I like the analogy, but just to get into the 'discussion', let's continue with this analogy: Let's say that it becomes common place to get lazy around the $hit pond because you know that you can 'grab a rake', even though the rake is not intended for that purpose, and eventually, the rake handle will become unusable as a rake.............I think the larger picture I get is that intentional/unintentional violations occur, and we get lazy because of the false sense of security derived from an ASRS report.
Nosehair, first, thank you for showing that a metaphor *can* be understood, and responding in kind. I know that it wasn't much of a stretch, but obviously it was well beyond the Russian's grasp.
You know someone who has consciously become lazy about following the regs merely because the ASRS offers immunity from sanction? If so, I bet that they are in the overwhelming minority. Make no mistake, a violation and a settling pond are still ugly, nasty experiences. Even if the rake keeps you from drowning, you still have $hit in your clothes and in every orfice. The rake only kept you from drowning, you may still contract Hepatitis-C. Likewise, even if an ASRS report ultimately stops the sanction from being applied, you still go through the whole investigation/enforcement/appeal process, which I'm told isn't terribly pleasant. Remember, the ASRS only prevents the sanction from being applied. It doesn't stop the enforcement process, you are still violated and you still have that violation on your record. It only keeps you from getting the suspension.
I think if they study human behavior, such as belly-button lint-picking while on take-off and can see a trend, and make procedural changes based on this information, maybe there is some good to come of it, but my feeling is that is not what happens.
Perhaps not, but we don't know. Lets say there's a SID which goes very close to restricted airspace, and because of a local LOA (Letter of Agreement) the approach facility typically gives a frequency change to center just at the point that the pilot should be turning onto a new course that takes him away from the Restricted airspace. And let's say that particular area has bad VHF radio reception, because of a small hill in line with approach's transmitter antenna. So a plane is nearing that critical point, approach gives them the new frequency, which is garbled, the crew is distracted by asking each other what frequency they were given, then they query approach on the frequency, dial it in, contact center and by that time they have sailed past the turn into the restricted airspace. Now, all the crew knows is that they punched into restricted airspace because they didn't turn when the SID said turn. According to the Russians inane little book report, they shouldn't file an ASRS, because they were supposed to turn on the next leg of the SID, and they didn't. "Inadvertent operational error", not worthy of a *PROPER* ASRS report. They should just take the fall, according to the Russian. Yet what they do not see is that there's a systemic flaw which conspired against them, and contributed to their "inadvertent operational error". Yet, if they don't file an ASRS report about their "inadvertent operational error" we miss the chance to investigate what's going on. Probably a single ASRS won't get the problem much attention. However, if NASA receives 10 ASRS reports a month, with this identical scenario at the same location, then presumably, it will be noticed and investigated. The thing is, you do not know, as an individual pilot which "inadvertent operational errors" are abetted by systemic flaws, and which are merely "lint picking" furthermore, you do not know what level of interest NASA has in lint picking. It may be that in the larger picture, busting altitudes due to lint picking is a greater threat to safety, than pilots busting a remote corner of restricted airspace at some low-volume airport, and NASA may actually have a program which is studying lint picking and altitude busts, and that by adding your lint picking incident to the database, you add weight to a body of statistics which grows large enough to drive research into the way altitudes are assigned, and received in the ATC arena. and that research yields a different method (technological, procedural, who knows) of assigning altitudes which completely eliminates the occurrence of lint picking altitude busts. Yet, if we adopt the outlook of the Russian's book report, we just punish the lint picking pilots and we completely miss the opportunity to adjust the system so that the *system* as a whole is more reliable, and we go on having lint picking altitude busts, because pilots, being human, will pick lint.
The fact is, that humans are fallible, and that almost any aviation mishap can be blamed on human failings, if you stretch hard enough. ( I think Avbug wrote an entertaining narrative on the subject involving a separated wing on a thread not long ago). Fortunately, there has been an attempt to shift focus away from just blaming the individual who screwed up, to examining the system as a whole and how it might be changed so that catastrophe doesn't occur when humans, inevitably, screw up. If the way to perfect aviation safety was jut to mete out more and more drastic punishment to individuals who make mistakes, it would be a step backward to offer immunity to humans who make mistakes. Fortunately, not everyone is as simple minded as the Russian, and NASA (and amazingly, the FAA) has recognized that it is worthwhile to study the system, instead of punishing individuals. The ASRS program is one result of that. The Russian would reverse that progress in thinking, and take a big step backward to the "punish the individual" dark ages.
The bottom line is that pilots flocking to the system to avoid sanctions is and was a very obvious and foreseeable consequence of the program. Now, a low as your opinion is of bureaucrats may be, it is impossible to imagine that even the dullest bureaucrat could have failed to see this happening. Of course they did, and doubtless it was a matter that was discussed at length in the planning stages of the ASRS. Yet, despite this obvious result, they went ahead with the program. Obviously, they felt that it was worth it, in spite of pilots or other aviation participants using it for the immunity benefits. So they accepted the inevitable result, consciously.