J'accuse MLBWINGBORN of being a management tool! J'accuse!
Actually, I think your analysis is correct, except for emphasis.
Management is almost entirely to blame for the current failures of legacy carriers. Just like TW's management failures that occured in 1960's helped to doom the airline, the inactivity and lethargy of the legacies especially US and UA, in addressing the "LCC threat" that was truly gathering in 1993, not 2003, is the most proximate cause of their current predictment. The union didn't help matters, but seriously, most of the rank and file had learned that every word out of the management mouth was a lie, including "an" and "the." And management signed off on every contract that was unsustainable. Fact.
The one management tactic operationally was the retreat to the fortress hub. This worked well, right up the point where the LCC went into direct competition (MCI, BWI, STL, DEN) or leached from a nearby facility (BWI, ISP, Bay Area), which is to say it didn't work at all. Management's second tactic, which was to try to attack costs in the form of generally of pilot salaries, to offset the loss of revenue. It just didn't do the trick. Why? See strategy one. They were married to the fortress hub, yield management model. Nobody could see past it. The boom of the late 90's help to camoflage these significant shortcomings, and as long as the revolving door of management came and went, and pilots upgraded and retired millionaires, everybody was happy.
Then oil went to $50, and the LLC gained the "critical mass" to be a major player. The simple fact is that all the king's horses and all the king's men aren't going to put anyone back to together again. The majors are in the position of a cold cat shot below V1. Too fast to stop, too slow to fly. They don't have the cash to revitalize their fleets a la Song, and they they are still losing money on full aircraft.
But they haven't had their head out of their collective ass since the Kennedy Administration, and I doubt they will find Jesus anytime soon.