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NTSB live webcast of 3407 sunshine hearing

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Findings will be no surprise, probable cause will be no surprise and safety recommendations will be no surprise.....

And the FAA monkeys will still be the FAA monkeys....

Nothing to see here....

Move along....
 
Findings will be no surprise, probable cause will be no surprise and safety recommendations will be no surprise.....

And the FAA monkeys will still be the FAA monkeys....

Nothing to see here....

Move along....

I'm interested more in the contributing factors.
 
I'm interested more in the contributing factors.

oh, the incompetence on the part of the flight crew?

Yes, I agree, I'll be interested in the NTSB's take on that.....

"....contributing to the cause the captains utter lack of competence and the company's decision to keep him employed...."
 
oh, the incompetence on the part of the flight crew?

Yes, I agree, I'll be interested in the NTSB's take on that.....

"....contributing to the cause the captains utter lack of competence and the company's decision to keep him employed...."

What I mean is that we all know the probable cause, loss of control. What the NTSB says what contributed to it is more interesting to me and more important as well. Things like fatigue, training, etc.
 
I find it VERY interesting that a switch, directly related to the adjustment of a Vref speed, is only addressed once, and in the after-start checks???

Is there a specific reason it's not on the in-range, checks, or on a checklist where the 'bugs' are being set for landing?

Is this consistent with BAS?

Any other Q400 operators on here that can discuss that?
 
I find it VERY interesting that a switch, directly related to the adjustment of a Vref speed, is only addressed once, and in the after-start checks???

Is there a specific reason it's not on the in-range, checks, or on a checklist where the 'bugs' are being set for landing?

Is this consistent with BAS?

Any other Q400 operators on here that can discuss that?

it is now included in the approach checklist. the approach checklist is performed after runway and approach assignment as well as after input of approach speeds.

prior to the accident is is a little unclear and not present on any checklist what procedure to use in regards to the position of this switch.

most of the discussion on this hearing is referring to prior to the accident.
 
it is now included in the approach checklist. the approach checklist is performed after runway and approach assignment as well as after input of approach speeds.

prior to the accident is is a little unclear and not present on any checklist what procedure to use in regards to the position of this switch.

most of the discussion on this hearing is referring to prior to the accident.

Yeah, I know it's changed now...but BEFORE, I'm wondering if Colgan's procedure was the same as other Q400 operators, and what the BAS procedure is/was.
 
Wow...this hearing sure paints Colgan training in a pretty bad light. Rightly so it would seem.

Unfathomable that the training would not include training on the use of the ref speed switch and relationship to bugged approach speeds.

It certainly begs the question of where was the FAA oversight of such a questionable training program.
 

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