Southwest Airlines plans ten percent annual growth into the foreseeable future. As Southwest Airlines grows in dominance and size, is it outgrowing its culture? Recent accidents and incidents might indicate something is up with the way they fly and their perspective on safety. Three recent articles are part of the customary corporate damage control after an incident or accident. Most notably, a January 12 interview of Mark Clayton, the Director of Safety at Southwest Airlines with “Air Safety Week,” a January 9 article and “Wall Street Journal,” (WSJ) and a December interview with the Southwest Airlines CEO by the WSJ.
The current industry standard flying into very low visibility conditions is accomplished by means of a “monitored approach” procedure which is an autopilot approach closely monitored by both pilots actively and equally and culminates in a autopilot landing or autopilot missed approach. However, Southwest uses a Head Up Display (HUD) instead. This is fine piece of equipment, but it is only on the captain’s side of the aircraft. The first officer does not have access to the same level of precise information as the captain and is therefore less able to identify a less than favorable approach and landing developing.
The HUD was originally deployed widely in fighter aircraft where a single pilot had to manage a tremendous amount of information and keep his “head up” outside the cockpit and away from the instrument panel to keep from running into the ground. The projection of instrument panel information on the cockpit front window canopy was the solution.
In the interview with “Aviation Safety Week” (Jan 12, 2006), Mark Clayton, Director of Flight Safety at Southwest, was asked “How do you provide skill in the use of the HUD for your first officers, because they don’t have a HUD to look through?” His response is that the first officers are familiarized with the equipment during training. “They are very familiar with the symbology, and they have the opportunity to use it in the simulator.” Knowing how it works and getting familiar with it in a simulator is laudable, but not having access to it when it is really needed--during the approach and landing--would seem to be a liability.
In response to the issue of insisting on hand flying the aircraft in very low visibility conditions without automation, Mr. Clayton’s response was “you can do that with autoland, but this fits nicely into our culture, where we really promote hand-flying the airplane. We develop our pilot skills not only with the number of segments we fly on a given day, but we encourage them flying the airplane and minimizing the use of automation. Using the HUD promotes hand flying, so we can hand-fly this airplane down to … 50 feet above touchdown. It takes a very high skill level, but it works very nicely into our culture and philosophy.”
A “very high skill level” indeed. A single pilot hand flying a 150,000 pound aircraft with 150 people to within the vertical distance of less than two hash marks on a football field to a five-foot wide stripe on piece of pavement that cannot yet be seen is quite a skill. But, unless Southwest is an aviation Lake Wobegon where everyone is above average, every day, then procedures need to used where the average pilot can execute a low visibility approach as this with certainty of success. Further, the frequent "segments we fly on a given day" would seem at the end of the day to leave the pilot quite fatigued, not honed to perfection.
While most of the industry has decidedly moved to more automation and more crew involvement so that two pilots can closely monitor flight path deviations, Southwest continues in “minimizing the use of automation” because it “works very nicely into our culture and philosophy.” Culture and philosophy are nice, but studies of decades of aviation accidents have led to two very strong conclusions: automation, when used properly, and the crew concept are extremely powerful accident prevention programs. What “culture and philosophy” is Mr Clayton referring to? Is this the culture which military fighter pilots found so popular during the early years of the airline? Yes, it takes a "very high skill" level to fly one of these approaches and the hubris of 'we are too good for automation' could be questioned.
More HUDs are coming online with other airlines and the International Federation of Air Line Pilots’ Associations (IFALPA) is endorsing has endorsed its use. However, the endorsement was contingent upon both pilots having one. “If a HUD adds significantly to safety, then giving it to only 50 percent of the team is viewed by IFALPA as counterintuitive,” Aviation Today reports. But they go on to say that “cost-conscious airlines probably will resist IFALPA’s call for dual installation.” Until recently, a similar argument was made against hardened cockpit doors.
Several years ago, Korean Airlines was the bane of the international commercial aviation with the Guam accident prompting their executives to consider strong medicine. Against major opposition from both management and pilots, they got outside help to restore their airline. While organizational retooling was difficult “transforming Korean Air's cockpit culture proved trickier,” the Wall Street Journal (9 Jan, 2006) reports. The WSJ states “Communication in the cockpit ‘was stifled sometimes to the point of being nonexistent,’ says Dave Greenberg, a former head of flight operations at Delta who joined Korean Air in January 2000 as its executive vice president of operations.”
To apply the lessons learned in western commercial aviation and “to change the way its pilots interacted, instructors took Korean Air's pilots in pairs and made them share responsibilities.” Further “it also reduced hiring from the South Korean military, whose fighter pilots, as in most air forces, were used to being their own bosses in the cockpit.”
This and many other initiatives succeeded. The WSJ said recently “the International Air Transport Association, a trade group for the world's major airlines, gave its imprimatur, certifying that Korean Air had achieved ‘the highest standards and best practices for safety’ ” in recent audits.
Does the culture at Southwest need to change? Despite recent runway accidents, their safety record is unmatched in the industry. But the recent accidents are certainly of concern in that they could be flagging a trend. In the most recent accident the NTSB states that after landing and noting the lack of “braking effectiveness…the first officer … moved his seat farther forward, and also applied maximum braking.”
During a low visibility tailwind approach to a short runway at night, the first officer was not in a position to equally assist, if required, in the management of the landing phase of this flight. Quite remarkable. Are first officers generally out of position at Southwest to make a difference due to a "culture and philosophy" that relegates them to an observer? Was this a result of this captain ‘being his own boss’ and excluding the other pilot? The first officer being out of the loop while the captain flew the HUD? Or perhaps just a simple oversight on today’s flight? Anecdotal to be sure, but significant enough to be in the NTSB initial report.
Southwest Airlines’ CEO Gary Kelly said recently “our primary goal, at this point, is to pinpoint the cause or causes of this accident and make any necessary correction” (WSJ Dec 19, 2005). The NTSB will also provide some insight. In the meantime, Southwest's review of flight operations will be a useful tool to see if they can adjust to flying coast to coast with many new pilots as they expand from a 4,000 pilot group to one with over 10,000 in the coming years.
http://www.aviationtoday.com/reports/southwest.htm
http://www.aviationtoday.com/sia/20020701.htm
http://online.wsj.com/public/article/SB113676875085241209-XOg5mhjR05asNu0AUMefYPSB_XU_20060115.html?mod=regionallinks
http://www.ntsb.gov/Pressrel/2005/051215.htm
http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/05353/624857.stm
The current industry standard flying into very low visibility conditions is accomplished by means of a “monitored approach” procedure which is an autopilot approach closely monitored by both pilots actively and equally and culminates in a autopilot landing or autopilot missed approach. However, Southwest uses a Head Up Display (HUD) instead. This is fine piece of equipment, but it is only on the captain’s side of the aircraft. The first officer does not have access to the same level of precise information as the captain and is therefore less able to identify a less than favorable approach and landing developing.
The HUD was originally deployed widely in fighter aircraft where a single pilot had to manage a tremendous amount of information and keep his “head up” outside the cockpit and away from the instrument panel to keep from running into the ground. The projection of instrument panel information on the cockpit front window canopy was the solution.
In the interview with “Aviation Safety Week” (Jan 12, 2006), Mark Clayton, Director of Flight Safety at Southwest, was asked “How do you provide skill in the use of the HUD for your first officers, because they don’t have a HUD to look through?” His response is that the first officers are familiarized with the equipment during training. “They are very familiar with the symbology, and they have the opportunity to use it in the simulator.” Knowing how it works and getting familiar with it in a simulator is laudable, but not having access to it when it is really needed--during the approach and landing--would seem to be a liability.
In response to the issue of insisting on hand flying the aircraft in very low visibility conditions without automation, Mr. Clayton’s response was “you can do that with autoland, but this fits nicely into our culture, where we really promote hand-flying the airplane. We develop our pilot skills not only with the number of segments we fly on a given day, but we encourage them flying the airplane and minimizing the use of automation. Using the HUD promotes hand flying, so we can hand-fly this airplane down to … 50 feet above touchdown. It takes a very high skill level, but it works very nicely into our culture and philosophy.”
A “very high skill level” indeed. A single pilot hand flying a 150,000 pound aircraft with 150 people to within the vertical distance of less than two hash marks on a football field to a five-foot wide stripe on piece of pavement that cannot yet be seen is quite a skill. But, unless Southwest is an aviation Lake Wobegon where everyone is above average, every day, then procedures need to used where the average pilot can execute a low visibility approach as this with certainty of success. Further, the frequent "segments we fly on a given day" would seem at the end of the day to leave the pilot quite fatigued, not honed to perfection.
While most of the industry has decidedly moved to more automation and more crew involvement so that two pilots can closely monitor flight path deviations, Southwest continues in “minimizing the use of automation” because it “works very nicely into our culture and philosophy.” Culture and philosophy are nice, but studies of decades of aviation accidents have led to two very strong conclusions: automation, when used properly, and the crew concept are extremely powerful accident prevention programs. What “culture and philosophy” is Mr Clayton referring to? Is this the culture which military fighter pilots found so popular during the early years of the airline? Yes, it takes a "very high skill" level to fly one of these approaches and the hubris of 'we are too good for automation' could be questioned.
More HUDs are coming online with other airlines and the International Federation of Air Line Pilots’ Associations (IFALPA) is endorsing has endorsed its use. However, the endorsement was contingent upon both pilots having one. “If a HUD adds significantly to safety, then giving it to only 50 percent of the team is viewed by IFALPA as counterintuitive,” Aviation Today reports. But they go on to say that “cost-conscious airlines probably will resist IFALPA’s call for dual installation.” Until recently, a similar argument was made against hardened cockpit doors.
Several years ago, Korean Airlines was the bane of the international commercial aviation with the Guam accident prompting their executives to consider strong medicine. Against major opposition from both management and pilots, they got outside help to restore their airline. While organizational retooling was difficult “transforming Korean Air's cockpit culture proved trickier,” the Wall Street Journal (9 Jan, 2006) reports. The WSJ states “Communication in the cockpit ‘was stifled sometimes to the point of being nonexistent,’ says Dave Greenberg, a former head of flight operations at Delta who joined Korean Air in January 2000 as its executive vice president of operations.”
To apply the lessons learned in western commercial aviation and “to change the way its pilots interacted, instructors took Korean Air's pilots in pairs and made them share responsibilities.” Further “it also reduced hiring from the South Korean military, whose fighter pilots, as in most air forces, were used to being their own bosses in the cockpit.”
This and many other initiatives succeeded. The WSJ said recently “the International Air Transport Association, a trade group for the world's major airlines, gave its imprimatur, certifying that Korean Air had achieved ‘the highest standards and best practices for safety’ ” in recent audits.
Does the culture at Southwest need to change? Despite recent runway accidents, their safety record is unmatched in the industry. But the recent accidents are certainly of concern in that they could be flagging a trend. In the most recent accident the NTSB states that after landing and noting the lack of “braking effectiveness…the first officer … moved his seat farther forward, and also applied maximum braking.”
During a low visibility tailwind approach to a short runway at night, the first officer was not in a position to equally assist, if required, in the management of the landing phase of this flight. Quite remarkable. Are first officers generally out of position at Southwest to make a difference due to a "culture and philosophy" that relegates them to an observer? Was this a result of this captain ‘being his own boss’ and excluding the other pilot? The first officer being out of the loop while the captain flew the HUD? Or perhaps just a simple oversight on today’s flight? Anecdotal to be sure, but significant enough to be in the NTSB initial report.
Southwest Airlines’ CEO Gary Kelly said recently “our primary goal, at this point, is to pinpoint the cause or causes of this accident and make any necessary correction” (WSJ Dec 19, 2005). The NTSB will also provide some insight. In the meantime, Southwest's review of flight operations will be a useful tool to see if they can adjust to flying coast to coast with many new pilots as they expand from a 4,000 pilot group to one with over 10,000 in the coming years.
http://www.aviationtoday.com/reports/southwest.htm
http://www.aviationtoday.com/sia/20020701.htm
http://online.wsj.com/public/article/SB113676875085241209-XOg5mhjR05asNu0AUMefYPSB_XU_20060115.html?mod=regionallinks
http://www.ntsb.gov/Pressrel/2005/051215.htm
http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/05353/624857.stm
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