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Raytheon's new BE400 Safety Communique for Dual Engine Failure

beechjetpilot1

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Safety Communiqué No. 272
August, 2006
TO: ALL OWNERS AND OPERATORS, CHIEF PILOTS, DIRECTORS OF
OPERATIONS, CHIEF INSPECTORS, DIRECTORS OF MAINTENANCE, ALL
RAYTHEON AIRCRAFT AUTHORIZED SERVICE CENTERS, AND
INTERNATIONAL DISTRIBUTORS AND DEALERS.
MODELS: ALL RAYTHEON MITSUBISHI MODEL MU-300; BEECHJET MODEL 400,
400A (INCLUDING HAWKER 400XP); MODEL 400T (T-1A AND TX) AIRCRAFT
SUBJECT: DUAL ENGINE POWER LOSS
In April 2006, Raytheon Aircraft Company (RAC) issued Safety Communiqué 269 to inform operators of
an incident in which a Model 400A experienced complete loss of power from both engines during descent.
The Safety Communiqué also reminded operators of FAA Approved Airplane Flight Manual (AFM)
procedures pertaining to operation in possible icing conditions, proper use of fuel system icing inhibitors,
and preflight inspections.
RAC is issuing this Safety Communiqué to provide updated information related to that event and other
occurrences of dual engine power loss. This Safety Communiqué also announces revisions to the various
model-specific AFMs. Due to design similarities, this information is applicable to all listed models.
From April, 2000 to June, 2006 RAC has received four reports of airplanes which experienced dual engine
power loss, including the incident referred to in Safety Communiqué 269. Following are brief summaries
of those reports (The referenced National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) reports may be viewed on
the internet at
www.ntsb.gov/NTSB/query.asp):

No NTSB Report
- On April 23, 2000, a Model 400A, Serial Number RK-122, departed Curacao and was
two hours 15 minutes into flight in clear air at an altitude of 41,000 feet (FL410) when the crew noticed
complete loss of power from the right engine, followed by a complete loss of power from the left engine
two seconds later. The crew reported they had experienced some thunderstorm activity, but were above
the tops of the clouds at the time of the incident. The left engine was successfully restarted and the
airplane landed without further incident at Macapa, Amapa (Northern Brazil).

NTSB Report ENG04IA021
- On July 12, 2004, a Model 400A, Serial Number RK-365, departed Duncan,
OK and was en route to Fort Myers, FL. Approximately 100 miles west of Sarasota, FL while descending
from FL410 in Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC) the aircraft experienced a complete loss of
power from both engines. After several attempts, the right engine was restarted and the airplane landed
at Sarasota, FL without further incident.

NTSB Report DCA06IA007
- On November 28, 2005, a Model 400A, Serial Number RK-317, departed
Indianapolis, IN and was en route to Marco Island, FL. The flight cruised at FL350 for 45 minutes, then
requested an ascent to FL400 due to clouds. The flight was at FL400 for 30 minutes. The flight descended
to FL380 for five to 10 minutes and was in Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC) in and out of the tops
of clouds. Shortly after decreasing power and initiating a descent from FL380, the crew reported a complete loss of power from the right engine, followed by the left engine ten seconds later. The crew was
unsuccessful in their attempts to restart the engines and landed successfully without engine power at
Jacksonville, FL.

NTSB Report ENG06IA020
- On June 14, 2006, a Model 400A, Serial Number RK-8 departed Quonset
Point, RI and was en route to Charleston, SC. The flight crew reported being about 70 miles south of
Norfolk, VA in VMC at FL380 with a solid cloud deck at FL350. The clouds were known to be the remnants
of tropical storm Alberto. After being directed to make a turn by ATC, the flight crew activated the engine
igniters and reduced engine power in preparation for activating engine anti-ice. After reducing engine
power but before activating engine anti-ice, the crew reported simultaneous and complete loss of engine
power. The crew was successful in restarting both engines and landed without further incident at Norfolk,
VA.

The last three incidents are still under investigation by the NTSB and no probable cause has been
determined at this time. However, it has been noted that certain circumstances are common to all of the
events:


The airplane was being operated near visible moisture and/or near convective activity.


The airplane was being operated at or above FL380.


Engine anti-ice was not in use at the time of power loss.


Except for the right engine from RK-317, which was removed as part of the investigation, all of the
involved engines remained in situ on the airplane and were returned to service. Subsequently,
there has been no reported loss of power associated with any of those engines.
FAA, RAC, and Pratt & Whitney Canada (P&WC) are cooperatively assisting the NTSB in its investigation
of these incidents. As a result of this information sharing, RAC has elected to revise the respective AFM
procedures in order to clarify them and to incorporate industry practice with regard to operation in or near
icing conditions.
With reference to the current Model 400A AFM, there are two CAUTION statements in Section 4,

NORMAL PROCEDURES.
The first CAUTION located under ANTI/DEICE SYSTEMS (IN FLIGHT
OPERATIONS) reads as follows:

CAUTION
Do not operate anti/deice systems at Ram Air Temperatures greater than 10°C unless in actual
icing conditions, as indicated by illumination of the ICING annunciator (If installed) or airframe ice
accumulation. Ice protection systems should be on prior to encountering actual icing. Turn
systems off when clear of icing conditions.
The second
CAUTION, located under DESCENT, states the following:

CAUTION
If icing conditions are anticipated during descent and approach, turn ice protection systems ON as
early as possible prior to penetrating clouds. Maintain wing/deice operation light ON
(approximately 70% N
2) during descent to assure proper wing anti-ice operation.

Safety Communiqué No. 272 3 of 3
The export of these commodities, technology or software are subject to the US Export Administration Regulations. Diversion contrary to U.S. law is prohibited. For guidance on
export control requirements, contact the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Export Administration at 202-482-4811 or at
www.bxa.doc.gov.

While observance of these
CAUTIONS remains paramount, RAC intends to expand the definition of

engine icing conditions
to include:


Illumination of the icing annunciator (If installed)


Airframe ice accumulation.


At all altitudes and Ram Air Temperatures (RAT) of 10°C or less in visible moisture (Any
obstruction to visibility should be considered visible moisture unless it can be determined to be
smoke, dust or ash).


Above 20,000 feet MSL, and RAT of 10°C or less and any of the following conditions:

o
Within approximately 5,000 feet above visible moisture associated with convective
activity

o
Within approximately 10 nm horizontally of visible moisture associated with convective
activity

o
In visible moisture

o
At any time that the conditions listed above cannot be verified
As was noted in Safety Communiqué No. 269, no lower temperature limit exists for the operation of antiice
systems. Operators should be aware that air moving through the engine experiences a significant
temperature increase as it passes through the compressor section. This increase could bring the air
temperature to a range where internal engine ice formation might occur if Engine Anti-Ice were not
operating. Operators should not assume ice formation to be impossible at very low ambient temperatures
(i.e., -30 degrees C or colder).
In addition, Safety Communiqué No. 269 states that activation of engine anti-ice is not recommended
above 90% N1 to prevent transient exceedance of engine ITT limits. This procedure has been reviewed by
RAC and P&WC and it has been determined that reduction of power below 90% N1 is not required. .Engine
gauges should be monitored and thrust levers adjusted (if required) to maintain engine ITT limits following
activation of engine anti-ice.
RAC will be releasing a Temporary Change (TC) to all applicable Model AFMs, with subsequent AFM
revision, to incorporate this information. Additionally, RAC intends to request an Airworthiness Directive
from the FAA to introduce and distribute this change both domestically and internationally.
As noted previously, the NTSB is still investigating these incidents. RAC continues to assist the NTSB in
this investigation and will provide additional information as required.
For additional information on operating in or near icing conditions, refer to the applicable Pilot’s Operating
Manual (POM), Section V, General Information on Specific Topics, Flight Operations, Flight in Icing
Conditions.
 

mynameisjim

Don't try this at home
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So loss of thrust in both engines at the same time for an unknown reason, but all returned to service.

Crazy.
 

400A

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mynameisjim said:
So loss of thrust in both engines at the same time for an unknown reason, but all returned to service.

Crazy.

Read it again, I thought the cause was plain to see.
 

honeycomb

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400A said:
Read it again, I thought the cause was plain to see.


Sure...I see it now....how could have I been soooo stupid....yep...as plain as day after I read it again.....;)
 

GoingHot

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beechjetpilot1 said:
NTSB Report DCA06IA007
- On November 28, 2005, a Model 400A, Serial Number RK-317, departed
Indianapolis, IN and was en route to Marco Island, FL. The flight cruised at FL350 for 45 minutes, then
requested an ascent to FL400 due to clouds. The flight was at FL400 for 30 minutes. The flight descended
to FL380 for five to 10 minutes and was in Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC) in and out of the tops
of clouds. Shortly after decreasing power and initiating a descent from FL380, the crew reported a complete loss of power from the right engine, followed by the left engine ten seconds later. The crew was
unsuccessful in their attempts to restart the engines and landed successfully without engine power at
Jacksonville, FL.

Good job by all of these crews, but extra points to this one.
 

PHX767

it's a dry heat
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GoingHot said:
Good job by all of these crews, but extra points to this one.

Even more cool points to the crew:

- The crew was an IP with a new pilot on his first tour
- The standby a/s indicator went to zero in the initial part of the descent

If you knew the IP, just visualize him calmly barking out directions to the other guy with flecks of chewing tobacco flying. A great guy to have in that situation.

:D
 

infiniti757

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NTSB Letter To The FAA

Heres a link to an NTSB letter on this whole situation it makes the theory of what they've come up with pretty clear, It's interesting reading. I wonder how the phenomena affects other types of aircraft.

http://www.ntsb.gov/Recs/letters/2006/A06_56_59.pdf
 

pamed19

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Help me out.What was the cause of the flameouts? I could not figure it out.
 

Ultra Grump

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They're theorizing that ice crystals melted during compression in the fan section, then re-froze on the stator vanes, blocking airflow to the engine.
 

pamed19

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Is that a reasonable assumption ?Do you think the procedures as outlined will stop the flameouts? I do not know if I should fly in one.
 

Ultra Grump

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It sounds plausible, but I don't know why it would happen only in Beechjets and not other aircraft that use the same/similar engines, or why it would suddenly be epidemic in just the last few years. That's what's odd.
 

400A

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pamed19 said:
Is that a reasonable assumption ?Do you think the procedures as outlined will stop the flameouts? I do not know if I should fly in one.

I think it is a very reasonable explanation. Ice could have also formed on the probes that talk to the electronic fuel controlers, which would not have reacted properly.

From what I was told, the new icing procedure is the same as on the citations. Someone correct me if I am wrong. That would have explained why the citations with the same engines have not had the problem.

I am still very comfortable in the airplane. I would not be affraid to fly it. (still do)
 

pamed19

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Both your posts and 400A's have been helpful to me in the first thread and I thank you both for same. What I get out of the NTSB letter is,as you say, an explanation,but it does not tell me the cause.Hopefully that will be discovered soon.I do not think I can ride in the 400A worrying that the pilot is going to turn all the right knobs at the right time.I should give you all more credit,I guess.Thanks again for taking the time to post!
 

Choppy

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pamed19 said:
Both your posts and 400A's have been helpful to me in the first thread and I thank you both for same. What I get out of the NTSB letter is,as you say, an explanation,but it does not tell me the cause.Hopefully that will be discovered soon.I do not think I can ride in the 400A worrying that the pilot is going to turn all the right knobs at the right time.I should give you all more credit,I guess.Thanks again for taking the time to post!

You are exactly correct in stating that the NTSB gave you an explanation but failed to give you the cause. The reason is nobody knows the cause!! That is the whole problem with the 400A, everbody's answer is an educated guess. If they really knew what the problem was there would not be a Safety Commun. there would be a change to the AFM for the checklist. They simply don't know exactly they just have thoughts!
 

400A

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pamed19 said:
Both your posts and 400A's have been helpful to me in the first thread and I thank you both for same. What I get out of the NTSB letter is,as you say, an explanation,but it does not tell me the cause.Hopefully that will be discovered soon.I do not think I can ride in the 400A worrying that the pilot is going to turn all the right knobs at the right time.I should give you all more credit,I guess.Thanks again for taking the time to post!

Every aircraft requires the pilot to turn on all the right knobs and switches or really bad stuff can happen. If you are going to rule out any aircraft that has had something strange hapen to it, you better not fly.

For example. they are not sure what made the Citation go down in Colorado, just before landing.

Challengers do not tolerate ANY wing contamination on take-off.

Get a 20 or 30 series Lear slow and you are in big trouble.

Lear 45's had a pitch trim problem.

A few CJ's have had some flame outs.

Have read many reports of Westwinds with complete electrical failures.

MU2,,, dont even go there.

Brazillia, no thank-you.

Just more food for thought, not flame-bait.

The last time Flight Safety discussed it, The only fatal Beechjet / Diamond accidents were CFIT.

The Aircraft is built like a Tank and I always feel very safe in it. I would much rather fly it than a small bodied Citation. I have flown both and liked both, the Beechjet is just more solid to me. I have been in it for almost 7 years and it has never scared me.
 

400A

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Choppy said:
You are exactly correct in stating that the NTSB gave you an explanation but failed to give you the cause. The reason is nobody knows the cause!! That is the whole problem with the 400A, everbody's answer is an educated guess. If they really knew what the problem was there would not be a Safety Commun. there would be a change to the AFM for the checklist. They simply don't know exactly they just have thoughts!

They safety communique said there is 2 AFM Changes.
 

SabreFlyR

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400A said:
The Aircraft is built like a Tank and I always feel very safe in it. I would much rather fly it than a small bodied Citation. I have flown both and liked both, the Beechjet is just more solid to me. I have been in it for almost 7 years and it has never scared me.[/quote]


I agree with 400A, if you ever get the chance to see the manufacturing process of the Beechjet do so. This airframe is right up there with the Hawker when it comes to strength.
As far being worried about flameouts, I am concerned but by no means afraid of the plane. In fact we just sold our straight 400 and have a late model 400A going to prepurchase.
I do not like having to run the engine heat at altitude for long periods though,at least with the ignition on also. I predict that we will start changing ignitors and ignition boxes more frequently now.
 
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