Diesel-9
Well-known member
- Joined
- May 1, 2005
- Posts
- 527
FWIW Brazilian Naval unit reportedly found the
>> complete vertical fin/rudder assembly of the doomed aircraft floating
>> some 30 miles from the main debris field. The search for the flight
>> recorders goes on, but given the failure history of the vertical fins on
>> A300-series aircraft, an analysis of its structure at the point of
>> failure will likely yield the primary cause factor in the breakup of the
>> aircraft, with the flight recorder data (if found) providing only
>> secondary contributing phenomena. The fin-failure-leading-to-breakup
>> sequence is strongly suggested in the attached (below) narrative report
>> by George Larson, Editor emeritus of Smithsonian Air & Space Magazine.
>> It's regrettable that these aircraft are permitted to continue in routine
>> flight operations with this known structural defect. It appears that
>> safety finishes last within Airbus Industries, behind national pride and
>> economics. Hopefully, this accident will force the issue to be
>> addressed, requiring at a minimum restricted operations of selected
>> platforms, and grounding of some high-time aircraft until a re-engineered
>> (strengthened) vertical fin/rudder attachment structure can be
>> incorporated. Les
>> --------------------------(Report)---------------------
>> This is an account of a discussion I had recently with a maintenance
>> professional who salvages airliner airframes for a living. He has been at
>> it for a while, dba BMI Salvage at Opa Locka Airport in Florida. In the
>> process of stripping parts, he sees things few others are able to see.
>> His observations confirm prior assessments of Airbus structural
>> deficiencies within our flight test and aero structures communities by
>> those who have seen the closely held reports of A3XX-series vertical fin
>> failures. His observations:
>>
>> "I have scrapped just about every type of transport aircraft from A-310,
>> A-320, B-747, 727, 737, 707, DC-3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, MD-80, L-188, L1011
>> and various Martin, Convair and KC-97 aircraft.
>>
>> Over a hundred of them.
>>
>> Airbus products are the flimsiest and most poorly designed as far as
>> airframe structure is concerned by an almost obsession to utilize
>> composite materials.
>>
>> I have one A310 vertical fin on the premises from a demonstration I just
>> performed. It was pathetic to see the composite structure shatter as it
>> did, something a Boeing product will not do.
>>
>> The vertical fin along with the composite hinges on rudder and elevators
>> is the worst example of structural use of composites I have ever seen and
>> I am not surprised by the current pictures of rescue crews recovering the
>> complete Vertical fin and rudder assembly at some distance from the crash
>> site.
>>
>> The Airbus line has a history of both multiple rudder losses and a
>> vertical fin and rudder separation from the airframe as was the case in
>> NY with AA.
>>
>> As an old non-radar equipped DC4 pilot who flew through many a
>> thunderstorm in Africa along the equator, I am quite familiar with their
>> ferocity. It is not difficult to understand how such a storm might have
>> stressed an aircraft structure to failure at its weakest point, and
>> especially so in the presence of instrumentation problems.
>>
>> I replied with this:
>>
>> "I'm watching very carefully the orchestration of the inquiry by French
>> officials and Airbus. I think I can smell a concerted effort to steer
>> discussion away from structural issues and onto sensors, etc. Now Air
>> France, at the behest of their pilots' union, is replacing all the air
>> data sensors on the Airbus fleet, which creates a distraction and shifts
>> the media's focus away from the real problem.
>>
>> It's difficult to delve into the structural issue without wading into the
>> Boeing vs. Airbus swamp, where any observation is instantly tainted by
>> its origin. Americans noting any Airbus structural issues (A380 early
>> failure of wing in static test; loss of vertical surfaces in Canadian
>> fleet prior to AA A300, e.g.) will be attacked by the other side as
>> partisan, biased, etc. "
>>
>> His follow-up:
>>
>> One gets a really unique insight into structural issues when one has
>> first-hand experience in the dismantling process.
>>
>> I am an A&P, FEJ and an ATP with 7000 flight hours and I was absolutely
>> stunned, flabbergasted when I realized that the majority of internal
>> airframe structural supports on the A 310 which appear to be aluminum are
>> actually rolled composite material with aluminum rod ends. They
>> shattered.
>>
>> Three years ago we had a storm come through, with gusts up to 60-70 kts.,
>> catching several A320s tied down on the line, out in the open. The A320
>> elevators and rudder hinges whose actuators had been removed shattered
>> and the rudder and elevators came off.
>>
>> Upon closer inspection I realized that not only were the rear spars
>> composite but so were the hinges. While Boeing also uses composite
>> material in its airfoil structures, the actual attach fittings for the
>> elevators,
>>
>> rudder, vertical and horizontal stabilizers are all of machined
>> aluminum."
>> -----------------(end of narrative)---------------
>> ________________________________
>>
>> You may have missed this one also:
>>
>> Subject: excerpts from various news about 447 Date: Sat, 06 Jun 2009
>> 17:21:15 +0000
>>
>> .....the jet issued 24 system failure messages before it crashed. =
>> Fourteen of those messages were sent within the space of one minute, =
>> from 3.10am BST to 3.11am BST, a briefing in Paris was told today.
>>
>> At 11pm (2am GMT) pilot Marc Dubois sent a manual signal saying he was =
>> flying through an area of 'CBs' - black, electrically charged =
>> cumulonimbus clouds that carry violent winds and lightning.
>>
>> At 11.10pm, automatic messages relayed by the jetliner indicated the =
>> autopilot had disengaged.
>>
>> This suggested Dubois and his two co-pilots were trying to thread their =
>> way through the storm manually.
>>
>> At this point a key computer system had switched to alternative power =
>> and controls needed to keep the plane stable had been damaged.
>>
>> An alarm also sounded, indicating that the 'fly-by-wire' system on the =
>> Airbus that controls the flaps on the wings had shifted to 'alternate =
>> law'.
>>
>> Alternate law is an emergency back-up system that kicks in after an =
>> electronic failure. It enables the plane to keep functioning with less =
>> energy - but reduces stability, which would have been desperately needed
>> = as the pilots battled to bring the jet safely out of the turbulence.
>>
>> At 11.12pm, two key computers monitoring air speed, altitude and =
>> direction failed. These would have increased the pilot's loss of control
>> = over the plane.
>>
>> The loss of instruments showing air speed in particular would have been =
>> detrimental. The pilot was trying to fly a fine line between slowing the
>> = plane enough to navigate through the turbulence, and not slowing so
>> much = that the plane stalled mid-air, which would have been
>> catastrophic.
>>
>> The messages show there was an inconsistency between the different =
>> measured airspeeds shortly after the plane entered the storm zone.
>>
>> At 11.13pm, control of the main flight computer, back up system and wing
>> = spoilers also failed.
>>
>> The last automatic message, at 11.14pm, indicated complete electrical =
>> failure and a massive loss of cabin pressure - catastrophic events, =
>> indicating that the plane was breaking apart and plunging toward the =
>> ocean.
>>
>> Last night Airbus warned airline crews to follow standard procedures if =
>> they suspect speed indicators are faulty.
>>
>> The Airbus telex was sent to customers of its A330s late yesterday. An =
>> industry official said such warnings are only sent if accident =
>> investigators have established facts that they consider important enough
>> = to pass on immediately to airlines.
>>
>> The recommendation was authorised by the French air accident =
>> investigation agency (BEA) looking into the disaster. It has said the =
>> speed levels registered by the slew of messages from the plane showed =
>> 'incoherence'.
>>
>> Airbus said its message to clients did not imply that the doomed pilots =
>> did anything wrong or that a design fault was in any way responsible for
>> = the crash.
>>
>> 'This Aircraft Information Telex is an information document that in no =
>> way implicates any blame,' a spokesman said today.
>>
>>
>>
>> For those who didn't receive it earlier, this from an old friend, retired
>> US Airways A320 driver. Good luck with the spelling and shorthand!
>>
>> Sorta funny- almost exactly what I had thought in the beginning. The guy
>> doing the CNN explanation of how lightning does not bring a/c down
>> happens to be a coworker of mine. I was interviewed on TV and said that
>> it could-reason: he stated that a "normal" a/c can't be brought down by
>> lightning-the AB is NOT a normal a/c.! A well positioned hit could make
>> the a/c virtually not flyable. U have 2 sys for flt control-elec/hyd. u
>> can loose either and still be able to control flt. If u loose both u are
>> pretty much a lawn dart because what u have left would be comparable to
>> trying to balance a plate ontop of a pencil! We had an F-100 hit and it
>> ******************** out all hyd fludi as the lines were ruptured. If the pcu for a flt
>> controls(s) had been hit (fried) and the strike continued and took out
>> hyd sys-of which there r 3-2 of which really count for anything-there u
>> go, just along for the ride.With that scenario the backup sys are moot.
>> Moral of the story-stay out of trw esp if u r a frog trying to hand fly
>> an AB. That's all I'm saying.
>>
>> As you might imagine, XXXX was not a fan of AB design philosophy.
>>
>>
>> complete vertical fin/rudder assembly of the doomed aircraft floating
>> some 30 miles from the main debris field. The search for the flight
>> recorders goes on, but given the failure history of the vertical fins on
>> A300-series aircraft, an analysis of its structure at the point of
>> failure will likely yield the primary cause factor in the breakup of the
>> aircraft, with the flight recorder data (if found) providing only
>> secondary contributing phenomena. The fin-failure-leading-to-breakup
>> sequence is strongly suggested in the attached (below) narrative report
>> by George Larson, Editor emeritus of Smithsonian Air & Space Magazine.
>> It's regrettable that these aircraft are permitted to continue in routine
>> flight operations with this known structural defect. It appears that
>> safety finishes last within Airbus Industries, behind national pride and
>> economics. Hopefully, this accident will force the issue to be
>> addressed, requiring at a minimum restricted operations of selected
>> platforms, and grounding of some high-time aircraft until a re-engineered
>> (strengthened) vertical fin/rudder attachment structure can be
>> incorporated. Les
>> --------------------------(Report)---------------------
>> This is an account of a discussion I had recently with a maintenance
>> professional who salvages airliner airframes for a living. He has been at
>> it for a while, dba BMI Salvage at Opa Locka Airport in Florida. In the
>> process of stripping parts, he sees things few others are able to see.
>> His observations confirm prior assessments of Airbus structural
>> deficiencies within our flight test and aero structures communities by
>> those who have seen the closely held reports of A3XX-series vertical fin
>> failures. His observations:
>>
>> "I have scrapped just about every type of transport aircraft from A-310,
>> A-320, B-747, 727, 737, 707, DC-3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, MD-80, L-188, L1011
>> and various Martin, Convair and KC-97 aircraft.
>>
>> Over a hundred of them.
>>
>> Airbus products are the flimsiest and most poorly designed as far as
>> airframe structure is concerned by an almost obsession to utilize
>> composite materials.
>>
>> I have one A310 vertical fin on the premises from a demonstration I just
>> performed. It was pathetic to see the composite structure shatter as it
>> did, something a Boeing product will not do.
>>
>> The vertical fin along with the composite hinges on rudder and elevators
>> is the worst example of structural use of composites I have ever seen and
>> I am not surprised by the current pictures of rescue crews recovering the
>> complete Vertical fin and rudder assembly at some distance from the crash
>> site.
>>
>> The Airbus line has a history of both multiple rudder losses and a
>> vertical fin and rudder separation from the airframe as was the case in
>> NY with AA.
>>
>> As an old non-radar equipped DC4 pilot who flew through many a
>> thunderstorm in Africa along the equator, I am quite familiar with their
>> ferocity. It is not difficult to understand how such a storm might have
>> stressed an aircraft structure to failure at its weakest point, and
>> especially so in the presence of instrumentation problems.
>>
>> I replied with this:
>>
>> "I'm watching very carefully the orchestration of the inquiry by French
>> officials and Airbus. I think I can smell a concerted effort to steer
>> discussion away from structural issues and onto sensors, etc. Now Air
>> France, at the behest of their pilots' union, is replacing all the air
>> data sensors on the Airbus fleet, which creates a distraction and shifts
>> the media's focus away from the real problem.
>>
>> It's difficult to delve into the structural issue without wading into the
>> Boeing vs. Airbus swamp, where any observation is instantly tainted by
>> its origin. Americans noting any Airbus structural issues (A380 early
>> failure of wing in static test; loss of vertical surfaces in Canadian
>> fleet prior to AA A300, e.g.) will be attacked by the other side as
>> partisan, biased, etc. "
>>
>> His follow-up:
>>
>> One gets a really unique insight into structural issues when one has
>> first-hand experience in the dismantling process.
>>
>> I am an A&P, FEJ and an ATP with 7000 flight hours and I was absolutely
>> stunned, flabbergasted when I realized that the majority of internal
>> airframe structural supports on the A 310 which appear to be aluminum are
>> actually rolled composite material with aluminum rod ends. They
>> shattered.
>>
>> Three years ago we had a storm come through, with gusts up to 60-70 kts.,
>> catching several A320s tied down on the line, out in the open. The A320
>> elevators and rudder hinges whose actuators had been removed shattered
>> and the rudder and elevators came off.
>>
>> Upon closer inspection I realized that not only were the rear spars
>> composite but so were the hinges. While Boeing also uses composite
>> material in its airfoil structures, the actual attach fittings for the
>> elevators,
>>
>> rudder, vertical and horizontal stabilizers are all of machined
>> aluminum."
>> -----------------(end of narrative)---------------
>> ________________________________
>>
>> You may have missed this one also:
>>
>> Subject: excerpts from various news about 447 Date: Sat, 06 Jun 2009
>> 17:21:15 +0000
>>
>> .....the jet issued 24 system failure messages before it crashed. =
>> Fourteen of those messages were sent within the space of one minute, =
>> from 3.10am BST to 3.11am BST, a briefing in Paris was told today.
>>
>> At 11pm (2am GMT) pilot Marc Dubois sent a manual signal saying he was =
>> flying through an area of 'CBs' - black, electrically charged =
>> cumulonimbus clouds that carry violent winds and lightning.
>>
>> At 11.10pm, automatic messages relayed by the jetliner indicated the =
>> autopilot had disengaged.
>>
>> This suggested Dubois and his two co-pilots were trying to thread their =
>> way through the storm manually.
>>
>> At this point a key computer system had switched to alternative power =
>> and controls needed to keep the plane stable had been damaged.
>>
>> An alarm also sounded, indicating that the 'fly-by-wire' system on the =
>> Airbus that controls the flaps on the wings had shifted to 'alternate =
>> law'.
>>
>> Alternate law is an emergency back-up system that kicks in after an =
>> electronic failure. It enables the plane to keep functioning with less =
>> energy - but reduces stability, which would have been desperately needed
>> = as the pilots battled to bring the jet safely out of the turbulence.
>>
>> At 11.12pm, two key computers monitoring air speed, altitude and =
>> direction failed. These would have increased the pilot's loss of control
>> = over the plane.
>>
>> The loss of instruments showing air speed in particular would have been =
>> detrimental. The pilot was trying to fly a fine line between slowing the
>> = plane enough to navigate through the turbulence, and not slowing so
>> much = that the plane stalled mid-air, which would have been
>> catastrophic.
>>
>> The messages show there was an inconsistency between the different =
>> measured airspeeds shortly after the plane entered the storm zone.
>>
>> At 11.13pm, control of the main flight computer, back up system and wing
>> = spoilers also failed.
>>
>> The last automatic message, at 11.14pm, indicated complete electrical =
>> failure and a massive loss of cabin pressure - catastrophic events, =
>> indicating that the plane was breaking apart and plunging toward the =
>> ocean.
>>
>> Last night Airbus warned airline crews to follow standard procedures if =
>> they suspect speed indicators are faulty.
>>
>> The Airbus telex was sent to customers of its A330s late yesterday. An =
>> industry official said such warnings are only sent if accident =
>> investigators have established facts that they consider important enough
>> = to pass on immediately to airlines.
>>
>> The recommendation was authorised by the French air accident =
>> investigation agency (BEA) looking into the disaster. It has said the =
>> speed levels registered by the slew of messages from the plane showed =
>> 'incoherence'.
>>
>> Airbus said its message to clients did not imply that the doomed pilots =
>> did anything wrong or that a design fault was in any way responsible for
>> = the crash.
>>
>> 'This Aircraft Information Telex is an information document that in no =
>> way implicates any blame,' a spokesman said today.
>>
>>
>>
>> For those who didn't receive it earlier, this from an old friend, retired
>> US Airways A320 driver. Good luck with the spelling and shorthand!
>>
>> Sorta funny- almost exactly what I had thought in the beginning. The guy
>> doing the CNN explanation of how lightning does not bring a/c down
>> happens to be a coworker of mine. I was interviewed on TV and said that
>> it could-reason: he stated that a "normal" a/c can't be brought down by
>> lightning-the AB is NOT a normal a/c.! A well positioned hit could make
>> the a/c virtually not flyable. U have 2 sys for flt control-elec/hyd. u
>> can loose either and still be able to control flt. If u loose both u are
>> pretty much a lawn dart because what u have left would be comparable to
>> trying to balance a plate ontop of a pencil! We had an F-100 hit and it
>> ******************** out all hyd fludi as the lines were ruptured. If the pcu for a flt
>> controls(s) had been hit (fried) and the strike continued and took out
>> hyd sys-of which there r 3-2 of which really count for anything-there u
>> go, just along for the ride.With that scenario the backup sys are moot.
>> Moral of the story-stay out of trw esp if u r a frog trying to hand fly
>> an AB. That's all I'm saying.
>>
>> As you might imagine, XXXX was not a fan of AB design philosophy.
>>
>>
