Not again! Heavy Jet takes off on ANC taxiway.

[A Squared]

Sure, they'll still make mistakes. But I'd never dismiss high tech. With large moving map displays for terrain, terrain warnings, and the airport diagrams; perhaps we'll see fewer flights into terrain, and less takeoffs on the taxiways.

Fewer flights into terrain?, sure ... fewer taxiway takeoffs? I doubt it. In the case of terrain avoidance, the newer technology gives you tools that allow you to do something you can't do without it. In the case of taxiway takeoffs, you alreay have the tools in the form of paper runway diagrams, compasses/heading indicators, and runway/taxiway edge lights. If the pilots involved didin't check the color of the edge lights to make sure they were white instead of blue, or check that the heading indicator matches the runway heading (in the case of the China Airlines airbus) what makes you think they'd look at a gee whiz moving map display to check if thye were on the corect runway? It wasn't a case of the pilots being unsure, and not having any means of checking, it was a case of the pilots being sure (but wrong) and not cross checking with the simple, low tech, foolproof tools *already* at thier disposal.

Remember how your instrument instructor told you to always check your compass and DG against the runway heading before adding power? (or maybe he didn't) that's one of the reasons, so you don't take off on a taxiway that is 80 degrees off from your runway.

 

[Say Again Over]

Mtrv is correct

I agree 100%, look what had to happen at the S. Teneriffe airport before the ATC got ground radar to keep track of aircraft taxiing. I think we will find that the visibility may have played a big part, I would wait to start pointing fingers.

 

[A Squared]

I agree 100%, look what had to happen at the S. Teneriffe airport before the ATC got ground radar to keep track of aircraft taxiing. I think we will find that the visibility may have played a big part, I would wait to start pointing fingers.

The accident at Tenerife happened because the KLM captain started his takoff roll without takeoff clearence. THe Pan-AM 747 crew knew they were still on the runway, the tower controller knew Pan-Am was on the runway, tower never issued a takeoff clearence. Ok, so given that KLM was rolling without clearence, and given tht ATC knew the runway wasn't clear, how would radar have helped this? Granted, the controller *might* have noticed the KLM 747 starting the takeoff roll in time to call an abort, but he might not have. Given the manner in which Van Zant, the KLM captain was behaving, I doubt it would have registered on his conciousnous if the Tower was telling him to stop. He was already ignoring his flight engineer who was telling him that they were not cleared to takeoff and that Pan Am might still be on the runway...and assuming that the controller would tell him to stop assumes that the controller noticed he was moving in time to get his attention. That's a big assumption, the controller, if he had radar wouldn't have any reason to be checking the radar that the runway wasn't clear, because he *knew* the runway wasn't clear, and he hadn't cleared KLM to takeoff.

As an aside, the tower controllers at Anchorage saw the China Airlines Airbus begine hte takeoff roll on Kilo, commented on it, but didn't do anything to stop them.

 

[Chronic Jetlag]

just the facts

Fewer flights into terrain?, sure ... fewer taxiway takeoffs? I doubt it. In the case of terrain avoidance, the newer technology gives you tools that allow you to do something you can't do without it. In the case of taxiway takeoffs, you alreay have the tools in the form of paper runway diagrams, compasses/heading indicators, and runway/taxiway edge lights. If the pilots involved didin't check the color of the edge lights to make sure they were white instead of blue, or check that the heading indicator matches the runway heading (in the case of the China Airlines airbus) what makes you think they'd look at a gee whiz moving map display to check if thye were on the corect runway? It wasn't a case of the pilots being unsure, and not having any means of checking, it was a case of the pilots being sure (but wrong) and not cross checking with the simple, low tech, foolproof tools *already* at thier disposal.

Remember how your instrument instructor told you to always check your compass and DG against the runway heading before adding power? (or maybe he didn't) that's one of the reasons, so you don't take off on a taxiway that is 80 degrees off from your runway.

Checking your compass and DG in this case would not have made a difference. They allegedly took off on taxiway Y which parallels runway 32 with the same magnetic alignment. Also checking your "gee whiz" moving map display don't always tell the whole story because some MD-11s have only three IRUs and no GPS installed which will be prone to mapshifts. Taxiway Y has recently been widened and it also extends into runway 6L. The crews faced multiple last minute runway changes, which meant they had to recalculate TO performance while taxiing. The incident is still under investigation; we DON'T know all the facts, ground trace radar is under review. Let's not jump into any conclusions and convict our fellow pilots. It could have happened to any one of us.

 

[Say Again Over]

Squared,

I think you need to check into the accident you spoke about, they have proof now there was a communication SNAFU along with the fact that ATC allowed two aircraft on an active runway bomb: ) at the same time, remember dead pilots have bad lawyers.

 

[A Squared]

Checking your compass and DG in this case would not have made a difference. They allegedly took off on taxiway Y which parallels runway 32 with the same magnetic alignment.

Right. That's why I included the parentetical reference to the China Airlines. That plane *did* take off on a taxiway which had a direction substantially different that the runway for which tey were cleared. Perhaps you missed that.

Taxiway Y has recently been widened and it also extends into runway 6L.

Uhh well actully, it wasn't recently widened, it was recently built. 3 years ago, it didn't exist, except as a 1000 ft segment between Lima and 6L. That would be one way to keep pilots from taking off on taxiways, make thne all 1000 ft or less.

The crews faced multiple last minute runway changes, which meant they had to recalculate TO performance while taxiing. The incident is still under investigation; we DON'T know all the facts, ground trace radar is under review. Let's not jump into any conclusions and convict our fellow pilots. It could have happened to any one of us.

I'm not trying io hang the crew at all. WHat I'm saying is that those who think gee-whiz techonological gadgets are the soulution to all the worlds ills may not have discovered the Holy Grail they think thay have. My comments about the crews actions, or omissions were not to accuse the crew, but to show that they (likely) didn't use the tools they had, so giving them more (and higher tech) tools is not the answer.

 

[A Squared]

I think you need to check into the accident you spoke about,

Uhh, no, I don't think I do. I have checked into it, in great depth and nauseating detail.

they have proof now there was a communication SNAFU

Yes, there *was* a communications SNAFU, the tower controller, read KLM some departure instructions and Van Zant interpreted them as a takeoff clearence, which it was not. That's the SNAFU, Van Zant *thought* he had been cleared to takeoff, when in fact he had not, even though his FE was questioning whether it was actually a takeoff clearence (it was not).

along with the fact that ATC allowed two aircraft on an active runway

Uhhh, happens every day. Have you ever been cleared to taxi into position and hold, then have ATC taxi a plane across the runway downfield? I have, it's a common occurence. Pan Am had been cleared to back taxi on the runway, because the taxiways were all blocked by other planes. There was no way to get to the takeoff position without taxiing on the runway for part of the way. KLM had been cleared into position to hold.

 

[Say Again Over]

May I ask what experience you may have in LVP ops? It is not a normal procedure to have two aircraft on the same runway at the same time, maybe years ago but not now, and for a very good reason.

 

[A Squared]

I think you need to check into the accident you spoke about,

Like I said, in my previous post, I have checked the accident pretty thouroughly, but it appears that you are a little confused on what transpired in Tenerife.

Here's some of the CVR recording and transmissions, the bold, italicized comments are mine. :

APP=Tenerife Tower.

RDO = Pan-Am radio transmission.

[SIZE=-1]1705:53.4 APP KLM eight seven * zero five uh you are cleared to the Papa Beacon climb to and maintain flight level nine zero right turn after take-off proceed with heading zero four zero until intercepting the three two five radial from Las Palmas VOR. (1706:08.2)

1706:09.6 KLM Ah roger, sir, we're cleared to the Papa Beacon flight level nine zero, right turn out zero four zero until intercepting the three two five and we're now (at take-off). (1706:17.9)

ca. 1706:13 KLM-1 We gaan. (We're going)

1706:18.19 APP OK.

1706:19.3 RDO No .. eh.

1706:20.08 APP Stand by for take-off, I will call you. (at this point the KLM 747 was already rolling)

1706:20.3 RDO And we're still taxiing down the runway, the clipper one seven three six. (Pan-Am is still on the runway)

1706:19.39 - 1706:23.19 RDO and APP communications caused a shrill noise in KLM cockpit - messages not heard by KLM crew.

1706:25.6 APP Roger alpha one seven three six report when runway clear. (obviously the tower understands [/SIZE][SIZE=-1]clearly[/SIZE][SIZE=-1] that the Pan-Am 747 is still on the runway)

1706:29.6 RDO OK, we'll report when we're clear.
APP Thank you




Now, exactly what part of the accident did you think I needed to study up on?

[/SIZE]

 

[A Squared]

May I ask what experience you may have in LVP ops? It is not a normal procedure to have two aircraft on the same runway at the same time, maybe years ago but not now, and for a very good reason.

I suspect that today's LVP's were not in effect then, likely they were a direct result of that accident.

 

[Say Again Over]

square

Please pull your head out of the sand, unless you were in one of the aircraft, you don't know what was heard in one cockpit or the other, your transcript is derived from the ATC tapes. If two transmissions are made at the same time, you have no idea what the other guy is hearing unless you are on the flight deck. I am not so likely to believe all the BS the accident investigators would like you to believe.

 

[A Squared]

Please pull your head out of the sand, unless you were in one of the aircraft, you don't know what was heard in one cockpit or the other, your transcript is derived from the ATC tapes. If two transmissions are made at the same time, you have no idea what the other guy is hearing unless you are on the flight deck. I am not so likely to believe all the BS the accident investigators would like you to believe.

OH, wow, you're really out there! Pull my head out of the sand? Now there's an intelligent agrument?

OK, here's an idea: instead of posting vauge irrelevancies like "check into the accident" "Pull your head out" why don't you state specifically, which statements of mine you think are incorrect, and why you think they are incorrect?

Now, about the transcript: Even if it *were* a transcript of only ATC's tape (it's not, it's the composite of ATC tape, Pan-Am's CVR and KLM's CVR) it shows very clearly that hte tower controller knew that Pan-Am was on hte runway, and it shows clearly that a the controller did not issue a takeoff clearence. Those are the points I was making. If you disagree, I'd be happy to discuss it, but please present your reasons for disagreeing in some sort of a mature, cohesive, manner, instead of ranting about "pulling your head out"

Deal?

I think we will find that the visibility may have played a big part, (in the takeoff incident at ANC)

Nope, here's METARS from that day

PANC 051053Z 01015G22KT 10SM CLR M09/M20 A2979
PANC 051453Z 01016G24KT 10SM CLR M09/M19 A2982
PANC 051653Z 01016KT 10SM FEW200 M09/M21 A2985
PANC 051853Z 01013G17KT 10SM FEW200 M09/M20 A2987
PANC 052053Z 36013KT 10SM FEW200 M08/M20 A2989
PANC 052253Z 01011KT 10SM FEW200 M07/M21 A2990
PANC 060153Z 01012KT 10SM FEW200 M07/M20 A2993
PANC 060353Z 36008KT 10SM CLR M08/M18 A2996
PANC 060553Z 36008KT 10SM CLR M09/M18 A2996
PANC 060753Z 01007KT 10SM CLR M10/M18 A2998
PANC 060953Z 18004KT 10SM FEW200 M13/M19 A2996

Looks like visibility wasn't much of a problem.