Part 1 of 2
2008 PlaneBusiness Ron Allen Award: Mesa Air Group Board of Directors
As longtime subscribers to PlaneBusiness Banter are aware, every year we give an award to the airline CEO or, in two previous cases, a related group of individuals, who we feel have caused the greatest harm to their respective airlines during the previous year.
As I have for the last several years, I opened up the floor for nominations from the PlaneBusiness Banter subscriber base.
While Jonathan Ornstein, CEO of Mesa Air Group received the lionshare of votes, I will also say that both subscribers and I also agreed on a strong second-place contender. That second place nominee was David Neeleman, former CEO and current Chairman of JetBlue.
As one reader wrote, "Thank god that the JetBlue board did what it did, when it did. If it had not, I'm not sure the airline would still be flying."
Another reader added, "I figure he's a slam dunk winner. Let's face it, he's the only CEO that I can think of who got fired by his board last year. Too bad it was a couple years too late."
And so it went.
But comments like these made me consider another possibility. Just as was the case several years ago when I presented this award to the United Airlines board of directors, perhaps I needed to rethink just who was more worthy of the award this year -- was it the CEO, or was it a compliant board that apparently refuses to do what it needs to do in the face of increasingly negative financial and operational evidence of mismanagement?
Interestingly, in looking at our two top vote-getters this year -- David Neeleman and Jonathan Ornstein -- an overriding similarity is apparent. It's called "ego." Or perhaps more accurately, an excess of ego.
In both cases, I would argue, only an airline's board of directors is capable of righting this type of ship -- as neither David nor Jonathan was, or is, likely to step down of their own accord. Why? Because, in their mind, they hadn't, or haven't done anything wrong.
When I awarded the PlaneBusiness Ron Allen Award for Airline (Mis)Management to Independence Air CEO Kerry Skeen, the backdrop was strikingly similar. Rather than accept lower payments to fly for United Airlines, Kerry and Company decided they would "go it alone" and, well, off they went. Right off the history pages of the airline industry.
I think it could be argued that had the JetBlue board of directors not removed David Neeleman from his position last spring, JetBlue might well have met a similar fate.
But the board of directors at JetBlue did what a board of directors is supposed to do. I know, what a strange and unusual concept that is. It replaced its CEO, because it believed that he was no longer the right person to lead the airline.
Bravo to them.
Which brings us to this year's award winner (s).
This year the 2008 PlaneBusiness Ron Allen Airline (Mis) Management Award goes not to Jonathan Ornstein, but to the Mesa Air Group board of directors.
As the following charts show, Mesa Air Group, during 2007, significantly lagged its two regional peers, Republic Holdings and SkyWest in metric after metric after metric.
I might add that the results from 2007, in the case of Mesa, reflect a downward trend which began in 2006. In other words, no, this isn't just about the "Hawaiian" problem.
Why did we choose just Republic and SkyWest for our comparison?
Because, as of now, they are the two regional airline operations that are most similar to Mesa's. ExpressJet is essentially a one-airline contract carrier which now also has a small branded entity; Pinnacle, primarily a one-airline contract in-house carrier. Comair? An in-house entity owned by it's mothership. And so it goes.
Let's take a look at how Mesa Air Group performed across several metrics in 2007, compared to its two major regional competitors.
First, there is the stock price. As you can see, Mesa posted the poorest performance of the three -- by a longshot, as the stock was down more than 60% for the year.
Second, let's look at market value, year over year.
As you can see, the market values of SkyWest and Republic changed little during the year, while Mesa lost 70% of its market value.
We did a debt-ratio analysis of Mesa Air Group, comparing it to other major airlines back in November. Well, here is how the airline's debt/value ratio stacks up against its two major regional airline competitors. Mesa posts the highest debt ratio of the three.
In the regional airline industry, it's all about revenue growth. No growth, no stock appreciation. Shareholders are not going to be happy.
As you can see by this chart, Republic Holdings was where the growth was last year, as total sales increased 13% for the year. SkyWest saw revenues up more than 8%. Mesa? Only 3%.
Then there is operating income. Many analysts use this as the true measure of a company's financial health. It is also called operating profit or EBIT, earnings before interest and taxes.
It is with this metric that I think Mesa really shows its colors. And they are not bright and cheery ones. A decline of this size in operating income is a red flag for any company, much less an airline.
Finally, we have one last metric, return on invested capital. This is a calculation used to assess a company's potential as a quality investment. It indicates how well a company's management is able to allocate capital into its operations. Comparing a company's ROIC with its cost of capital (WACC) suggests how effectively invested capital is being used.
It is defined as net operating profit less adjusted taxes divided by invested capital and is usually expressed as a percentage, as you see below.
As you can see, Mesa once again dramatically lags its two major regional peers, as it actually posted a negative return on invested capital for the year.
Then there is the significant drop in the level of the airline's cash and short-term investments. Before Mesa Air Group began its folly in Hawaii, aka go!, the airline was sitting on more than $300 million in cash and short-term investments.
As of the end of 2007, the airline was down to $188 million in cash, marketable securities and debt investments. This amount included $97 million of restricted cash, $90 million of which covered an appeal bond posted in the Hawaiian Airlines case.
Now, my question to readers today is this -- given all of this financial performance information, why would a company's board of directors refuse to make a change in control at the top of the company? And hey, we haven't even talked about the specifics driving these numbers, such as: the millions of dollars lost on go!; operational problems with the airline's regional partners due to lack of crews; massive numbers of pilot departures; an embarrassing public trial in which the airline's CFO was found to have destroyed evidence while supposedly ridding his computer of a virus he claimed to have picked up when looking at internet porn, while its CEO looked ridiculous claiming under oath that "forestall" meant to "encourage"; and finally, the airline was found to have misused confidential information concerning a competitor, and was ordered to pay more than $80 million in damages and legal fees. No, we aren't talking about any of these items.
No, we're simply talking about hard and cold financial facts.
I suppose they may have their reasons, but prudent financial management and shareholder responsibility does not appear to be among them.
As for Mesa Air Group's CEO Jonathan Ornstein, he has already racked up a dubious award for the year, having snared the runner-up position in Herb Greenberg's "Worst CEO of the Year" competition at MarketWatch.
In addition, while Mr. Ornstein seems to be inordinately preoccupied with the airline's relatively tiny presence in Hawaii, he is also in charge of a much larger regional airline on the mainland that is not running very efficiently. And as US Airways COO Robert Isom said last week, there is nothing more expensive than running an inefficient airline.