Yep, here is a synopsis...(not sure when it was written)
from
http://www.najaco.com/books/indestructible_pilot/book/law/law_3.htm
When a pilot is hired by a company, his former company must disclose any unfavorable qualities about the pilot.
(a) True
(b) False
This is not true yet, but it might soon be. This yet to be enforced rule was brought about by the following accident: A Jetstream was descending, aiming to join the localizer at the final approach fix for the ILS approach at Raleigh-Durham International Airport (RDU) in North Carolina. The flight had been cleared to land, several miles behind a Boeing 727, when the captain called for an increase in prop speed. A moment later he said to the first officer, "Why’s that ignition light on? We just had a flameout?"
The following transcript, taken from Cockpit Area Microphone tapes, covers the final 51 seconds of the flight.
[CAP = Captain. FO = First officer. Times are Eastern Standard Time. Background sounds are in italics.]
TIME 1833:38
FO—I’m not sure what’s goin’ on with it.
CAP—We had a flameout.
Low-frequency beat of out-of-sync props begins and continues for eight seconds.
FO—’K you got it?
CAP—Yeah.
FO—We lose an engine?
CAP—OK yeah . . . OK, uh . . .
FO—I’m gonna turn that . . .
CAP—See if that, turn on the auto . . .
FO—I’m goin’ to turn on, both uh. . . ignitions, OK?
CAP—OK
FO—We lost that en . . . left one?
CAP—Yeah.
FO—Whatta you want me to do, you gonna continue?
CAP—OK, yeah, I’m gonna continue, just back me up.
FO—All right, I’m gonna . . .
TIME 1834:03
Sound of low-frequency beat begins and continues for three seconds.
CAP—Let’s go missed approach.
FO—All right.
Sound of stall warning horn for .7 second.
CAP—Set max power.
Sound of stall warning horn for .3 second.
FO—Lower the nose, lower the nose, lower the nose.
Sound of single stall warning horn starts, immediately followed by sound of dual stall warning horns.
FO—You got it?
CAP—Yeah.
FO—Lower the nose.
Unidentified rattling sound.
FO—It’s the wrong, wrong foot, wrong engine.
The stall warnings stop; the prop beat begins and continues for four seconds; the stall warnings resume; there is a sound of heavy breathing.
FO—Here.
The stall warnings stop, then resume, followed by the sound of impact.
The pilot stepped on the wrong rudder pedal, without having had an engine failure in the first place. Both crewmen and 13 passengers died in the crash; five passengers survived with serious injuries. When the first officer warned, "Lower the nose, lower the nose" and "wrong foot, wrong engine," the Jetstream’s indicated airspeed was dropping toward 100 knots and its heading had drifted 60 degrees to the left of the localizer course. In the final eight seconds, it lost 1,200 feet of altitude, its airspeed rose from 100 to 200 knots, and it experienced increasing G excursions, reaching almost three Gs just before impact. It had turned 140 degrees from the ILS course.
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) found that "the probable causes of this accident were: 1) the captain’s improper assumption that an engine had failed, and 2) the captain’s subsequent failure to follow approved procedures for engine failure, single-engine approach and go-around, and stall recovery."
In fact, the left engine had not failed at all; the brief illumination of an ignition light was the engine’s programmed response to a momentary negative torque condition that occurred when the first officer brought the prop speed control levers up to 100 percent while the power levers were at flight idle. The basic test would have been simply to advance the power lever and check for a response. This was not done. The next step was to feather the propeller, but this was not done either, nor was it even considered by the crew.
The captain’s decision to go-around, even though the plane was properly positioned and configured to land, suggests that the captain might have felt unable to immediately cope with the situation. This demonstrated a lack of judgment and training.
The NTSB found that when the captain had worked for Comair flying a SAAB 340, he failed his first second-in-command check in eight different areas, including judgment. One captain who flew with him found him "moody and unpredictable," and recommended that he be dismissed from the company. After the accident this captain stated to the NTSB, "[he had] below-average flying skills...was frequently ‘behind the airplane’ and often lost situational awareness...I was somewhat concerned that [he] may freeze up or get tunnel vision in an emergency situation."
The accident captain resigned from Comair on January 3, 1991, and went to work for American Eagle four days later. Because of a company policy, Comair did not provide to American Eagle any of its unfavorable assessments of the pilot.
The captain flew with American Eagle for almost four years, first in the Shorts SD3 60 and subsequently in the Jetstream 31. He received unsatisfactory marks for performance in initial training and during subsequent retraining for the Jetstream, and a failure on his first type rating check for the Jetstream. Rumors among first officers about the captain’s "flying deficiencies" started circulating. The Base Manager indirectly communicated to first officers that if they had concerns about the captain’s performance, they should inform him; but none came forward.
The night before the accident, the captain told his roommate that he was considering resigning from the airline, and that "the next day’s trip might be his last." They then prayed together.
The NTSB made several recommendations to the FAA as a result of this accident. The most significant of them was that an information storage and retrieval system be created that would allow airlines to obtain information about "skills, abilities, knowledge and judgment" of prospective hires from their previous employers.
