Turkish Airline 737 Crash in AMS

[ualdriver]

Re: The Black Swan

I've coincidentally once met Nassim Nicholas Taleb at a B & N as he was being escorted around the store by an employee. As the employee walked past me, I had asked where I might find The Black Swan. To my surprise, he told me that the gentleman he was with was Taleb. We shook hands (I gave him some high praise as well) and he gave me an autographed copy.

Wow. Taleb and Black Swan references on flightinfo.com. I'm impressed

 

[Publishers]

Today they are saying it was an altimeter problem mis-informing the auto pilot which led to engines being pulled back. Crew realized to late in game that the speed was wrong and too late for recovery.

 

[rjcap]

The captain was occupying the left hand seat, a fully qualified first officer occupied the right hand seat. For this first officer this was a training flight. Another first officer occupied the observer's seat.

The airplane was performing an ILS approach to runway 18R on autopilot in fairly bad visibility according to standard operating procedures by Turkish Airlines. Mist and low cloud prevailed suggesting, that the crew most likely did not see Polderbaan (runway 18R) while commencing the final descent.

While the airplane was at 1950 feet MSL with the autoflight systems coupled to the ILS already, the left hand radar altimeter produced a wrong height reading of -8 feet. This resulted in the autothrottles to pull the thrust to idle. The landing gear warning horn sounded as a result of the erroneous reading, but was not considered to be a problem according to the cockpit voice recorder. However, this warning should have alerted the crew of a radar altimeter problem.

The stick shaker activated at a height of about 500 feet AGL, at which point full power was applied. This however was already too late to recover the flight and the airplane subsequently impacted ground.

The airplane hit ground with the tail first at a speed of 92 knots (normal landing speed would have been 140 knots) and slid for about 150 meters until coming to a stop. The airplane's tail broke off and the fuselage ruptured at the business class, the landing gear separated according to its design. The engines separated and continued for an additional about 250 meters due to the thrust they developed and the sudden deceleration of the airframe.

The fatalities were mainly along the line of rupture through the business class. The cockpit crew was fatally injured mainly because of the enormeous deceleration forces and the nose wheel, that got partially embedded into the cockpit.

The flight data recorder stores 25 hours of flight data, which covered the last 8 flights of the airplane. During those flights another two failures of the left hand radar altimeter had been recorded.

A Boeing Alert sent to all operators of 737s (all types) said, that no evidence of bird strike, engine or airframe icing, wake turbulence or windshear has been found so far. There was adequate fuel on board throughout the entire flights. Both engines responded normally to throttle inputs, the airplane responded normally to flight control inputs all the time.

The digital flight data recorder indicated, that the autopilot B and autothrottle was being used for an ILS approach to runway 18R. The right hand radar altimeter was providing proper data, while the left hand radar altimeter provided faulty readings of -7 and -8 feet. The autothrottles, using the left hand radar altimeter, transitioned to the flare mode and retarded the throttles to idle thrust. The throttles remained at the idle stop for about 100 seconds, while the airspeed dropped to 40 knots below selected approach speed.

According to Boeing, if one of the radar altimeters provides erroneous height readings (regardless of whether the radar altimeter indicates itsself failed or not - failure flag or not), typical flight deck effects requiring crew intervention would be erratic radar altimeter readings on the instrument displays with differences between the two readings, inability to engage both autopilots in dual mode for the approach mode, unexpected removal of flight director bars, unexpected configuration warnings and a premature autothrottle RETARD announciation on the pilots' primary flight displays.

 

[shroomwell]

If all that is true, this is a massive flight crew mistake.

 

[embpic1]

The throttles remained at the idle stop for about 100 seconds, while the airspeed dropped to 40 knots below selected approach speed.

Holy crap! Were these guys asleep? Even the jumpseater didn't catch it.... Wow. Just wow.

 

[rjcap]

This article was posted today on the Aviation Herald Website. Scroll down to the bottom.

http://avherald.com/h?article=41595ec3&opt=0




I

 

[jimcav]

Who was flyin the f**kin airplane?

 

[embpic1]

Who was flyin the f**kin airplane?

I am not saying anything about the Turks, but I have heard many foreign pilots are great at running the automation. The problem is when you take the automation away things can get ugly. I knew a NWA guy that used to go to China to train guys on the 400 in the sim. He said if you turn off the flight director and make them hand fly they had a hell of a time keeping the plane out of the dirt.

 

[jimcav]

Actually the same can be said about some of the folks I have flown with. Sad but true.

 

[vtwo]

me too

we have had a memo come out about 3 or4 months ago "during day vfr conditions It is recommended to hand fly with no flt director or auto pilot and auto thrust disconnected."
Makes for a busy day as Pilot Monitoring, but fun as well.

some it comes to them with no issues. Other are wondering where they are at. and why, and what is next.