The F/O's dilemma...

[TurboS7]

I just tell my FO's to do whatever they want. It is a lot easier for me to adapt to them than for them to adapt to me. I really don't care where they put their charts, if I need some info. I will ask for it. Just don't take the taxi chart and put it in your flight case when I am trying to taxi, your job may be over but mine has just begun.

 

[Draginass]

Excellent posts. If you are in doubt about another pilot's attitude, adherence to procedure, or serious questions about their judgement, and you don't get any satisfaction after a one-on-one detailed flight debrief, it may be time to contact your union's Professional Standards Committee. Think how badly you'd feel if a month after you flew with a dangerous idiot, he killed everyone on board in an accident . . . . and you did nothing about it.

 

[Tref]

I guess we've all been in similar situations at some time. One thing that is important to distinguish is the difference between assuming control and assuming command. If you need to assume control it might be the old below DH debate or jumping on the brakes so you don't hit a tug. Assuming command means that the PIC is no longer the PIC.

One such example was on a long haul flight with an augmented crew. The Captain felt sick, but even though his relief commander replaced him in the left seat and he was now in the jump seat, he still wanted to call the shots. The relief commander told him not to worry and to take a passenger seat in the back. In effect he was assuming command of the flight.

One thing that can come in handy with difficult Captains is the "assertiveness statement." It has 5 parts:

-State the person's first name
-Say, "I'm concerned."
-State your concern
-Offer a solution
-Ask for a response

It would sound something like this. "Dave, I'm concerned. We're at our minimum diversion fuel and the last two aircraft have gone missed on the approach. I really think we should divert to our alternate. Wouldn't you agree?"

If you keep it simple and not challenging then even the most difficult Captain should respond. This can help in a bind. As far as getting along when the flight is going well, I can't offer too much assistance. I've flown with some guys that were just horrible. And they weren't just Captains.

When I was an FO I thought I'd flown with every A-hole in the company, but after I upgraded, I realized I'd only flown with half of them. The good news is that as I've moved up through the ranks, to better airlines, there are fewer of them.

 

[skydiverdriver]

Again, all good posts, but nobody is helping me with the jerk captains. I have to admit that the jerks I flew with in cargo were far worse than the pax guys, but they still exist. I still don't feel comfortable calling in sick, as it leaves some other poor reserve guy to fly with him. I also don't see how I can contact pro-standards about a guy who is terribly anal, or just a jerk to work with. Any suggestions?

 

[Draginass]

Sky - Do you have a "do not pair" advisory in your bids? Personally, I think someone who is severly "personality challenged" is unqualified to lead an aircrew. Talk to your professional standards people and get their advice. Keep in mind that your probably not the only one that has a problem with that person.

 

[avbug]

The first few captains I flew with were career "bad guys." One had knocked three copilots unconscious in the cockpit when he didn't like their actions. Another senior individual, with company ownership and a management title to boot, pulled me aside and told me if he didn't see me do exactly what he wanted, he'd put a shotgun in my mouth and pull the trigger. Another was an extreme egoist.

I quickly learned what I did and didn't want to become, and used every individual and opportunity as a learning experience. I determined exactly how I wanted others to see me, and how to deal (and not deal with others) in the air, in the industry, and on the ground.

The only advice I can give for dealing with tough characters in the cockpit is to deal with it, unless it represents a safety of flight issue. In such a case, only deal with it on the ground, as you can always find employment, but it's hard to do when dead, or when without a certificate because of enforcement action. Use it as a learning experience, but for the F/O trying to make good with a rough senior, do everything in your power to make your captain look good, and to keep him or her happy...and don't compromise yourself in the process. If you can do that, count on the opportunity to move on to a better flying mate, and you'll do well.

This too, shall pass.

 

[Freight Dog]

What do you do when the guy in question doesn't give a hoot about the professional standards or what they say, and is a check airman?

 

[bobbysamd]

Problem captains

Sounds like the classic interview question to me. Great discussion and great comments. Make sure you have documentation that supports your position. Don't forget the Professional Standards option at your union and sending in NASA reports. I read once that most NASA reports come from members of airline crews.

What I've always found hard to believe is these jerks you're mentioning got past the hiring gatekeepers. Absent connections from above, I always understood that personality plays a major role in airline hiring, that you're supposed to approach everyone at the interview with your hat in your hand and if you don't you can just walk out and go home. Oh, well, so much for that myth . . . . .

 

[skydiverdriver]

All good information. Hey, wasn't there a crash where an American Eagle captain who was known to hit his FO's, did something really stupid and killed some people? I think that was when Clinton signed the act that lets them share training records. I was told that this particular captain was previously fired from Comair. Keep those suggestions coming.

Draginass, no, we don't have a don't pair option, but I wish we did. Again, I could call in sick, but I dont' think that's fair to the poor reserve guy who may not be able to stick up for himself as well as I can. I have been dealing with captains for years, mostly as a dispacher. I would rather deal with them, than later find out that they killed some passengers when he was with a less attentive or assertive FO. Thanks guys.

 

[FL000]

Yep, here is a synopsis...(not sure when it was written)

from http://www.najaco.com/books/indestructible_pilot/book/law/law_3.htm

When a pilot is hired by a company, his former company must disclose any unfavorable qualities about the pilot.

(a) True

(b) False

This is not true yet, but it might soon be. This yet to be enforced rule was brought about by the following accident: A Jetstream was descending, aiming to join the localizer at the final approach fix for the ILS approach at Raleigh-Durham International Airport (RDU) in North Carolina. The flight had been cleared to land, several miles behind a Boeing 727, when the captain called for an increase in prop speed. A moment later he said to the first officer, "Why’s that ignition light on? We just had a flameout?"
The following transcript, taken from Cockpit Area Microphone tapes, covers the final 51 seconds of the flight.

[CAP = Captain. FO = First officer. Times are Eastern Standard Time. Background sounds are in italics.]

TIME 1833:38

FO—I’m not sure what’s goin’ on with it.

CAP—We had a flameout.

Low-frequency beat of out-of-sync props begins and continues for eight seconds.

FO—’K you got it?

CAP—Yeah.

FO—We lose an engine?

CAP—OK yeah . . . OK, uh . . .

FO—I’m gonna turn that . . .

CAP—See if that, turn on the auto . . .

FO—I’m goin’ to turn on, both uh. . . ignitions, OK?

CAP—OK

FO—We lost that en . . . left one?

CAP—Yeah.

FO—Whatta you want me to do, you gonna continue?

CAP—OK, yeah, I’m gonna continue, just back me up.

FO—All right, I’m gonna . . .

TIME 1834:03

Sound of low-frequency beat begins and continues for three seconds.

CAP—Let’s go missed approach.

FO—All right.

Sound of stall warning horn for .7 second.

CAP—Set max power.

Sound of stall warning horn for .3 second.

FO—Lower the nose, lower the nose, lower the nose.

Sound of single stall warning horn starts, immediately followed by sound of dual stall warning horns.

FO—You got it?

CAP—Yeah.

FO—Lower the nose.

Unidentified rattling sound.

FO—It’s the wrong, wrong foot, wrong engine.

The stall warnings stop; the prop beat begins and continues for four seconds; the stall warnings resume; there is a sound of heavy breathing.

FO—Here.

The stall warnings stop, then resume, followed by the sound of impact.

The pilot stepped on the wrong rudder pedal, without having had an engine failure in the first place. Both crewmen and 13 passengers died in the crash; five passengers survived with serious injuries. When the first officer warned, "Lower the nose, lower the nose" and "wrong foot, wrong engine," the Jetstream’s indicated airspeed was dropping toward 100 knots and its heading had drifted 60 degrees to the left of the localizer course. In the final eight seconds, it lost 1,200 feet of altitude, its airspeed rose from 100 to 200 knots, and it experienced increasing G excursions, reaching almost three Gs just before impact. It had turned 140 degrees from the ILS course.
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) found that "the probable causes of this accident were: 1) the captain’s improper assumption that an engine had failed, and 2) the captain’s subsequent failure to follow approved procedures for engine failure, single-engine approach and go-around, and stall recovery."
In fact, the left engine had not failed at all; the brief illumination of an ignition light was the engine’s programmed response to a momentary negative torque condition that occurred when the first officer brought the prop speed control levers up to 100 percent while the power levers were at flight idle. The basic test would have been simply to advance the power lever and check for a response. This was not done. The next step was to feather the propeller, but this was not done either, nor was it even considered by the crew.
The captain’s decision to go-around, even though the plane was properly positioned and configured to land, suggests that the captain might have felt unable to immediately cope with the situation. This demonstrated a lack of judgment and training.
The NTSB found that when the captain had worked for Comair flying a SAAB 340, he failed his first second-in-command check in eight different areas, including judgment. One captain who flew with him found him "moody and unpredictable," and recommended that he be dismissed from the company. After the accident this captain stated to the NTSB, "[he had] below-average flying skills...was frequently ‘behind the airplane’ and often lost situational awareness...I was somewhat concerned that [he] may freeze up or get tunnel vision in an emergency situation."
The accident captain resigned from Comair on January 3, 1991, and went to work for American Eagle four days later. Because of a company policy, Comair did not provide to American Eagle any of its unfavorable assessments of the pilot.
The captain flew with American Eagle for almost four years, first in the Shorts SD3 60 and subsequently in the Jetstream 31. He received unsatisfactory marks for performance in initial training and during subsequent retraining for the Jetstream, and a failure on his first type rating check for the Jetstream. Rumors among first officers about the captain’s "flying deficiencies" started circulating. The Base Manager indirectly communicated to first officers that if they had concerns about the captain’s performance, they should inform him; but none came forward.
The night before the accident, the captain told his roommate that he was considering resigning from the airline, and that "the next day’s trip might be his last." They then prayed together.
The NTSB made several recommendations to the FAA as a result of this accident. The most significant of them was that an information storage and retrieval system be created that would allow airlines to obtain information about "skills, abilities, knowledge and judgment" of prospective hires from their previous employers.