Mechanics, crew faulted in MD-82 engine fire

[Bringupthebird]

There are probably items related to information contained in the final weight and balance that comes across ACARS. In an effort to improve on-time performance they'd rather clog up the taxiways with aircraft "waiting for their numbers" than come up with a streamlined method of computing performance that could be done at the gate.

 

[aa73]

What on earth is on it (that can't be done before taxiing?)

Patriot.... you are dealing with years on top of years of ancestral worship at good old AA. There are LOTS of stuff we could at the gate, or before taxiing, but we don't.

However -

Just recently, they changed to a Before Taxi checklist now where we set the flaps prior to releasing parking brakes (and we turn on packs, isolation switch, flight controls, etc.)

That said, it's all still verified on the before T/O checklist. Here it is:

Takeoff data & bugs
T/R panel
MCP/Radios
Flaps
Stab trim
Autobrakes
Anti ice
Map display
(when cleared onto runway)
T/O PA
Packs
Lights

Now you know why we taxi so slow!

Like I said, most of that can be done prior to brake release, a couple even at the gate. But getting AA to adapt to 21st century procedures takes a long time.

p.s. some of this may be inaccurate as I've only been flying relief pilot for the past two months.:smash:

 

[Golden Falcon]

WASHINGTON (AP) -- American Airlines failed to catch repeated errors by mechanics before a September 2007 flight that made an emergency landing after one of its engines caught fire during departure.
The 143 people onboard weren't injured, but the incident could have become catastrophic because of additional mistakes by the flight crew, members of the National Transportation Safety Board said Tuesday.
The four-member board recommended changes in pilot training programs to take into account simultaneous emergencies.
The findings come as American faces heightened scrutiny by the Federal Aviation Administration.
The agency recently assigned a special team of 17 inspectors to examine American's aircraft maintenance and other operations. The special audit is expected to take about three months.
The NTSB's hearing on Tuesday was held to examine the Sept. 28, 2007 incident in which American Flight 1400's left engine caught fire during a departure climb from Lambert-St. Louis International Airport.
The MD-82, a mid-sized airliner, returned to the airport, but fire had damaged the aircraft's hydraulic system so that the plane's rudder wasn't functioning and the nose landing gear failed to extend during an initial landing attempt. A second attempt was successful.
While there were no injuries, the plane sustained substantial damage.
American spokesman Tim Wagner said the airline is changing training procedures for mechanics and pilots as a result of the incident, and hiring more auditors to review maintenance work.
NTSB's issues "were with our personnel not following our procedures rather than any problem with our procedures," he said.
Investigators said the engine had had repeated trouble starting beginning 10 days before the incident. Maintenance crews replaced a starter valve six times during that period. On the day of the incident, the engine again failed to start when the plane was at the gate and had to be started manually a second time before Flight 1400 took off.
It turned out mechanics had failed to properly maintain a metal air filter, which disintegrated, investigators said. The destruction of the filter led to a series of other mechanical problems, including a bent pin, which helped caused the engine fire.
During the fire, the flight crew made several mistakes that acerbated the problem and could have led to a more serious accident, investigators said.
The pilot interrupted his emergency checklist to inform passengers of the trouble, which delayed his shut-off of fuel to the fire and allowed the fire to burn longer, investigators said. That led to the damage to the hydraulic system, they said.
"We probably wouldn't be here talking if he had done that checklist in a timely manner," investigator Dave Tew said.
The co-pilot was engaged in trying to wrestle the cockpit door closed after the fire partially shutdown the aircraft's electrical system, which released the automatic door lock, they said.
"It seems to me it was a series of people taking shortcuts that accumulated on this particular day into what could have been much more catastrophic," said safety board member Kitty Higgins.
Last August, the FAA asked American to pay a $7.1 million civil penalty -- one of the largest ever assessed against an airline -- for continuing to fly two jets after an FAA inspector and American's own mechanics found problems with their autopilot systems.
American, a unit of Fort Worth-based AMR Corp., operates the world's largest fleet of MD-80 series planes, with 275 of them. When oil prices spiked last year, American stepped up plans to replace them with more fuel-efficient jets, but that will take years.
As they age, the MD-80s are facing more maintenance issues. Last July, the FAA ordered airlines to inspect certain MD-80 models -- including most of American's -- for cracks on overwing frames. Last April, American grounded its entire MD-80 fleet to repack the electrical wiring, causing the cancellation of more than 3,000 flights.
Associated Press Writer David Koenig in Dallas contributed to this report.

aviate, navigate, communicate, all airplanes small or large...still applies..intersting what AA's SOP's dictate...ours are clear...

 

[aa73]

aviate, navigate, communicate, all airplanes small or large...still applies..intersting what AA's SOP's dictate...ours are clear...

as are ours... but i'm sure you'll NEVER do stuff out of order the next time you get multiple emergencies and have no clue as to what's going on.

my point is this.... it's very easy to sit here and point out the correct way to do stuff, SOPs, nitpick the small stuff while sitting comfortably in your chair at home. this crew was dealing with multiple emergencies at low altitude. the CA had a small break in his checklist and chose to inform his pax. big deal.

they got the jet down safely with no harm. if anything, they DID aviate, navigate and communicate.... all with multiple emergencies! cut them some slack. you don't see Sully getting crucified for forgetting the ditch switch and making a PA while at the same time flying the a/c, do you?

 

[Colonel Savage]

Maybe that's where he got the idea from, "Hey, Sully did it, must be oooo-taaay!!"

 

[jimcav]

F**k all those monday morning quarterbacks! Nobody got hurt, no metal was bent, f**k them! How much experience does Kitty Higgins have in large jets? Has she ever walked a mile in that crew's shoes?

 

[Amish RakeFight]

It's called making an example of someone. Someone needs to be left holding the bag. Plain and simple. Those guys did fine in my eyes, FWIW.

 

[A Squared]

Yeah I know this is an old thread, but it's new to me.

He probably delayed the checklist by 20 seconds max. ............ I love how they did not mention how many seconds he delayed the checklist by. .

Actually, they do in the report. it was a full 2 minutes between when the second item on the checklist was accomplished (throttle idle) and the checklist was resumed after the captain had finished chatting with the stewardesses.


From the NTSB report: "The checklist states that, if the Engine Fire light remains illuminated after these two steps are taken, which it did in the accident airplane, the fuel lever should be moved to the OFF position, and the engine fire handle should be pulled."

The report doesn't mention any thing about pauses, or waiting any particular amount of time after pulling hte throttle to idle. The report further states:

An American Airlines captain and check airman stated that, if there was a fire indication in the cockpit, he expected that the checklist would be completed 95 percent of the time without stopping. He added that, if there was an engine fire, it would make sense that “you would at least close the fuel control lever, pull the fire handle, and shoot a bottle at a minimum.”

Maybe I'm missing something here but it seems tough to justify stopping a fire checklist for 2 minutes to talk to people who don't necessarily need to be talked to right then, when you have a fire.

It was 4 minutes from when the fire warning went off until the fire extinguisher was discharged. FO had called through 1500 a minute prior to the fire bell, they were in VFR conditions, and already configured for climb, so it wasn't like it happened at v2 on a 600RVR takeoff.

 

[ron burgundy]

A - Aircraft--fly it
B - Bold face/immediate action items--do them
C - Checklist/QRH--read it
D - Data, landing distances, inflight min control speed, whatever--compute it
E - Emergency -- declare one

F, G, H, I, J, K, L, M, N, O,

P - P.A.--make one

F, G, H, I, J, K, L, M, N, O,
Frig Great High Iincome Just Kill Lorenzo My Nightmares Over

 

[BrickTop]

Did I hear right AA did something stupid and fired the crew? If so whynot march right over to FSDO and slap the FAA jockey in his mouth. At that point whats to lose....