pilotyip
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Subject: P-3 Mishap Report
P-3 Mishap Report: JAG Man says 2 of 3 pilots short on flight hours. Proper procedures not followed during engine failure. By Andrew Tilghman
Two of the three pilots on board the P-3 Orion that narrowly averted a fatal catastrophe last year when it plummeted nearly 6,000 in 25 seconds were not current with flight-time requirements, an internal Navy report shows. In addition, when the aircraft began to shake violently and an engine malfunctioned, the crew fell into "scope lock" and did not strictly follow the Navy's air training standards, according to the Judge Advocate General Manual investigation, obtained by Navy Times. However, those issues did not result in any disciplinary action stemming from the July 22 incident near Naval Air Station Whidbey Island, Wash., according to the report. The P-3 from Patrol Squadron 1 (VP-1) was conducting a training flight in which one of its four engines was shut down on purpose. But a second engine on the same port wing malfunctioned, rolling the aircraft violently and sending it spiraling to-ward the ground at 290 knots. The plane was pulling more than 5Gs before the aviators were able to restart the first engine to recover at less than 200 feet and land safely. The plane was essentially destroyed - the fuel tank was ripped open, several panels were bent or buckled, and dozens of rivets ripped out as the starboard wing skin peeled away, the report says. It will not be returned to the fleet. The incident came seven months after the Navy had already grounded 39 P-3s; almost one-quarter of the maritime patrol fleet at the time, because of fears that "structural fatigue" could cause wing sections to break off in flight. According to the report, two pilots and an off-duty pilot along with three flight engineers and an observer were on board. One of the pilots had 3.8 flight hours during the previous 30 days, far short of the 10 hours required by Patrol and Reconnaissance Group. A second pilot had 3.3 flight hours, the report says.
Problems that day began after the pilots conducted a simulated engine fire and shut down one of the port engines. The pilot at the controls and the flight engineer "discussed the simulated emergency" and "this discussion resulted in delaying" their procedures to restart the engine, the investigation found. That's when the flight crew noticed engine fluctuations in the second engine on the port wing and shut that engine down before trying to restart the first. The engineering investigation found no malfunction in the No. 2 engine or propeller, and it remains unclear what caused the second engine’s problem, the report says. The plane lost speed and soon fell into a spiraling nosedive. The pilots allowed the third and fourth engine on the plane's other side to remain at maximum power, despite Naval Air Training and Operating Procedures Standardization rules calling for them to cut power down to "flight idle" levels. The stall drove a counterclockwise rotation and the yaw produced by the two engines at maximum power.
According to the report's conclusions, "Non-compliance with NATOPS recommended Out of Control Flight procedures pro- longed the recovery to controlled flight." The pilots' "failure to meet the [wing training manual] proficiency minimums fostered an environment in such that instrument scans and [crew resource management] skills were not sufficient to prevent the series of events that led to the mishap," the report says. The flight instructor and patrol plane commander were sent be-fore a Field Naval Aviator Evaluation Board, the report says. A Navy spokesman declined to disclose the results of those boards. After the incident investigation, Patrol and Reconnaissance Wing 10 revised its rules so that pilots who are not current on proficiency requirements will not be assigned as a patrol plane commander with- out approval from a commanding officer, according to the investigation’s endorsements. The wing commander also recommended reviewing the flight proficiency guidelines to clarify minimum hours and establish re-medial actions when those are not met
P-3 Mishap Report: JAG Man says 2 of 3 pilots short on flight hours. Proper procedures not followed during engine failure. By Andrew Tilghman
Two of the three pilots on board the P-3 Orion that narrowly averted a fatal catastrophe last year when it plummeted nearly 6,000 in 25 seconds were not current with flight-time requirements, an internal Navy report shows. In addition, when the aircraft began to shake violently and an engine malfunctioned, the crew fell into "scope lock" and did not strictly follow the Navy's air training standards, according to the Judge Advocate General Manual investigation, obtained by Navy Times. However, those issues did not result in any disciplinary action stemming from the July 22 incident near Naval Air Station Whidbey Island, Wash., according to the report. The P-3 from Patrol Squadron 1 (VP-1) was conducting a training flight in which one of its four engines was shut down on purpose. But a second engine on the same port wing malfunctioned, rolling the aircraft violently and sending it spiraling to-ward the ground at 290 knots. The plane was pulling more than 5Gs before the aviators were able to restart the first engine to recover at less than 200 feet and land safely. The plane was essentially destroyed - the fuel tank was ripped open, several panels were bent or buckled, and dozens of rivets ripped out as the starboard wing skin peeled away, the report says. It will not be returned to the fleet. The incident came seven months after the Navy had already grounded 39 P-3s; almost one-quarter of the maritime patrol fleet at the time, because of fears that "structural fatigue" could cause wing sections to break off in flight. According to the report, two pilots and an off-duty pilot along with three flight engineers and an observer were on board. One of the pilots had 3.8 flight hours during the previous 30 days, far short of the 10 hours required by Patrol and Reconnaissance Group. A second pilot had 3.3 flight hours, the report says.
Problems that day began after the pilots conducted a simulated engine fire and shut down one of the port engines. The pilot at the controls and the flight engineer "discussed the simulated emergency" and "this discussion resulted in delaying" their procedures to restart the engine, the investigation found. That's when the flight crew noticed engine fluctuations in the second engine on the port wing and shut that engine down before trying to restart the first. The engineering investigation found no malfunction in the No. 2 engine or propeller, and it remains unclear what caused the second engine’s problem, the report says. The plane lost speed and soon fell into a spiraling nosedive. The pilots allowed the third and fourth engine on the plane's other side to remain at maximum power, despite Naval Air Training and Operating Procedures Standardization rules calling for them to cut power down to "flight idle" levels. The stall drove a counterclockwise rotation and the yaw produced by the two engines at maximum power.
According to the report's conclusions, "Non-compliance with NATOPS recommended Out of Control Flight procedures pro- longed the recovery to controlled flight." The pilots' "failure to meet the [wing training manual] proficiency minimums fostered an environment in such that instrument scans and [crew resource management] skills were not sufficient to prevent the series of events that led to the mishap," the report says. The flight instructor and patrol plane commander were sent be-fore a Field Naval Aviator Evaluation Board, the report says. A Navy spokesman declined to disclose the results of those boards. After the incident investigation, Patrol and Reconnaissance Wing 10 revised its rules so that pilots who are not current on proficiency requirements will not be assigned as a patrol plane commander with- out approval from a commanding officer, according to the investigation’s endorsements. The wing commander also recommended reviewing the flight proficiency guidelines to clarify minimum hours and establish re-medial actions when those are not met
