328dude
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The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is probing what role dropping steps from the elevator rigging and cable tension process during maintenance played in the fatal crash two days later of an Air Midwest Beech 1900D in January.
Two mechanics and an inspector worked on the plane Jan. 6 at Raytheon Aerospace's Huntington, W. Va., maintenance site. One mechanic told NTSB he skipped several steps of the complete rigging process in the Beechcraft Maintenance Manual while adjusting tension in the elevator cables.
Mechanics adjusted turnbuckles to increase cable tension during the maintenance but opted not to re-rig the elevator. FDR data show the elevator position of the aircraft was in an "excessively down" position for flights after maintenance, not a normal neutral position, NTSB said. The board found a change in the 1900D's control column during maintenance, resulting in the aircraft losing two-thirds of its down elevator capability.
An NTSB staff member pointed out yesterday during a hearing that signatures on the inspection checklist show all the steps were complete.
Early on, NTSB highlighted a 1.8-inch difference in the length between turnbuckles on the up and down elevator cables recovered from the crash (DAILY, Jan. 29). The turnbuckle on the down elevator cable was almost fully extended, while the turnbuckle on the up cable was near a fully retracted position.
Air Midwest VP and Director of Maintenance Joe Machalek noted during the NTSB hearing that even though the first item on the checklist didn't apply to the Beech 1900D, "you still address the steps. You follow the manual."
At the time of maintenance the quality assurance (QA) inspector was teaching two mechanics in on-the-job training to sign off on their records as completing the task. He was also working on the aircraft's number one engine. Huntington's Air Midwest Regional site Manager John Oxley noted that was "not an unusual circumstance."
Air Midwest claims the Beech 1900D maintenance manual lacked clear instructions that would have prevented the mis-rigging of the elevator. In a letter to NTSB, Machalek recommended a mandatory revision of the manual's procedures. Air Midwest also audited the Huntington maintenance center in November 2002 and found inefficient staffing at each shift, and no system existed to alert mechanics to maintenance manual revisions.
Raytheon told Air Midwest on Jan. 3 it had increased staff by 20% and started a "Read and Sign" file for manual revisions.
Two mechanics and an inspector worked on the plane Jan. 6 at Raytheon Aerospace's Huntington, W. Va., maintenance site. One mechanic told NTSB he skipped several steps of the complete rigging process in the Beechcraft Maintenance Manual while adjusting tension in the elevator cables.
Mechanics adjusted turnbuckles to increase cable tension during the maintenance but opted not to re-rig the elevator. FDR data show the elevator position of the aircraft was in an "excessively down" position for flights after maintenance, not a normal neutral position, NTSB said. The board found a change in the 1900D's control column during maintenance, resulting in the aircraft losing two-thirds of its down elevator capability.
An NTSB staff member pointed out yesterday during a hearing that signatures on the inspection checklist show all the steps were complete.
Early on, NTSB highlighted a 1.8-inch difference in the length between turnbuckles on the up and down elevator cables recovered from the crash (DAILY, Jan. 29). The turnbuckle on the down elevator cable was almost fully extended, while the turnbuckle on the up cable was near a fully retracted position.
Air Midwest VP and Director of Maintenance Joe Machalek noted during the NTSB hearing that even though the first item on the checklist didn't apply to the Beech 1900D, "you still address the steps. You follow the manual."
At the time of maintenance the quality assurance (QA) inspector was teaching two mechanics in on-the-job training to sign off on their records as completing the task. He was also working on the aircraft's number one engine. Huntington's Air Midwest Regional site Manager John Oxley noted that was "not an unusual circumstance."
Air Midwest claims the Beech 1900D maintenance manual lacked clear instructions that would have prevented the mis-rigging of the elevator. In a letter to NTSB, Machalek recommended a mandatory revision of the manual's procedures. Air Midwest also audited the Huntington maintenance center in November 2002 and found inefficient staffing at each shift, and no system existed to alert mechanics to maintenance manual revisions.
Raytheon told Air Midwest on Jan. 3 it had increased staff by 20% and started a "Read and Sign" file for manual revisions.
