Term Paper: CFIT

[FN FAL]

I'll sugest you go to ASRS web site and FAA website. In the ASRS web you will find good feedback from the pilots in some of the report. Ihope you find this info helpfull to you.
http://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/report_sets_nf.htm
Good luck

The NTSB website would be a good place to look as well, but I'm betting the reason that Diesel is having a hard time finding information for his paper, is that there is a dearth of information regarding automation causing CFIT accidents.

 

[FN FAL]

Wasn't there an airbus accident or near-accident where the crew accidentally punched in a descent of 3000fpm instead of 3.0 degrees?

Yea, that would be automation causing a CFIT accident. Not that pilots are supposed identify, verify and do instrument scans or anything remotely close to that...because that would be considered flight crew negligence. Unless someone could prove that the training department was negligent in training the flight crew. Maybe the company that built the plane was negligent in telling the company about the mode control panel and all the funny looking buttons on it.

 

[KeroseneSnorter]

Yea, that would be automation causing a CFIT accident. Not that pilots are supposed identify, verify and do instrument scans or anything remotely close to that...because that would be considered flight crew negligence. Unless someone could prove that the training department was negligent in training the flight crew. Maybe the company that built the plane was negligent in telling the company about the mode control panel and all the funny looking buttons on it.

I would think that his paper is going to deal with the Human factors and how we interact with automation. Or in some cases do not interact with automation. I know my brain used to be able to hold an assigned altitude longer than the 5 seconds it takes to dial it up in the alt. selector window, but now after so many years with an altitude alert and pre select window, when I fly light aircraft I find myself having to ask for the altitude again.

Little things like that can have a profound effect on a flight. Is it a human error? Yes. Was it automation induced? Well that might be a good paper!

 

[imacdog]

Yea, that would be automation causing a CFIT accident. Not that pilots are supposed identify, verify and do instrument scans or anything remotely close to that...because that would be considered flight crew negligence. Unless someone could prove that the training department was negligent in training the flight crew. Maybe the company that built the plane was negligent in telling the company about the mode control panel and all the funny looking buttons on it.

I'm not saying that automation caused the accident, but it was certainly an accident in which automation played a role.

 

[Kingairrick]

desiel;
PM me your address, I took that class too, and I have what you need.
In the mean time:
Airbus A320- Fec 14th 1990, Indian Airlines, 92 Fatals, NTSB cited automation as a contributing factor.
Airbus itself blames automation in the famous vidoe of the 320 at the airshow hitting the tees.

 

[Diesel]

I appreciate all the responses but my paper has to deal with automation and how it has caused CFIT accidents and prevented it. So the cali incident is an excellent choice. for example they were comletley relying on the FMS. Both were heads down typing and typing away. I EGPWS had been available at the time they would have been able to perform an evasive action sooner and maybe cleared the mountain.

I'm thinking i might have to narrow my thesis to just how the reliance on automation has caused CFIT incidents. I might do a blurb about how there are technology out there that is preventing this but the reliance on the "box" is no longer having us do any sort of backup.

I'm writing this partly because my boss got killed in a cfit accident into the mountains. If we had TAWS at the time this would never have happened.

Kingairik pm is on the way.

 

[JediNein]

http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=20030605X00790&key=1

The above CFIT accident occurred in a plane equipped with dual Garmin GNS 430 GPS units. This means dual GPS, dual VOR, dual Comms, and at least one set of charts aboard. Multiple means of position orientation were available, yet the CFII did not use them.

Another accident, another CFII blindly following ATC Radar Vectors, the Glendale 6? departure off Van Nuys: http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=20001213X35001&key=1

Enjoy the term paper!

 

[mar]

Hang on a sec.

So the cali incident is an excellent choice. for example they were comletley relying on the FMS. Both were heads down typing and typing away. I EGPWS had been available at the time they would have been able to perform an evasive action sooner and maybe cleared the mountain.

Don't be quite so dismissive towards the crew. Like most accidents this one had several factors layered on top of each other.

It's not so simple as to say their "heads were down typing" and EGPWS could've saved them.

You're focusing on the computer right? Then you need to realize that there were two different beacons with the *same* identifier in the database.

They "typed" in the identifier and the plane took them to the wrong one.

They knew something was wrong but didn't figure it out in time.

Throw in a loss of situational awareness, poor ATC communication and speedbrakes that were not retracted during the climb and suddenly you have an accident.

 

[Diesel]

Okay lets ignore for the fact that the crew would never have been able to land from the point where they were cleared for the straight in.

There are many identifiers that have the same key. That's not uncommon. It was the reliance on the crew that the box must be right because it came up with the identifier and not cross checking it before hitting the excute button.

The reliance on automation to help them figure out where they were going was a serious player in the accident.

Let's say if the crew had a map display on the MFD do you think they would have hit the mountain? Would that type of technology have prevented this type of accident?

I look forward to your responses. Too bad I can list flightinfo.com as a source of reference.

 

[Diesel]

Jedi- Cool thanks for the info.

 

[FN FAL]

http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=20030605X00790&key=1

The above CFIT accident occurred in a plane equipped with dual Garmin GNS 430 GPS units. This means dual GPS, dual VOR, dual Comms, and at least one set of charts aboard. Multiple means of position orientation were available, yet the CFII did not use them.

Another accident, another CFII blindly following ATC Radar Vectors, the Glendale 6? departure off Van Nuys: http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=20001213X35001&key=1

Enjoy the term paper!

What about the Nascar racing team crash?

 

[mar]

Better question for a 757 pilot.

There are many identifiers that have the same key. That's not uncommon. It was the reliance on the crew that the box must be right because it came up with the identifier and not cross checking it before hitting the excute button.

Let's say if the crew had a map display on the MFD do you think they would have hit the mountain? Would that type of technology have prevented this type of accident?

I certainly don't have any official reference beyond my own experience but I'd certainly question the protocol of instituting two navaids within the same FIR with identical identifiers.

For the most part I'm just speaking as a pilot who's made many nighttime approaches in crappy weather to crappy airports in Alaska.

In other words, I don't know what I'm talking about.

But yeah, I agree, all things being equal if some sort of graphical display of the terrain had been available their (the crew) "red flags" would've been raised a lot sooner...

...but the elimination of just *one* of the factors in that accident would've prevented it: Better info in the FMS; Better ATC system; Better situational awareness; Better GPWS escape maneuver (speedbrake retraction).

In my last post I was just trying to point out that the AA crew got suckered...or maybe let themselves get suckered into a bad situation but they weren't asleep at the wheel so to speak.

Good luck.

 

[KigAir]

http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0UBT/is_16_16/ai_84985136

Capt. Wu, 32 years old and with just one year as captain in the B767, elected instead to fly a circling approach, in rain and mist.