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shuttle columbia

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Just found a version of that article (by the AP):
http://www.canada.com/news/story.asp?id=5D2C14DD-903F-4D5D-9059-9DFAEAC99D31

HOUSTON (AP) - After days of analysis, NASA backed away Wednesday from the theory that a piece of foam debris that struck Columbia during liftoff was the root cause of the shuttle disaster.

Ron Dittemore, manager of the shuttle program, said investigators now are focusing more closely on the desperate effort of Columbia's automatic control system to hold the speed of the spacecraft stable despite an increasing level of wind resistance, or drag, on the left wing. Dittemore said that after a careful study of the damage possible from the fall of a chunk of foam insulation that was believed to be 50 centimetres and one kilogram, investigators are "looking somewhere else."

"It doesn't make sense to us that a piece of debris could be the root cause of the loss of Columbia and its crew," Dittemore said. "There's got to be another reason."

He said investigators are now asking if there was "another event that escaped our attention" that might have caused Columbia to break up just minutes before the end of its 16-day mission, killing all seven astronauts.

Practically from the start, investigators have been looking at the possibility that the piece of foam that fell off the shuttle's big external fuel tank 81 seconds after lifoff Jan. 16 caused damage to the thermal tiles under the left wing that doomed the flight. The thermal tiles keep the ship from burning up during re-entry into Earth's atmosphere.

While Columbia was still aloft, NASA engineers analysed the potential damage to the thermal tiles and concluded that based on such factors as the estimated size, weight and trajectory of the chunk of foam, any damage to the tiles was minor and the crew was in no danger.

In recent days, some space experts have speculated that the chunk of foam was coated or infused with ice, which could have increased the weight - and destructive potential - of the piece that hit the shuttle.

"I don't think it's ice. I don't think there's an embedded ice question here," Dittemore said, adding that the foam is water-resistant and that an inspection team found no ice conditions that day. "So it is something else."

Dittemore said that during Columbia's final minutes, the autopilot was causing the craft to rapidly move the control surfaces and to eventually even fire small rockets in a losing effort to gain control of the yawing motion of Columbia.

Final bits of data from the spacecraft showed that "we were beginning to lose the battle," he said.

For this reason, Dittemore said his team is intensifying efforts to recover a final 32 seconds of data from the spacecraft.

This data, the very last signals from the dying Columbia, was not processed at Mission Control because the quality of the electronic signals was too poor to be considered reliable.

But Dittemore said the signals are being extracted from computers and will be examined to find clues to why Columbia's left wing was encountering so much drag.

"Perhaps the 32 seconds will help us understand," he said.
 
CBS radio news this morning said USAF has photos of the shuttle just prior to breaking up showing a "jagged" left wing LE. This may be the evidence that would bring NASA to discount the wing underside damage theory.

However, it's not know what could have damaged the wing LE (ice, insulation, meteorite, space junk). Here's another article on the PC decision to change fuel tank insulation systems.

http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,77832,00.html
 
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Hi!

Some comments on the Challenger explosion:

An earlier poster said that the Morton-Thiokol (spelling>) co. told NASA they shouldn't fly the Challenger in the cold weather.

On a documentary I saw, they interviewed the 2 Mort-Thik engineers who knew the Challenger was unsafe at lower temperatures. They were fairly certain that the Challenger would blow up, and relayed that info to their manager. Their manager, who was the official co. rep to NASA disagreed and overruled them, and told NASA that the Challenger would be OK, so, officially, the co. did NOT tell NASA they shouldn't launch.

The engineers said they were fairly certain the Challenger would blow up on the pad, so when they saw it lift off successfully, they thought that it might actually make it to orbit. Obviously, their worst fears were confirmed a few seconds later.

My ex-father-in-law was a shuttle cargo engineer. My ex-wife and her mother both told me that he had come home complaining for a couple of years (this was prior to 1984, which was when he died), about problems with the shuttle. He said that it was unsafe at lower-temperatures, and that a number of workers at NASA had been discussing this for quite a while. Obviously, they were unable to get through to the top at NASA. Since he died in 1984, he didn't know that his fears were correct with regards to the Challenger.

Cliff
GRB
 
atpcliff said:
The engineers said they were fairly certain the Challenger would blow up on the pad, so when they saw it lift off successfully, they thought that it might actually make it to orbit.
It could well have. Reverse angle video of the launch pad showed black smoke coming from the joint just after the SRB's were lit.
 
In fact the black smoke was the O-Ring vaporizing and the residue turning crystaline which "saved" the shuttle from having a breach a few seconds into the launch. Then later in the climb the shuttle experienced the largest bit of air turbulence in the history of the program which the engines and shuttle system compensated for beautiful but which disturbed the "temporary O-ring" of crystal and caused the sudden appearance of flame which in less than 10 seconds melted the lower attachment point of the SRB to the ET. The right SRB then pivoted around the forward attachment point and the tip of the SRB breached the ET causing sudden and total aerodynamic breakup of the ET and shuttle. The fireball was the fuel burning but it was not an explosion that caused Challenger to be destroyed but rather pure aerodynamic forces. Sad facts, perhaps if the turbulence hadn't be encountered the weakend O-Ring would have held a few more seconds to burnout and the shuttle would have made it.
 
saabcaptain said:
In fact the black smoke was the O-Ring vaporizing and the residue turning crystaline which "saved" the shuttle from having a breach a few seconds into the launch. Then later in the climb the shuttle experienced the largest bit of air turbulence in the history of the program which the engines and shuttle system compensated for beautiful but which disturbed the "temporary O-ring" of crystal and caused the sudden appearance of flame which in less than 10 seconds melted the lower attachment point of the SRB to the ET. The right SRB then pivoted around the forward attachment point and the tip of the SRB breached the ET causing sudden and total aerodynamic breakup of the ET and shuttle. The fireball was the fuel burning but it was not an explosion that caused Challenger to be destroyed but rather pure aerodynamic forces. Sad facts, perhaps if the turbulence hadn't be encountered the weakend O-Ring would have held a few more seconds to burnout and the shuttle would have made it.

The facts may be sad but think about it this way: If NASA lucked out and the Challenger accident did not happen, then NASA would have, from that day forward, believed that it was okay to completely ignore safety warnings, and an accident would have occurred eventually.
 
dmspilot00 said:
The facts may be sad but think about it this way: If NASA lucked out and the Challenger accident did not happen, then NASA would have, from that day forward, believed that it was okay to completely ignore safety warnings, and an accident would have occurred eventually.
Good point. Sometimes instead of stumbling around continuously, it takes a fall on the face to wake up and fly right.
 

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