially roll substatially to the stalled side, just like an airplane spinning after a stall.
But like an airplane, it's recoverable if you have enough altitude. Just don't do it close to the ground like the AZ crew did.
shroomwell
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I'll give a try on VRS. Think of the wake turbulence that your ERJ or a 757 leaves. I rotor is just a rotating wing and it to has wake turbulence. It created the turblence all around because of the rotation. In forward flight you are continuously outrunning your wake. However in a hover it is just below you. If you reduce collective or lower altitude without forward airspeed you fall into your own wake and it can rapdily push you down into the ground if you are low.
Hope that make sense for you. Just about to get my heli CFI.
Hope that make sense for you. Just about to get my heli CFI.
ChichiAV8B
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I am not a big fan of the V-22. I saw one crash right in front of my eyes killing its seven people on board back in 92. I flew Harriers and we all know the story on the AV-8. Any machine that operates in the VSTOL regime is going to suffer a higher accident rate. I am no expert on the V-22. I just hope we don't start flying this aircraft until all the bugs are fixed. They carry too many people.
skiddriver
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MJG said:
You have to re-enter effective translational lift (forward flight) where the inflow to the rotor disk has sufficient additional forward component to "push" the recirculating vortex out of the rotor disk. In the V-22 you can accomplish this by either adding forward cyclic (and slightly reducing collective), or rotating the nacelles forward. Rotating the nacelles takes time however, and you'll lose a good bit of altitude in either case. Since the first indication that you've entered VRS is a greatly increased sink rate, generally at low altitude, which doesn't respond to additional collective application, the best thing is to not enter vortex ring state (or settling with power -Marines / power settling - Army) by respecting the rate of descent vs. IAS limits for HOGE flight (NMT 800 FPM ROD when less than 40 KIAS for almost all helicopters and the V-22) and never get into it.
I sat on several test planning boards and flew chase for the V-22 at Patuxent River. Conceptually the aircraft works, but the complexity of upsizing the XV-15 to carry a load of combat troops and equipment, and to make the V-22 shipboard capable has led to a series of engineering gotchas that have ended in some of the crahes. The Arizona crash was caused by a training deficiency. The fixed wing equivalent would have been a pilot stalling the aircraft on short final. The C-130 pilot at the controls made a basic error that helo trained pilots are hammered on from day one. Never let your rate of descent build into a potential settling with power situation. Not his fault really, he was put in the game without sufficient training.
HueyPilot
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I agree alot with skiddriver.
The Army taught us about settling with power before we even touched an aircraft. It is correct to view VRS as the helicopter's version of the stall/spin on final. The Army used to do a demo of settling with power at altitude, but then decided it's best to just teach students to avoid it altogether.
VRS is basically slowing and descending enough to have the rotor's tip vortex interfere with the normal airflow through the rotor disk (the plane of rotation of the rotor blades). Every Army pilot can reiterate that descending greater than 300 FPM at a speed less than ETL (effective translational lift), with power applied (ie, AOA on the blades), can induce VRS.
Like a stall in FW aircraft, the only way to escape is get the blades out of the stalled regime and back flying again. Increasing collective pitch will only increase the AOA and not remedy the VRS situation, thus making it worse. You have to fly out of the VRS regime...forward, backward, doesn't matter, but you need to fly out of the vortex.
The news media, once they latched onto the VRS thing, painted the Arizona crash (and VRS) as being a design problem with the V-22...that is not true. Not to say the V-22 doesn't have its problems, but VRS is just as much a design problem for the V-22 as stall/spins are for any airplane. The program overall still takes a hit for that one though, because the FW pilot, as stated above, wasn't fully aware of VRS.
I do believe that over time, the engineering kinks will be worked out, and the V-22 will be at least a marginally successful aircraft....and its successor will be a huge improvement on the original....sort of like the AV-8A and AV-8B...first one was barely able to do its mission and was very dangerous...second one was a huge improvement over the first. And the JSF VSTOL version is supposed to be a huge improvement over the AV-8B.
I believe canceling the V-22 because of perceived problems is shortsighted. Some of these problems would have been avoided had the program had full funding over the past 10 years.
The Army taught us about settling with power before we even touched an aircraft. It is correct to view VRS as the helicopter's version of the stall/spin on final. The Army used to do a demo of settling with power at altitude, but then decided it's best to just teach students to avoid it altogether.
VRS is basically slowing and descending enough to have the rotor's tip vortex interfere with the normal airflow through the rotor disk (the plane of rotation of the rotor blades). Every Army pilot can reiterate that descending greater than 300 FPM at a speed less than ETL (effective translational lift), with power applied (ie, AOA on the blades), can induce VRS.
Like a stall in FW aircraft, the only way to escape is get the blades out of the stalled regime and back flying again. Increasing collective pitch will only increase the AOA and not remedy the VRS situation, thus making it worse. You have to fly out of the VRS regime...forward, backward, doesn't matter, but you need to fly out of the vortex.
The news media, once they latched onto the VRS thing, painted the Arizona crash (and VRS) as being a design problem with the V-22...that is not true. Not to say the V-22 doesn't have its problems, but VRS is just as much a design problem for the V-22 as stall/spins are for any airplane. The program overall still takes a hit for that one though, because the FW pilot, as stated above, wasn't fully aware of VRS.
I do believe that over time, the engineering kinks will be worked out, and the V-22 will be at least a marginally successful aircraft....and its successor will be a huge improvement on the original....sort of like the AV-8A and AV-8B...first one was barely able to do its mission and was very dangerous...second one was a huge improvement over the first. And the JSF VSTOL version is supposed to be a huge improvement over the AV-8B.
I believe canceling the V-22 because of perceived problems is shortsighted. Some of these problems would have been avoided had the program had full funding over the past 10 years.
I'm gonna disagree on this one. The side by side prop-rotor configuration is going to lead to a lot of trouble on the vortex ring state. Unlike single rotor or tandem rotors, I can certainly see situations developing where one side of the V-22 goes into VRS, the other side doesn't, the pilot mistakenly adds power, and the aircraft flips over.
The aircraft itself doesn't make sense in the fact that the heavy lift, attack, and utility aircraft are all helos and nothing can keep up with the V-22. The whole fleet needs to be updated to a tilt-rotor to have matching performance characteristics. My solution would be to upgrade all of the single rotor helos with the Piasecki vectored thrust ducted propellor modification (80% of the Osprey's performance at a fraction of the cost), skip the Osprey tilt-rotor technology and move ahead with the canard/rotor concept the Boeing Phantom Works is testing.
The aircraft itself doesn't make sense in the fact that the heavy lift, attack, and utility aircraft are all helos and nothing can keep up with the V-22. The whole fleet needs to be updated to a tilt-rotor to have matching performance characteristics. My solution would be to upgrade all of the single rotor helos with the Piasecki vectored thrust ducted propellor modification (80% of the Osprey's performance at a fraction of the cost), skip the Osprey tilt-rotor technology and move ahead with the canard/rotor concept the Boeing Phantom Works is testing.
skiddriver
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The differential VRS issue is interesting, but I challenge you to show how you could put one proprotor into deep VRS and have the other delivering normal lift.
The shipboard qual series showed clearly that the V-22 can readily fly at combat weight with one proprotor HOGE and one HIGE.
The Arizona accident was tragic, but the VRS envelope was well defined before the accident (despite the claims of the distraught widow). I don't call it pilot error for the reasons I gave above, but the cause of the accident was simple, the pilot established the aircraft in a flight regime where it couldn't land safely and couldn't fly out of VRS. The truth is that no helo could have recovered from the deeply established VRS that the pilot induced in an attempt to land in a zone where he should have just gone around.
The shipboard qual series showed clearly that the V-22 can readily fly at combat weight with one proprotor HOGE and one HIGE.
The Arizona accident was tragic, but the VRS envelope was well defined before the accident (despite the claims of the distraught widow). I don't call it pilot error for the reasons I gave above, but the cause of the accident was simple, the pilot established the aircraft in a flight regime where it couldn't land safely and couldn't fly out of VRS. The truth is that no helo could have recovered from the deeply established VRS that the pilot induced in an attempt to land in a zone where he should have just gone around.
If you are on the edge of the envelope and for whatever reason (crosswind, turbulence, etc) one side gets dirty air and the other has clean, then you enter differential VRS. That leads to how soon the pilot detects power settling (we just had an experienced JetRanger instructor spread the skids here because he didn't recognize it). If the pilot does NOT recognize the situation and mistakenly adds power, then the bad air side sinks while the good air side climbs - and the Osprey flips.
For an example of twin rotor configurations producing differing results, the CH-46E NATOPS states that when entering retreating blade stall you don't know which way the Phrog will roll because you don't know whether the front or aft rotor system will stall first.
You are absolutely correct about a C-130 pilot being at the controls of the dash-2 Osprey in AZ - I floated with both of the pilots of the lead Osprey and they were both outstanding pilots.
I also have doubts about the Osprey being able to land (not fly) at high altitudes (10,000 ft) due to the high blade loading of the prop-rotors. At any rate, it was a fun simulator to fly.
For an example of twin rotor configurations producing differing results, the CH-46E NATOPS states that when entering retreating blade stall you don't know which way the Phrog will roll because you don't know whether the front or aft rotor system will stall first.
You are absolutely correct about a C-130 pilot being at the controls of the dash-2 Osprey in AZ - I floated with both of the pilots of the lead Osprey and they were both outstanding pilots.
I also have doubts about the Osprey being able to land (not fly) at high altitudes (10,000 ft) due to the high blade loading of the prop-rotors. At any rate, it was a fun simulator to fly.
bugchaser
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HueyPilot
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V-22 debate
If that's your arguement saying the V-22 is unsafe, then every airplane out there is unsafe.
Get an airplane close to stall speed, kick in some rudder, and you'll stall one wing before the other one...and a spinnin' you'll go...and it's pretty much unrecoverable at low altitude.
If that's your arguement saying the V-22 is unsafe, then every airplane out there is unsafe.
Get an airplane close to stall speed, kick in some rudder, and you'll stall one wing before the other one...and a spinnin' you'll go...and it's pretty much unrecoverable at low altitude.
skiddriver
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First, I'm glad you guys are considering what is going on with this aircraft because you'll be flying it for a long time.
I was the senior test pilot in the Cobra shop at Pax during my follow-on tour from NTPS. One of my classmates was the primary V-22 test government pilot at Pax for over 4 years (involuntarily extended despite his desire to get to the fleet) and was supposed to be one of the first squadron CO's prior to the New River crash. We compared notes on the V-22 test progress throughout his stay there. I flew chase on the aircraft and sat in on way to many V-22 test plan review boards as the acting CTP. I point these things out as a way to say that I know a little bit of what I'm talking about.
The design problems which resulted in the majority of the fatal crashes should have been caught, but the complexity of designing a new aircraft makes that difficult. In particular, the software problems that lead to the New River crash managed to make it through years of testing before they killed that crew.
I hate discussing accidents that can be termed pilot error, and I'm sure your shipmate was a good pilot, but the answer to overshooting a zone isn't to enter a 2000+ FPM ROD below the established VRS airspeed limit.
The differential VRS argument is a lot like many of the arguments about the V-22. What do you think would happen in a 46 if you entered a several thousand FPM vertical descent and then yanked in a bunch of collective? My Dad had the rear rotor shot off his 46 by an RPG during a recon extract off a hilltop in Vietnam (they survived). How well do you think it flew then? One online quote I've seen said that if you put the V-22 in a hover and then yanked the thrust levers to zero, it would enterd a 3000 FPM ROD in a few swconds, and used that as an argument that the aircraft was unsafe. What would happen if you put an AH-1W in a hover and slammed the collective down to the flat pitch setting? Does that make the AH-1W unsafe?
The real problem with the V-22 is going to be found in maintainability and reliability, and because of the tight clearances on board ship, I forsee the day that some young ham fist is going to have some ship structure-proprotor interaction.
Fly the aircraft in the envelope and it's will perform as advertised (mostly).
Good luck and keep thinking about this stuff. It can help keep you from getting killed. Also, don't be afraid to call the test shop at Pax. We always enjoyed getting inquires from the fleet, it kept us on our toes.
Edit:
One other point that I should have made. Anytime someone makes a positive or negative claim about an aircraft or system, we should try and apply a little critical thinking. Who are they and why are they putting the info out there? Some of the biggest opponents of the V-22 and UH-1Y programs are the Army and Navy H-60 PMA's. They have actively campaigned to put holes in these programs to force the Marine Corps to buy H-60's and keep the 60 production line open. They like the H-60 and want the production line open for follow-on buys. They don't give a rat's butt about the Marine Corps or our requirements.
Sikorsky helicopters, in particular, has had 3 different aircraft systems in play as V-22 replacements, and you will regularly see disinformation passed around by their representatives and employees, past and present. They aren't doing it out of a purely altruistic desire to provide the best system for the Marine Corps, they want to sell helicopters.
Same thing with the AH-1Z program. The Apache mafia actively campaigned with foreign governments looking to buy attack helicopters (that is active duty Army personnel lobbied foreign governments - British and Dutch) to promote the Longbow and provided data that they said proved that the Cobra was unsafe. Why? To keep the production line open and drive down the Army's unit cost.
I had the head of Army aviation acquisition ask me why we didn't just buy the Longbow instead of upgrading the Cobra? I countered by asking if the Army was willing to help pay the estimated 5-10 mil cost (per airframe) to redesign the Apache for shipboard use, on top of the 15 mil per airframe cost, plus the squadron retool and add-on GSE cost. He got very quiet.
The biggest oppenents of the Army's Comanche? The Army's Apache crowd. They boasted to me in an informal meeting that they were going to "kill the Comanche program and take their money."
The list goes on.
That is not to say that there aren't well-informed and well-intentioned folks who question the wisdom of program expense, or the safety of systems, solely from a sense of concern for our servicepeople or concern over public expenditure. There are. It's just that it is difficult to weed out their arguements from the sharks who are looking to nab other program's funds to cover their expenses. It is even harder to tell where the well-intentioned folks got their data.
The spinning of data by all sides (pro and con) is another topic all together.
So I'll end by saying that when someone says "if you do this with an XYZ aircraft, that will happen, causing a fatal accident," you should ask yourself, "if I do the same thing with another, similar aircraft, what will happen?" and "why is this person saying this anyway, what do they stand to gain?"
Also, if you have to choose among opinions, just remember the sign we had in our office at Pax River. "Never trust an engineer, they tend to blurt out the truth under pressure."
If you have a question call one of the engineers or engineering test pilots at Pax, they'll answer it for you if they can.
I was the senior test pilot in the Cobra shop at Pax during my follow-on tour from NTPS. One of my classmates was the primary V-22 test government pilot at Pax for over 4 years (involuntarily extended despite his desire to get to the fleet) and was supposed to be one of the first squadron CO's prior to the New River crash. We compared notes on the V-22 test progress throughout his stay there. I flew chase on the aircraft and sat in on way to many V-22 test plan review boards as the acting CTP. I point these things out as a way to say that I know a little bit of what I'm talking about.
The design problems which resulted in the majority of the fatal crashes should have been caught, but the complexity of designing a new aircraft makes that difficult. In particular, the software problems that lead to the New River crash managed to make it through years of testing before they killed that crew.
I hate discussing accidents that can be termed pilot error, and I'm sure your shipmate was a good pilot, but the answer to overshooting a zone isn't to enter a 2000+ FPM ROD below the established VRS airspeed limit.
The differential VRS argument is a lot like many of the arguments about the V-22. What do you think would happen in a 46 if you entered a several thousand FPM vertical descent and then yanked in a bunch of collective? My Dad had the rear rotor shot off his 46 by an RPG during a recon extract off a hilltop in Vietnam (they survived). How well do you think it flew then? One online quote I've seen said that if you put the V-22 in a hover and then yanked the thrust levers to zero, it would enterd a 3000 FPM ROD in a few swconds, and used that as an argument that the aircraft was unsafe. What would happen if you put an AH-1W in a hover and slammed the collective down to the flat pitch setting? Does that make the AH-1W unsafe?
The real problem with the V-22 is going to be found in maintainability and reliability, and because of the tight clearances on board ship, I forsee the day that some young ham fist is going to have some ship structure-proprotor interaction.
Fly the aircraft in the envelope and it's will perform as advertised (mostly).
Good luck and keep thinking about this stuff. It can help keep you from getting killed. Also, don't be afraid to call the test shop at Pax. We always enjoyed getting inquires from the fleet, it kept us on our toes.
Edit:
One other point that I should have made. Anytime someone makes a positive or negative claim about an aircraft or system, we should try and apply a little critical thinking. Who are they and why are they putting the info out there? Some of the biggest opponents of the V-22 and UH-1Y programs are the Army and Navy H-60 PMA's. They have actively campaigned to put holes in these programs to force the Marine Corps to buy H-60's and keep the 60 production line open. They like the H-60 and want the production line open for follow-on buys. They don't give a rat's butt about the Marine Corps or our requirements.
Sikorsky helicopters, in particular, has had 3 different aircraft systems in play as V-22 replacements, and you will regularly see disinformation passed around by their representatives and employees, past and present. They aren't doing it out of a purely altruistic desire to provide the best system for the Marine Corps, they want to sell helicopters.
Same thing with the AH-1Z program. The Apache mafia actively campaigned with foreign governments looking to buy attack helicopters (that is active duty Army personnel lobbied foreign governments - British and Dutch) to promote the Longbow and provided data that they said proved that the Cobra was unsafe. Why? To keep the production line open and drive down the Army's unit cost.
I had the head of Army aviation acquisition ask me why we didn't just buy the Longbow instead of upgrading the Cobra? I countered by asking if the Army was willing to help pay the estimated 5-10 mil cost (per airframe) to redesign the Apache for shipboard use, on top of the 15 mil per airframe cost, plus the squadron retool and add-on GSE cost. He got very quiet.
The biggest oppenents of the Army's Comanche? The Army's Apache crowd. They boasted to me in an informal meeting that they were going to "kill the Comanche program and take their money."
The list goes on.
That is not to say that there aren't well-informed and well-intentioned folks who question the wisdom of program expense, or the safety of systems, solely from a sense of concern for our servicepeople or concern over public expenditure. There are. It's just that it is difficult to weed out their arguements from the sharks who are looking to nab other program's funds to cover their expenses. It is even harder to tell where the well-intentioned folks got their data.
The spinning of data by all sides (pro and con) is another topic all together.
So I'll end by saying that when someone says "if you do this with an XYZ aircraft, that will happen, causing a fatal accident," you should ask yourself, "if I do the same thing with another, similar aircraft, what will happen?" and "why is this person saying this anyway, what do they stand to gain?"
Also, if you have to choose among opinions, just remember the sign we had in our office at Pax River. "Never trust an engineer, they tend to blurt out the truth under pressure."
If you have a question call one of the engineers or engineering test pilots at Pax, they'll answer it for you if they can.
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Couple more questions.
What happened in the New River accident, someone mentioned a software bug?
Also how many total accidents, fatal and non-fatal, has the V-22 program suffered? And how does this accident rate per test hours compare with the Harrier program when it went through its growing pains?
What happened in the New River accident, someone mentioned a software bug?
Also how many total accidents, fatal and non-fatal, has the V-22 program suffered? And how does this accident rate per test hours compare with the Harrier program when it went through its growing pains?
skiddriver
Well-known member
- Joined
- Nov 27, 2001
- Posts
- 405
I'll second what skiddriver said about accident. I didn't see the report but the Corps is so small I can't remember if what I heard was privileged or not. Try a google search.
My problem with the Osprey is not over its safety - every aircraft will have problems when flown outside its envelope - but the cost of the program and the limited missions. If the V-22 could have been purchased a decade ago at the price quoted, then maybe it was a good idea. Now, with the price going through the roof, I think there are better alternatives. I wrote on the V-22 as a prime example of waste in my acceptence paper for the Naval War College. In talking to engineers, specifically those at Piasecki who are working on the Vectored Thrust Ducted Propellor modifications, I believe the compound helo is a much more cost effective alternative to the tilt-rotor concept.
My problem with the Osprey is not over its safety - every aircraft will have problems when flown outside its envelope - but the cost of the program and the limited missions. If the V-22 could have been purchased a decade ago at the price quoted, then maybe it was a good idea. Now, with the price going through the roof, I think there are better alternatives. I wrote on the V-22 as a prime example of waste in my acceptence paper for the Naval War College. In talking to engineers, specifically those at Piasecki who are working on the Vectored Thrust Ducted Propellor modifications, I believe the compound helo is a much more cost effective alternative to the tilt-rotor concept.
Michael Knight
helping the innocent
- Joined
- Nov 25, 2001
- Posts
- 103
Selection into this program has been rumored for the last 10 years. Yes, they did select some right out of flight school a few years ago and they never made it to the cockpit since the program had so many setbacks with the highly qualified fleet experienced crews that were initially assigned. No blame to those initial crews, the aircraft was/is still in its proving phase with so many aircraft problems. If I were a flight student I would do anything to avoid selection into the 22 program. It is going to be a painful program for many years to come. Personally I think the Corps should have abandoned the 22 program years ago and followed the Army's lead with regards to helicopter purchases. I think the Corps will stick with it instead of admitting it was a mistake... kind of like the Harrier program, but that is another subject in itself.
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