Results of P-3 spin 7G pull out

[RogerMOSA]

Let's just say, if you find yourself with 1&2 down, and reeeaaaaal slow......DO NOT add power and drop the left wing. You'll probably roll over on your back. I'm just sayin'....

#1 was restarted on the way down. T

 

[zippy]

Well played Ninja. Well played.

Gotta give him credit. Been a FI.com member for over 2 years and his first post is a P-3 bashing post. Gotta admire that. I think I wasted my first post on General Lee.

My hat is off to you sir. I look forward to your second post.

His comment really hurt... as bad as the red stripe even. If you'll excuse me, I'm going to find some women of ill repute to wipe away the tears from my eyes with my per diem money.

 

[OrionFE]

years ago there was a Lockheed P-3 Test Pilot named John Christianson, who wrote a few articles on how to pull out of inverted flight and spins in a P-3. Evidently, this has happened to foreign operators over the years as well. From what I remember, all power to idle was the first step. VmcAir was always 145, with 5 in the cockpit, someone should be keeping an eye on the flight instruments! In addition, there is nothing that criticle that #2 needed to be immediately shutdown! I realized that after retiring from the navy and flying civilian. We were always locked and loaded to shut something down.

 

[SIG600]

Two huge things that stand out to me here without reading the JAGMAN or SIR:

1.) The Ops dept either completely lost the bubble as to crew currency and scheduling all these dudes together, or they were forced into a corner. I know manning, money, and airframes are a huge deal in the P-3 community now. It may have been unavoidable or put low on the risk assesment being a "canned" flight. Something to get them a few hours. Who knows.

2.) A gross lack of understanding by the crew of basic multi engine aerodynamics, and the factors that effect Vmc. The pilot at the controls should have been spring loaded to yank power on all engines as soon as the second engine on the port side hiccuped. The second time this should have happened was when the plane rolled off. That's nothing more than a Vmc demo right there. To push the operating engines to max???? WTF chuck. Then to have NO ONE reach up and pull the throttles back??? Again, basic multiengine aero right there.

 

[zippy]

Two huge things that stand out to me here without reading the JAGMAN or SIR:

1.) The Ops dept either completely lost the bubble as to crew currency and scheduling all these dudes together, or they were forced into a corner. I know manning, money, and airframes are a huge deal in the P-3 community now. It may have been unavoidable or put low on the risk assesment being a "canned" flight. Something to get them a few hours. Who knows.

2.) A gross lack of understanding by the crew of basic multi engine aerodynamics, and the factors that effect Vmc. The pilot at the controls should have been spring loaded to yank power on all engines as soon as the second engine on the port side hiccuped. The second time this should have happened was when the plane rolled off. That's nothing more than a Vmc demo right there. To push the operating engines to max???? WTF chuck. Then to have NO ONE reach up and pull the throttles back??? Again, basic multiengine aero right there.

If I remember correctly, the squadron in question currently has a double FO front office... Not sure what its Front office/OPS layout ways but it is not (or wasnt until this event brought the issue to light publicly) uncommon for pilot proficiency to be sacrificed as the squadron chases readiness requirements with their limited assets. This seems to happen a bit more when NFOs are driving things- they seem to tend to focus more on the bottom line number of events, hours, quals etc. Single anchor OPSOs and front office tend to push pilot trainers and bounce flights as a priority more often.


Regarding the second thing... I'm not going to comment on what was actually done anymore then what the media has been revealed, but you bring up another good point. OCF procedures are still not memory items in the P-3 NATOPS. Even after this event...

 

[SIG600]

Regarding the second thing... I'm not going to comment on what was actually done anymore then what the media has been revealed, but you bring up another good point. OCF procedures are still not memory items in the P-3 NATOPS. Even after this event...

It doesn't even have to be a memory item (but should be). That's just simple aero there, and should be an inherent will to save ones own ass. As far as OCF not being a memory item, do you plan to break the book out after departure? We will kick a guy out of the brief and cancel a hop if he can't spit out OCF word for word quickly and concisely.