First, I'm glad you guys are considering what is going on with this aircraft because you'll be flying it for a long time.
I was the senior test pilot in the Cobra shop at Pax during my follow-on tour from NTPS. One of my classmates was the primary V-22 test government pilot at Pax for over 4 years (involuntarily extended despite his desire to get to the fleet) and was supposed to be one of the first squadron CO's prior to the New River crash. We compared notes on the V-22 test progress throughout his stay there. I flew chase on the aircraft and sat in on way to many V-22 test plan review boards as the acting CTP. I point these things out as a way to say that I know a little bit of what I'm talking about.
The design problems which resulted in the majority of the fatal crashes should have been caught, but the complexity of designing a new aircraft makes that difficult. In particular, the software problems that lead to the New River crash managed to make it through years of testing before they killed that crew.
I hate discussing accidents that can be termed pilot error, and I'm sure your shipmate was a good pilot, but the answer to overshooting a zone isn't to enter a 2000+ FPM ROD below the established VRS airspeed limit.
The differential VRS argument is a lot like many of the arguments about the V-22. What do you think would happen in a 46 if you entered a several thousand FPM vertical descent and then yanked in a bunch of collective? My Dad had the rear rotor shot off his 46 by an RPG during a recon extract off a hilltop in Vietnam (they survived). How well do you think it flew then? One online quote I've seen said that if you put the V-22 in a hover and then yanked the thrust levers to zero, it would enterd a 3000 FPM ROD in a few swconds, and used that as an argument that the aircraft was unsafe. What would happen if you put an AH-1W in a hover and slammed the collective down to the flat pitch setting? Does that make the AH-1W unsafe?
The real problem with the V-22 is going to be found in maintainability and reliability, and because of the tight clearances on board ship, I forsee the day that some young ham fist is going to have some ship structure-proprotor interaction.
Fly the aircraft in the envelope and it's will perform as advertised (mostly).
Good luck and keep thinking about this stuff. It can help keep you from getting killed. Also, don't be afraid to call the test shop at Pax. We always enjoyed getting inquires from the fleet, it kept us on our toes.
Edit:
One other point that I should have made. Anytime someone makes a positive or negative claim about an aircraft or system, we should try and apply a little critical thinking. Who are they and why are they putting the info out there? Some of the biggest opponents of the V-22 and UH-1Y programs are the Army and Navy H-60 PMA's. They have actively campaigned to put holes in these programs to force the Marine Corps to buy H-60's and keep the 60 production line open. They like the H-60 and want the production line open for follow-on buys. They don't give a rat's butt about the Marine Corps or our requirements.
Sikorsky helicopters, in particular, has had 3 different aircraft systems in play as V-22 replacements, and you will regularly see disinformation passed around by their representatives and employees, past and present. They aren't doing it out of a purely altruistic desire to provide the best system for the Marine Corps, they want to sell helicopters.
Same thing with the AH-1Z program. The Apache mafia actively campaigned with foreign governments looking to buy attack helicopters (that is active duty Army personnel lobbied foreign governments - British and Dutch) to promote the Longbow and provided data that they said proved that the Cobra was unsafe. Why? To keep the production line open and drive down the Army's unit cost.
I had the head of Army aviation acquisition ask me why we didn't just buy the Longbow instead of upgrading the Cobra? I countered by asking if the Army was willing to help pay the estimated 5-10 mil cost (per airframe) to redesign the Apache for shipboard use, on top of the 15 mil per airframe cost, plus the squadron retool and add-on GSE cost. He got very quiet.
The biggest oppenents of the Army's Comanche? The Army's Apache crowd. They boasted to me in an informal meeting that they were going to "kill the Comanche program and take their money."
The list goes on.
That is not to say that there aren't well-informed and well-intentioned folks who question the wisdom of program expense, or the safety of systems, solely from a sense of concern for our servicepeople or concern over public expenditure. There are. It's just that it is difficult to weed out their arguements from the sharks who are looking to nab other program's funds to cover their expenses. It is even harder to tell where the well-intentioned folks got their data.
The spinning of data by all sides (pro and con) is another topic all together.
So I'll end by saying that when someone says "if you do this with an XYZ aircraft, that will happen, causing a fatal accident," you should ask yourself, "if I do the same thing with another, similar aircraft, what will happen?" and "why is this person saying this anyway, what do they stand to gain?"
Also, if you have to choose among opinions, just remember the sign we had in our office at Pax River. "Never trust an engineer, they tend to blurt out the truth under pressure."
If you have a question call one of the engineers or engineering test pilots at Pax, they'll answer it for you if they can.
