The FAA knew of, and disapproved of the AAN operational concept for several years before taking this action. In short, AAN offered to perform the duties of an air carrier (with the full approval of their local FSDO and it's designated POI) for any private company wishing to do business as an air carrier without obtaining their own air carrier certificate. A monthly fee was paid to AAN to perform these duties. Many of these operators were former certificate holders who no longer had operating authority for a variety of reasons.
AAN also operated a pay-for-training FO program that catered mainly to foriegn pilots trying to build enough time to get their ATP and get their foot in the door of the charter business. These guys would pay AAN for the aircraft specific training, (either in-house or at a 142 center) the indoc and would then be placed with various companies operating on AAN's certificate as jet FOs. They would be provided with quarters and a small living allowance by these operators. The kids got the flight time/experience and the operators got cheap labor. Many of the 25+ DBAs listed in their OpSpecs are/were what I, and many other charter pilots I know have come to refer to as "bottom feeders." (polite version!) While there may have indeed been exceptions, the two companies I worked for on this certificate, and several others I had exposure to, fit this description accurately. I won't even start on the subject of accidents and violations since I don't have the specific instances at hand to quote from. Suffice to say that when the FAA finds a pattern of safety issues, their most effective people are eventually assigned to the case until a final resolution of the matter is reached.
On the surface, AAN appeared to provide all the operational control, crew duty and qualification tracking, aircraft mx tracking and other normal certificate holder responsibilities as well as or better than most single DBA carriers. They had an impressive manual and operational control procedures on paper. Whether this was true in practice was the subject of a long FAA investigation. Whenever an issue was brought up, AAN addressed it with a new procedure or policy. Theirs is the most restrictive and paperwork intensive company manual I have seen to date. Trouble is, some of their "customers" kept getting into trouble and bending metal. Some lives were lost as well.
The family who ran this company were always kind to me personally. I have no axe to grind and I feel badly that things turned out this way for them. As a matter of fact, I personally benefitted greatly from the experience of working for bottom feeders who could not have operated without a certificate to "piggy back" on. I was lucky enough to be able to get in this business without having to pay for OJT and so were a few people I know. On the other hand, responsibilty and accountability demand that a higher standard than that exhibited by AAN's overall operation be enforced by the FAA. What the FAA cited in their press release is only the tip of the iceberg they found when they went looking. Should this action ever go to a courtroom, the rest of the evidence will be made public. For this reason alone, I suspect this matter will quietly fade into obscurity.
I expect that other pilots who had dealings with this organization may have had different experiences or formed different impressions than I did. If so, I will be happy to read them here. Balancing how much I benefitted against how risky and shady these operations were will always leave me with mixed feelings on the matter. Another chapter in aviation history closed.
Best,