Welcome to Flightinfo.com

  • Register now and join the discussion
  • Friendliest aviation Ccmmunity on the web
  • Modern site for PC's, Phones, Tablets - no 3rd party apps required
  • Ask questions, help others, promote aviation
  • Share the passion for aviation
  • Invite everyone to Flightinfo.com and let's have fun

Things never change for UAL exec's

Welcome to Flightinfo.com

  • Register now and join the discussion
  • Modern secure site, no 3rd party apps required
  • Invite your friends
  • Share the passion of aviation
  • Friendliest aviation community on the web
WhiteCloud said:
Thanks for the education. You've describe a very cumbersome, complicated and inefficient process compounded by lack of training facilities and personel to accomplish a reactionary management directive. What a circus.

That's the process at all large airlines with multiple fleet types.
9/11 was a devastating event for the industry; every airline was suddenly hemmoraghing cash flying around empty seats. UAL had already programmed a phaseout of the 727 fleet; grounding them immediately was a wise measure to reduce costs.
The inefficiency in the sudden grounding of the 727 fleet occurs with the pilots. If UAL could have immediately furloughed everyone on the 727 (out of seniority order), the pilot utilization rates would have been much different. But the fact that the pilot contract does not allow for furloughing out of seniority order means that pilots remained on property a lot longer than they would have had everyone been able to immediately go to another fleet/seat without any additional training.
The 727 fleet was about 15% of UAL's total fleet; you're talking a whole lot of crews that were sitting around waiting for training. UAL was able to cut the bottom 600 or so almost immediately, and retire the over 60 FEs, but every 727 captain & most FOs required training on another piece of equipment.

The alternative to this, which you will probably see with any airline with an all airbus fleet, is having similar aircraft that require little more than differences training. But a large airlne requires multiple guages of aircraft so that they can choose the right sized aircraft for the job. It's not a 100% perfect fit to match guage with routes, but it is constantly tweaked for optimum performance.
I'll agree with you that the process is cumbersome, complicated and inefficient. It's that way at AMR, Delta, CAL, NWA; anyone with a large and diverse fleet. As for not enough training facilities, I'd respectfully disagree. Post 9/11 created an epic surge in training requirements. The previous rule of thumb was once 10% were below you, you were safe. UAL furloughed about 25% of its pilots.
I suppose it could be considered a reactionary management directive. But what was the alternative? Continue to fly a full schedule with low load factors, burning through cash even faster than we did? There were no good choices; it was a $hitty choice or a different kind of $hitty choice.
 
WhiteCloud said:
So what are the utilization figures today?

I don't have a number, but I can tell you that they're decreasing. The reason why they're decreasing is that there are pilots who have been recalled and are now in training. Those recalled pilots who fly 0 hours count into the average. Those figures would also include management pilots.
Now, if you want to talk averages among line pilots, it would be a much more steady number. I don't know the average hours flown among line pilots, but I'd be willing to bet that it's somewhere in the 70 hour/mo range.
 
Andy UAL's monthly guarantee is what?
 
pilotyip said:
Andy UAL's monthly guarantee is what?

65 hours, 70 for reserve. They run out of reserves on the LCO (737/A320 fleets) on a regular basis.
 
Last edited:
Then I would bet if you are averaging 70 hours a month your running in the same ball park with LLC's
 

Latest resources

Back
Top Bottom