UPS Airbus down in Birmingham

[X-rated]

The Jeppesen LOC 18 chart is wrong.

Note the date:

Here's the NACO LOC 18 chart for comparison:
http://155.178.201.160/d-tpp/1308/00050L18.PDF

Thanks! Mystery solved.

 

[Newkem]

Mystery solved?

The Jeppesen LOC 18 chart is wrong.

Note the date:

Here's the NACO LOC 18 chart for comparison:
http://155.178.201.160/d-tpp/1308/00050L18.PDF

I just searched FDC notams for BHM on the FAA site and that above NOTAM is not currently published. The current BHM LOC 18 Jepp chart date is 17 AUG 12. Terps AMD 2A 8 MAR 2012.

It says "Night: NA."

There is a note on the briefing strip that says 2. When VGSI inop, procedure not authorized at night.

Still somewhat of a mystery...

 

[Quimby]

i keep hearing that, but i can't seem to find the notam. The only notam posted was that the easternmost part of it was closed which still left over 10,000' available.

bhm 08/034 bhm rwy 6/24 clsd wef 1308140900-1308141000

 

[G4dude]

Just my opinion, but pilots depend too much on inst during visual approaches. With this being possibly the second instance of visual approach issues, maybe visual approaches without inst assistance should be part of training during initial and recurrent.

I agree, and so do many of my colleagues. Too much emphasis on automation, not enough manual flying skills. Not that necessarily has ANYTHING to do with this UPS disaster. What a sad thing, condolences to all affected.

 

[Bringupthebird]

I disagree. The pilots have become complacent in manipulation of the automation, but lack situational awareness. The average pilot could manually fly out of a given situation, but it doesn't dawn on him what the real problem is until it's too late. I blame the wholesale erosion of training (computer-based instruction, training by memo, etc.) as a place for airlines to save money. AQP basically proves how little the airlines care about really training pilots. If it's cheaper and the FAA buys off on it, it must be OK.

The most recent automation-related accidents (and I am not saying that the UPS can be counted as one) are proving that this apparently is not the case.

 

[booo]

Maybe its time to recognize the fact that we live in a new era.

No need to abbreviate so much as we needed to do in the days of the telex.

Wow!

BKN becomes BROKEN, OVC becomes OVERCAST, etc. 700 OVERCAST means 700 Overcast!

FAA is still testing Private Pilots on weather maps that are only available at Flight Service Stations that they are rarer and more distant by the day as they shut down mor and more facilities.

N/A Not Authorized, or Not Available, or the dozen other interpretations I've heard from new F/O's.

Dumbing down aviation? Yes and no! Dumbing it down to the new gen of pilots ? Yes ! Bringing it up to modern tech? Yes!

High speed printers have been in use for years, time to use the technology available for clear and concise communications.

 

[livin'thesim]

Some pilots are safer on automation, some safer without it.

All depends on where your weaknesses and areas of complacency lie.

Complacency is a broad term, some pilots are almost never complacent on certain items and almost always complacent on others.

 

[scoreboardII]

Anyone know if a 306 has EGPWS or just GPWS? Thanks.

Prayers to the families.

 

[atpcliff]

from another message board:

1999 NASA report on 18 approach.

The approach to runway 18 at bhm is marginally safe at best and is a setup for an accident at worst.*****

Runway 5/23 was closed from XA00Z to XK00Z. As a result, we briefed the localizer runway 18 approach. It was my first officer's leg and neither of us had flown to this runway before. We were both acutely aware of the high terrain to the north of the field and paid particular attention to that fact in our approach briefing. The only depiction of the high terrain is on the airport page.*****

The WX was clear with excellent visibility. Bhm approach cleared us for the visual but we indicated we wanted to intercept the final outside of baskin and fly the final part of the localizer 18 approach. Although not listed on the approach page, there is a PAPI on the left side of runway 18 which has been in use for about 1 yr. We calculated the appropriate vdp based on timing as well as on the ibxo DME. From the vdp it was clear to us that if the field was not in sight at the 1300 ft altitude at the ibxo 3.3 DME, it would not be possible to complete the approach safely. The PAPI was visible from the 3.3 DME and we began a 700 FPM descent when on GS.*****

The first officer and I were both bothered by the close visual proximity of the ground while on the final stages of the approach. At about 1 mi from touchdown, a car passed under us on an east/west road. It was between 100 ft and 80 ftAGL. I again verified visually that we were on the PAPI glide path and that the glide path was visually correct with the runway visual presentation. It was clear that we were correct and the radio altimeter then began to show the ground dropping away a bit.*****

We passed over the threshold at 50 ft AGL having been centered on the glide path the entire time. By use of the ft scale and the graphic presentation on the airport page, I believe the radio altimeter was accurate and that we were on or even slightly above the glide path when we had the 80-100 ft reading.*****

How high are the trees on that hill? Although the approach and landing were uneventful, the following problems are presented: 1) there is no note about the extremely close proximity to high terrain when on this approach. The mandatory airport review page does not address runway 18 or runway 36. 2) there is no PAPI depicted in commercial chart despite having been in service for about 1 yr according to the bhm tower. 3) using a 3 degree GS and an aim point 1000 ft down runway 18, the 884 ft terrain 4000 ft north of the field calculates to a ht above ground of less than 100 ft. Trees are of course not included in this calculation. 4) runway 18 slopes down to the south and complicates the landing. A 7100 ft runway means a 6100 ft area to stop in and the downslope tends to have the effect of falling away from an aircraft in the flare. Unless you fly it on to the runway fairly aggressively, the distance could be even less. 5) NOTAM 11/023 reports runway 18 is ungrooved from 1550 to 2490. NOTAM 11/024 reports runway 36 is ungrooved from 4610-5550 ft. This obviously would have an affect on stopping under most instrument conditions, ie, a wet runway.*****

I respectfully submit the following recommendation: discontinue use of runway 18 for company operations due to the high terrain present under the normal glide path. This is a dangerous approach so prohibit it. If the use of runway 18 is not prohibited, then I make the following recommendations: 1) include a picture of the runway 18 and runway 36 approachs on the mandatory airport review pages. 2) include specific notes on the operations pages about the high terrain to the north giving radio altimeter readings of 80-100 ft, 1 mi north of the field. 3) restrict use of runway 18 to day VFR conditions only and require the localizer runway 18 approach be flown. 4) update the bhm page forthwith to show the PAPI for runway 18.*****

To be blunt, I will not fly to this runway in the WX or to a wet runway. If it is the only runway open in those conditions I will divert.*****

Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter states that he has followed up with company, and they have issued a prohibition against using runways 18/36 except during day VFR conditions. He also stated that he did not see the rotating beacon on the hill approximately 1 mi from the runway. The GPWS indication did not show any red during the approach, but varied from green to amber. The first officer was flying the approach and the captain monitored the descent. He said that they did not exceed about 700 FPM rate throughout the final approach, and that after landing, both pilots debriefed their impressions to each other. They felt that they had taken prudent precautions, but that this approach was hazardous.

 

[atpcliff]

http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-321900256.html

Recently, an airline began to receive notices that crews flying the RNAV (GPS) RWY 36 approach into Birmingham, Alabama (BHM) were receiving GPWS alerts while descending from the MDA to the runway.
...
Flight inspection noted that a GPWS alert was received at the reported location if the aircraft continued to follow the published Vertical Descent Angle (VDA) below MDA.

Upon reading on the topic, if you fly a derived (FMS/GPS) glidepath below an MDA, you may hit obstacles...this practice does not guarantee a safe approach to the runway.

This topic is very confusing....I didn't understand this fully until researching the topic, and have found other pilots do not, either.

IFR, Jun 2013:
"Advisory Glidepaths": (Non-precision Visual Descent Angle....GPS/FMS Derived, LNAV/VNAV, LPV, LNAV+V, etc.)

"...a non-precision advisory glidepath is not guaranteed clear of obstacles below MDA, as a real glideslope is. Assuming it's safe is a widespread problem even affecting the airlines.
...
How we can take advantage of the benefits of CDFA (Continuous Descent Final Approach) while avoiding obstacles if following an advisory (derived) glidepath below MDA is currently a hot topic within the FAA and industry; expect to hear more once the dust settles."