The Rogue and the Professional

[Alamanach]

avbug-His book stands as a definitive analysis of poor pilot behavior. Rogue pilots are a problem. Holland wasn't the last. The airline industry recently, in 2004, had two rogues destroy an aircraft. Kern didn't make this stuff up... he just quantified it....

Does he ever tell us what to do about it? Mere quantifying isn't needed; the NTSB already does that.

 

[Rez O. Lewshun]

Valid point perhaps,

It seems self evident what the problems were... choice. Holland choose to fly that way and the leadership sanctioned it.... In addition the other pilot was quite clear: "this guy is a ticking time bomb".

I mean what else do we need to hear? What else needs to be said?

There is a rogue problem in your organization if..

Guys don't fly standard.
they fly for cheap thrills
the organizational authority does nothing about it...
the cries for help go ignored...


After reading Kern's Rogue book I had a better understadning of what flying standard and professional was all about.... Maybe there are guys out there on the wrong path and this book helped put them the right path....

Other case studies include the EMB crash where the CAPT engaged the autopilot and set the pitch according to the FA's desire so she didn't have to push the cart on such an incline. Finally the autopilot kick off and said "I, George, can't do this anymore"... They crashed....

There will be another accident because of rogue behavior.... It is a problem....

Here is more form Kern....


http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ISBN=0071373624/magentaline-20/

 

[avbug]

His book stands as a definitive analysis of poor pilot behavior. Rogue pilots are a problem. Holland wasn't the last. The airline industry recently, in 2004, had two rogues destroy an aircraft. Kern didn't make this stuff up... he just quantified it....

Which is my point...he quantified it poorly. His book is hardly difinitive, nor is it authoritative. Closer to cleverly packaged bubble gum philosophy which can be weaved over any data set or example of twisted metal and death. Kern made obervations, which may provide the basis for some thoughtful discussion, but are hardly difinitive. Remember, merely because something appears in print, doesn't make it right.

There is a rogue problem in your organization if..

Guys don't fly standard.

This is a good example of improper characterization. Kerns work fits a narrowly defined model, but is in no way difinitive. Standardization is only important where frequent changing and mixing of flight crews takes place.

As an example, examine a slice of several organizations who fly the same type aircraft. Standardization does not exist between the various flight departments, as each employ their own policies, practices, and proceedures. Never the less, each may operate on a very professional basis.

I'm not decrying standardization. It's a good thing. However, I have flown for organizations in which standardization was not cohesive, yet crews flew quite safely, and very professionally. The examples I provided previously illustrate that. We sought for a certain level of standardization each year with preseason training, but that type of work by necessity is not a cookie cutter operation and requires a lot of individual application to rapidly changing, unique situations. The battle plan, as they say, is always fluid. Such operations do not constitute rogue operations, however, nor do those engaging in those operatiosn become rogues.

Other case studies include the EMB crash where the CAPT engaged the autopilot and set the pitch according to the FA's desire so she didn't have to push the cart on such an incline. Finally the autopilot kick off and said "I, George, can't do this anymore"... They crashed....

Again, I believe attempting to qualify this behavior as rogueish is misleading and inappropriate. This represents asinine and stupid behavior, and there's a difference. Moreover, to set that as a case study, one might re-evaluate the situation with various assumptions to explore the validity of the application...suppose for example that the captain in this case was in fact a meticulous professional who made a lapse in judgement. Has he displayed a rogue attitude, or are we addressing something entirely different? I'd say in that case what we have is a very inappropriate classification if we're still calling him a rogue.

We can label him a "rogue", but that doesn't accomplish anything beyond irritating avbug.

Don't flatter yourself.

Now, avbug may be obnoxious and disagreeable, but I think this time he does have a point.

Flattery will get you nowhere.

After reading what he wrote about Holland, I'm not better able to identify warning signs in other pilots, or in myself, or recognize life situations that promote rogue behavior, or anything else. I'm no wiser for having studied Kern's work.

I don't necessarily agree there, either. I think any review of accidents, incidents, and various examples has merit...what kern provided isn't any different than what we get in the NTSB reports...with some additional personal insights. I think we each take something from every person with whom we interact; we make judgements, we decide what we agree with and what we don't...and we take something away to use in the next decision or interaction. The recent lear ending exercise that's been so talked about, the infamous botched roll, is a good example of a rogueish behavior.

The problem I have is that if we undertake to seek out behaviors based on the artificial classification system that kern has given us, we're limiting ourselves and we're minimizing the value of the lessons life brings us. We're squeezing what we see into small box categories that fit not the real world, but a model of it inside a narrowly defined box...we miss the meat and potatos of the lesson, and it's true worth.

We're not sorting cookie cutter ginger bread men as we examine each pilot, and toss them into a pile...rogue, rogue, professional, rogue, rogue, mmm this one looks good (crunch crunch crunch), rogue, rogue, profess...no....rogue, and so on. It's just not that easy.

Was rolling the Learjet a standard thing? By company policy, no. By company culture from some reports, yes. But if it were a standard thing would this make it okay? Even if the company condoned it? No, it's still a foolish act. Not having the skill or capability to do it properly is also a big problem, but dismissing the pilot as a rogue may be overlooking some of the more important details. Now granted, kern identified other characteristics and traits which are not in discussion here...but I believe you see the point. Pehaps this pilot wasn't so much the outlaw hero as just an idiot. Perhaps he was something else completely. Perhaps he just saw Elvis.

Maybe that pilot was a "ticking time bomb" too. I don't know enough about his case to say.

Some of the examples used in Kerns book(s) were mine, given at his request in person and in correspondence. A lot of people had input.

 

[Alamanach]

I think any review of accidents, incidents, and various examples has merit...what kern provided isn't any different than what we get in the NTSB reports...with some additional personal insights.

The problem with Kern's study of Holland is that it lacks balance. Hearing only a lopsided version can be worse than hearing no version at all.

The problem I have is that if we undertake to seek out behaviors based on the artificial classification system that kern has given us, we're limiting ourselves and we're minimizing the value of the lessons life brings us. We're squeezing what we see into small box categories that fit not the real world, but a model of it inside a narrowly defined box...we miss the meat and potatos of the lesson, and it's true worth.

On this and most of the rest of it, you and I agree completely. But I still say you're irritated.